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S U M M A RY
Traditional authentication systems are considered persistent as they rarely limit
the time the authentication is valid. Conversely, sensor-based authentication sys-
tems are considered transient as they allow continuous authentication of the
users.
In this thesis we present Persistent Authentication for Location-based Services,
as a new approach to authentication that combines traditional access control sys-
tems with the sensing technologies and tracking capabilities offered by smart
environments. Persistent authentication enables the secure provision of location-
based services through non-intrusive authentication of mobile users in a smart
environment. The objective is to shift the current authentication paradigm from
a single discrete event to a continuous session. This is accomplished by utilising
the contextual awareness provided by the smart environments to track princi-
pals from the point of initial authentication to the point where authorisation is
requested by the location-based services.
Facial recognition and appearance analysis are integrated in the persistent au-
thentication system as remote biometric experts that operate at a distance and
require no interaction from the users. The experts perform continuous authentica-
tion by processing samples of the biometric modalities as they become available.
Combining scores from multiple biometric experts is known as sensor fusion.
A common challenge in this field is that the results from evaluating different
biometric characteristic are usually incompatible, as they have different score
ranges as well as different probability distributions. Error-rate-based fusion is
presented as a novel fusion technique that transforms individual scores, from
different biometric systems, into objective evidences and combine them using
Bayesian inference.
Persistent authentication offers an effective integrated protection measure that
is distributed directly in the facility and is non-intrusive to the public and af-
fordable to the facility owners. Persistent authentication is suitable for security
sensitive applications and can help protect the facility against insiders, intruders
and hostile reconnaissance.
v

R E S U M É
Traditionelle autentificeringssystemer anses som vedvarende da de sjældent be-
grænser den tid autentificeringen er gyldig. Omvendt, betragtes sensorbaserede
autentificeringssystemer som transiente, da de tillader kontinuerlig autentificer-
ing af brugerne.
I denne afhandling præsenterer vi Persistent Authentication for Location-based
Services, som ny tilgang til autentificering der kombinere traditionelle adgangskon-
trolsystemer med sensor teknologi og sporing i smarte miljøer. Persistent Authen-
tication muliggøre sikre lokationsbaserede tjenester gennem ikke-invasiv auten-
tificering af mobile brugere i smarte miljøer. Formålet er at ændre det nuværende
autentificeringsparadigme fra en diskret begivenhed til en kontinuerlig session.
Dette opnås ved at udnytte de kontekstuelle faktorer fra det smarte miljø til at
spore brugerene fra deres indledende autentificering til det punkt hvor autentifi-
ceringen skal bruges af de lokationsbaserede tjenester.
Biometriske eksperter der udfører ansigtsgenkendelse og analyse af udseende
er integreret i systemet. Disse eksperter opererer på afstand og kræver ingen in-
teraktion fra brugerne. Eksperterne foretager løbende autentificering ved at pro-
cessere prøver af de biometriske modaliteter som de er tilgængelig.
Kombinationen af scorer fra flere biometriske eksperter er kendt som sensor
fusion. En udfordring i sensor fusion er at resultaterne fra evalueringen af de
forskellige biometriske modaliteter kan være uforenelige, da de har forskellige
score intervaller og sandsynlighedsfordelinger. Error-based-fusion præsenteres
som en ny fusions metode der omdanner de individuelle score fra forskellige
biometriske systemer til objektive beviser der kombineres ved hjælp af Bayesiansk
interferens.
Persistent Authentication er en effektiv integreret beskyttelsesforanstaltning
der distribueres direkte i bygningerne. Persistent Authentication er ikke-invasiv
for brugerne og økonomisk overkommelig for bygningsejerne. Persistent Au-
thentication er tiltænkt sikkerhedsfølsomme anvendelser og kan hjælpe med at
beskytte bygninger mod eksterne og interne trusler.
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Part I
S E C U R E B U I L D I N G S

1
I N T RO D U C T I O N
As the presence of technology progressively increases to pervade our urban envi-
ronment it is envisaged that the advancements and protection measures employed
to secure buildings, too, will become truly pervasive. In the editor’s foreword
to Homeland Security [1], Reiter et al. state that for secure buildings, the pri-
mary advancements considered are pervasive technologies that involve the use
of surveillance, access control, and data analysis to detect patterns of activities
that presage attacks. These technologies help prevent unauthorised entry and ac-
cess and play a major role in preventing, detecting, and providing early warning
of attacks.
This thesis focuses on two of the main research topics in pervasive computing:
analysing sensor-based person tracking technologies and identifying anomalous
behaviour using a given set of sensors; both person tracking and anomaly detec-
tion are large and active research areas that will be investigated in the context
of detecting offenders and disrupting their attack plans. The contributions in this
thesis are to implement and integrate the appropriate technologies from these ar-
eas to form an effective situational protection measure, which will be evaluated
with respect to the given context.
State of the art protection measures that are developed and implemented in the
absence of contextual information are of limited effectiveness. In security anal-
ysis, humans are identified as both the most important and the weakest point in
the implementation of security. Thus, there is a need for a new approach that inte-
grates human and organisational factors at the design stage, and merges security
requirements with the complex constraints of inhabitable environments.
With regard to building security, human threats can be divided into three
groups:
• Illegitimate access. Attacks conducted by individuals who gain unautho-
rised entry into restricted areas, either through infiltration, tailgating or
forced entry.
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• Insiders. Attacks conducted by individuals who belong to the target organ-
isation or have other affiliations that grant them authorisation to access
restricted areas.
• Hostile reconnaissance. Scouting of the organisation prior to an attack,
which is an integral part of the operational activity for offenders.
Buildings can be analysed as designed artefacts that gives rise to specific pat-
terns of human interaction and behaviour, such as varying movement degrees,
strategic points of interaction, or secluded spaces for quiet conversations. These
behavioural patterns and the general accessibility of buildings are governed by
the application of access control. Access control systems introduce restrictions
on the permissible movement degrees and help protect valuable parts of the build-
ing from unauthorised entry. However, it is often practicality and cost objectives,
rather than security concerns, which guide the development and deployment of
access control systems.
Access control systems generally require two tasks to govern accessibility:
authentication and authorisation. Authentication verifies the identity of the per-
son requesting access and authorisation determines whether access should be
granted according to the specified access control policy. Access control must be
performed at all entry points to protected facilities, which generally means that
authentication must also be performed. Repetitive re-authentications require at-
tention from the users and reduce the usability of the overall system. Moreover,
the cost of installing authentication devices on every entry point may be pro-
hibitive in many contexts. This combination of poor usability and cost generally
results in a coarse granularity of the access control system.
Access control systems with low usability are at the risk of being compromised
by the very users it is trying to protect. Users may leave doors open or share ac-
cess cards or passwords to reduce the repetitive re-authentications. Mark Weiser
states, in his vision of ubiquitous computing, that technology must be calm [2] in
order to allow users to focus on their primary tasks. This implies that any authen-
tication or authorisation technology should require minimal attention from the
users. Further, the advances in technology have made us used to, and even come
to expect, that technology is ever-present. Weiser predicted that: “Next comes
ubiquitous computing, or the age of calm technology, when technology recedes
into the background of our lives.” [3], and technology has receded, not only into
4
1.1 C O N T E X T UA L AWA R E N E S S
the background of our lives, but into the very environment in which we interact.
Technology embedded into the environment in this way makes the environment
smart and may be defined as “a small world where all kinds of smart devices are
continuously working to make inhabitants’ lives more comfortable” [4, p. 3].
Smart devices embedded in the environment in this way may help in the au-
thentication of inhabitants and could be equally suited for determining the lo-
cation of these inhabitants. As such, indoor positioning systems have seen an in-
crease in popularity in recent years. In particular, tracking of inhabitants in indoor
environments have become vital in hospitals to locate and page staff, in homes
for elderly people, and in industry for applications in logistics, warehousing and
automation. Ideally, the provision of such services are completely transparent to
the users, who simply observe that services are available as they are needed, for
example, doors unlock and open when approached and lights that automatically
turn on when a room is entered.
In this thesis we take a new approach to authentication, by combining tradi-
tional access control systems with the sensing technologies and tracking capa-
bilities offered by smart environments. Our approach is called Persistent Authen-
tication for Location-based Services and extends the underlying authentication
model PAISE, proposed in earlier work by Kirschmeyer et al. [5]. The goal in per-
sistent authentication is to enable the secure provision of location-based services
through calm authentication of mobile users in a smart environment. Our objec-
tive is to shift the current authentication paradigm from a single discrete event to
a continuous session. We accomplish this by utilising the contextual awareness
provided by the smart environment to track principals from the point of initial au-
thentication to the point where authorisation is requested by the location-based
service.
1.1 C O N T E X T UA L AWA R E N E S S
Contextual awareness is generated by smart devices that sense their environment
and record the aspects of their surrounding context. Liberman et al. [6] state that
context depends on where the boundary between the system and the environment
is drawn, as this affects what is considered explicit and implicit in the system. In
this way, context can be any measurable and relevant information and each type
5
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of context is a distinctive element. For smart environments, Schilit et al. [7] de-
fine the three most important aspects of context as being: where you are, who you
are with, and what services are nearby. Moreover, Schilit et al. find the temporal
changes in contexts are important as the same sensory data may have different
meanings according to changes in both time and location.
The key application for contextual awareness in persistent authentication is to
estimate the location of principals as they interact with services in the environ-
ment. We use the contextual awareness provided by the pervasive technologies
to infer the location of principals in consecutive sensory measurements. This
leads to the matching problem, which is the problem of identifying which princi-
pals are corresponding in two following measurements. This requires a similarity
metric to indicate the level of correlation between the principals. In addition, to
avoid the possibility of comparing the similarity metrics of all principals in the
environment, the system must predict the location of each principal in the next
measurement.
The similarity between two individuals can be described by their biometrics,
that is, their intrinsic human traits. For humans, learning to recognise people
just by looking at their face is a fundamental skill that we acquire early in child-
hood [8] [9] and which remains an integral part of our social interactions through-
out life. We use faces to identify people in a group and in addition faces provide
us with information about peoples demographic, including sex, race, and age, as
well as their emotional state. We perceive this information effortlessly and apply
it without conscious thought in our interactions with other people.
When asking a child to draw a face, the result might be two circles for the eyes,
a curved line for the mouth, and perhaps a dot for the nose. While seemingly sim-
ple, these archetypical features represent the basic forms of a face and resemble
the features used in computer vision face detection methods [10] [11]. With these
methods, facial recognition can be used to provide a similarity metric, and have
several advantages over other biometrics such as fingerprints, handprints and iris
recognition, as it is non-intrusive and can be captured remotely, without user
interaction.
In persistent authentication we use facial recognition as a similarity metric to
solve the matching problem by periodically verifying the identity of tracked prin-
cipals. To ensure a calm authentication process, the facial features are captured at
a distance with no interaction required by the principals. The main challenge with
6
1.1 C O N T E X T UA L AWA R E N E S S
this approach is that the process is not completely reliable: the biometric system
may fail to identify a principal, or conversely, may make an incorrect identifica-
tion. The frequency of these errors depends on the discriminative power of the
biometric and the quality of the acquisition process, which is affected by adverse
environmental conditions, such as dust or poor luminosity. These factors are fur-
ther compounded when using remote biometrics, as the quality and resolution
of the captured biometric sample are significantly lower due to the uncontrolled
acquisition process.
To increase the reliability of the biometric verification, multiple biometric
characteristics can be used simultaneously. Common for such an approach is
that the combined system is generally more robust than each of the individual
components. Combining biometrics in this way is known as sensor fusion, and
a common challenge in this field is that the results from evaluating the different
biometric characteristic are usually incompatible, as they have different score
ranges as well as different distributions. Consequently, a sensor fusion technique
is needed.
In this thesis we present error-rate-based fusion, a novel fusion technique that
transforms individual scores from different biometric systems into objective evi-
dences and combine them using Bayesian inference. Error-rate-based fusion uses
the false acceptance and false rejection rates of the biometrics systems to gener-
ate a confidence value that represents the probability that a principal has been
correctly identified.
This combination of persistent authentication, remote biometrics and sensor
fusion forms a robust situational protection measure capable of exploiting con-
textual information, provided by pervasive technology, to address the complex
problems of protecting buildings against human threats and providing secure
location-based services. In essence, the persistent authentication system makes
it possible to perform informed decisions based on the user’s current context, for
instance, detecting that the cleaning personnel are accessing a restricted area, or
that the carrier delivering goods does not go beyond the loading area.
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1.2 E U RO P E A N S E V E N T H F R A M E W O R K P RO G R A M M E
In 2010, the European Union funded the Resilient Infrastructure and Building
Security (RIBS) project under the Seventh Framework Programme to support the
specification of requirements for effective and affordable protection measures.
Focusing on commercial buildings in an urban environment, the RIBS project
was built on the idea that eliciting a set of requirements and making it available
to technology developers would support the development of more satisfactory
security products.
In order to achieve this aim, the RIBS consortium deployed the expertise re-
quired to accurately analyse the problem of requirements engineering, consider-
ing the various factors that could affect the quality of the results. Knowledge in
the areas of business, security and crime science, laws and ethics, architecture
and several fields of science and technology was leveraged to address it.
Over a period of thirty-six months, the RIBS consortium developed and adopted
a multi-disciplinary approach to meet the following objectives:
• To develop a set of requirements for new counter-terrorism protection mea-
sures for commercial buildings.
• To develop a set of measurements that can be used to evaluate the level of
protection offered by candidate security measures proposed to be imple-
mented in buildings and infrastructures.
The tasks carried out to achieve these two objectives contributed to meeting a
broader objective:
• To develop and apply a methodological framework that can support the
development of requirements for physical security measures considering a
range of constraints and objectives.
Several elements within the description of work limited the scope of the project
to prioritise existing buildings and therefore retrofitting and to consider a range
of threats, namely chemical, biological, explosives, and insider or intruder (CBE-
I) agents. This thesis concerns the protection measures developed as part of the
RIBS project to detect and deter insiders and intruder threats.
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Most of the counter-terrorism technologies currently deployed in public spaces
are concentrated at a few sites including airports, embassies and major event
venues. In most cases, the implementation of security procedures has noticeably
affected our behaviour, and simple items such as water bottles are now on the lists
of prohibited objects. In addition, the security technologies acquired to protect us
are relatively expensive, and their intrusiveness and poor efficiency undoubtedly
more widely known than their effectiveness.
In comparison, few counter-terrorism measures exist outside these highly con-
trolled places to protect the population. The large majority of commercial build-
ings and cultural venues, open to the public, are fitted with anti-theft measures,
not counter-terrorism ones. Whilst intelligence agencies claim to have success-
fully disrupted a number of terrorist plots the fact remains that when criminals
are not caught before reaching their destination, terrible damage occurs. Such is
the case with the double bomb attack on the British Consulate and the HSBC
headquarter in Istanbul, and the recent attack on the Marriot hotel in Islamabad.
The cause of the general unpreparedness can be found in the lack of incentives
for most organisations to invest in counter-terrorism equipment. The frequency
of serious terrorist attacks is relatively low in comparison with the number of po-
tential targets, making security investments difficult to justify. At a time where
many European governments reduce public expenditure, it seems justified to ask
whether the cost of security is too high. Additionally, the cost of security is in-
curred in more than monetary expense, and the need for even more security sys-
tems in society is debatable.
Conversely, there is a need for effective integrated protection measures dis-
tributed in the facilities that are non-intrusive to the public and affordable to
the facility owners. At the same time the measures must take into account the
evolving resources and methods of modern terrorists. Motivated by these factors
we present persistent authentication, an effective situational protection measure
for smart environments that detects unauthorised entry and access, and provides
early warning of attacks.
There is a growing interest in surveillance applications, due to the prevalence
of cheap sensors and processors at reasonable costs. Further, the growing matu-
rity of algorithms and processing techniques over the past few years enables the
9
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application of remote surveillance of unattended environments. For sensor-based
person tracking, the type, range and density of sensors embedded into the envi-
ronment depends on the threat scenario and the characteristics of the protected
area. Simple motion detection sensors may be appropriate in sparsely populated
areas, while multiple sensors, possibly of different types, may be needed in more
densely populated areas. Commonly, the most prevalent sensor type found in
critical facilities today are closed-circuit television cameras.
Thus, to ensure the viability of the approach, the implementation must inte-
grate with existing authentication and sensor technologies to minimise cost ob-
jectives and ensure that the privacy of monitored principals are not unnecessarily
compromised.
In persistent authentication we utilise the authentication sessions acquired
from the authentication system, the contextual awareness provided by the smart
environment and the confidence values from the sensor fusion technique to detect
anomalous behaviour and ensure the secure provision of location-based services.
In this way persistent authentication can help protect against terrorism, and in-
directly against other types of (organised) crimes. We recognise the difference
between terrorism and volume crime; however our approach is sufficiently ro-
bust to allow its application to a wider range of security problems.
1.4 O B J E C T I V E S
The goal of this thesis is to develop a novel approach for person authentication in
smart environments to improve the resilience and security of buildings in Europe.
The proposed algorithms are implemented in close cooperation with an European
financial Institute to ensure the viability of the approach. Case studies and eval-
uations are performed to test the system and assess the performance. The case
studies form the basis for the evaluation of the systems persistence, robustness,
and scalability, whereas the evaluation on publicly available datasets ensures the
reproducibility of the results. The main objectives of this thesis are:
1. Shifting the current authentication paradigm from a single discrete event to
a continuous session by developing a secure, calm and persistent authenti-
cation methodology that combines traditional authentication systems with
the sensing capabilities offered by smart environments.
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2. Providing contextual awareness to location-based services by ensuring that
multiple mobile principals are efficiently and robustly authenticated and
tracked while present in the smart environment.
3. Learning contextual and behavioural patterns of the occupants from multi-
ple sources, including the movement and interaction behaviours of princi-
pals in the environment to detect diverging patterns.
1.5 C O N T R I B U T I O N S
This thesis presents four contributions: (1) development and evaluation of per-
sistent authentication, (2) introduction of remote biometrics for continuous user
authentication, (3) formulation of error-rate-based fusion of biometric systems,
and (4) implementation of contextual and behavioural recognition techniques.
1. The contributions to persistent authentication constitute the implementa-
tion of a robust, non-invasive, authentication system for mobile users in a
smart environment that uses closed-circuit television cameras. The result
is a calm approach to authentication, where users are transparently authen-
ticated towards the system.
2. Remote biometrics for continuous user authentication are introduced to
solve the matching problem by periodically verifying the identity of tracked
principals. The contributions include research into the biometric character-
istics suited for continuous evaluation and the implementation and evalua-
tion of these algorithms.
3. A novel sensor fusion scheme is presented to solve a common problem that
occurs in sensor fusion, namely, that the evaluation of multiple biometric
characteristics produce results that are incompatible, due to different score
ranges and different probability distributions. The contributions constitute
the formulation and evaluation of an error-rate-based fusion technique.
4. Data exploration techniques are introduced to identify contextual and be-
havioural patterns in the data. A dedicated tool is developed to process and
structure very large quantities of data, to learn the prevalent patterns with
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regards to the contextual awareness and the spatial configurations of the
environment. The findings are integrated with state of the art data visuali-
sation tools to present the information in a meaningful way.
1.6 T H E S I S O U T L I N E
The presented research is organised in the following way. Part II provides an
overview of the state of the art to frame the further research. Chapter 2 dis-
cusses authentication factors in smart environments, continuous authentication
and biometric characteristics for use in biometric authentication. Following is a
discussion of multi-factor authentication and remote biometrics and finally an
overview of fusion techniques and the problems associated with normalisation
and transformation of score level fusion. Chapter 3 concerns person tracking in
smart environments and provides an overview of tracking techniques and a clas-
sification of different system topologies for positioning systems.
Part III presents the persistent authentication model, the definition of authen-
tication and authorisation zones and the statistical relationship between the mea-
surements and the environment. The pseudo-code for the persistent authentica-
tion algorithm is presented and methods for anomaly detection discussed. Chap-
ter 5 presents error-rate-based fusion, the operational phases of the fusion strat-
egy and how to combine the output of multiple biometric experts into objective
evidences. In addition, the effect of quality on fusion is discussed.
Part IV details the algorithms and techniques used in the implementation of
the camera-based persistent authentication prototype, the tracking algorithm and
the implementation of remote biometric experts.
Part V discusses the evaluation of persistent authentication and consists of a
combination of case studies, scenario-based validations and evaluation on public-
domain datasets. The implementation of the prototype is evaluated on the basis
of its persistence, robustness, and scalability.
Part VI presents our conclusions and contributions and outlines the directions
for future work.
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Part II
S TAT E O F T H E A RT

2
AU T H E N T I C AT I O N I N S M A RT E N V I RO N M E N T S
Authentication is the process of verifying a user’s identity to ensure the integrity,
confidentiality, and availability of a system. The authentication process involves
three phases: enrolment, presentation and evaluation. The enrolment phase pre-
cedes the other two phases and typically happens only once. In this phase infor-
mation about the users are acquired and stored within the authentication system
for later use. In the presentation phase, which occurs every time the user’s iden-
tity needs to be verified, the user’s authentication information is presented to the
system. In the evaluation phase, the newly presented authentication information
is compared to the enrolment record and a decision whether to authenticate the
user is made. Traditionally, for a static authentication process, this decision is
binary: accept or reject.
To implement calm authentication, users must be continuously authenticated
in an unobtrusive way, i.e., not requiring their participation. Alternatively, users
can be authenticated at a single, strategic, location and have the smart devices
embedded in the environment facilitate their authentication by providing the au-
thentication information to the location-based services as they are requested.
Existing authentication methodologies outline three basic factors that can be
used to authenticate principals [12]:
1. Something the user knows (e.g., a password or passphrase).
2. Something the user has (e.g., an access card or smart-card).
3. Something the user is (e.g., biometric characteristics, such as a finger-
print).
These factors are considered device-centric, if the authentication is based on
possession, i.e., something the user has, or user-centric if the authentication is
based on knowledge or inherence, i.e., something the user knows or is. The fac-
tors may either require active participation, such as swiping a smart-card or using
a fingerprint scanner, or no interaction, for instance carrying a wireless authen-
tication device or being subject to a remote biometric scanner. A multi-factor
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authentication system combines two or more of these factors and provides a
higher degree of assurance than a single-factor system [13], as it is more difficult
to forge or obtain several authentication samples at the same time. By definition
true multi-factor authentication requires two authentication factors from different
categories. Combining multiple factors from the same category also increases the
security of the system, but it does not constitute multi-factor authentication [14].
Bardram et al. [15] [16] note that ubiquitous computing implies a shift in the
use of computers, moving from a ‘one-to-one’ to a ‘many-to-many’ relationship
between users and computers. This change in paradigms creates new usability
challenges for computer security, especially user authentication, as the contem-
porary user authentication schemes are not calm. When using a personal com-
puter for everyday tasks this is only a minor inconvenience, but in some work
environments it poses substantial usability problems.
Bardram et al. base their research on studies of medical work at several large
Danish hospitals [17] [18], where they observed that it was not uncommon that
clinicians would log in 30 times a day on various devices. As a result, users would
avoid logging out, share passwords or hand over sessions to one another, which
compromised the security of the system. To make the authentication system calm,
Bardram et al., proposed location-based authentication, a concept that builds
upon the founding work of Denning et al. [19]. They define a proximity-based
user authentication mechanism using wireless tokens that supplements the exist-
ing authentication methodologies with information about the location of users.
This “allows users to be authenticated on a device simply by approaching it
physically”. Consequently location can be integrated as the fourth factor in the
classical user authentication methodologies.
2.1 C O N T I N U O U S AU T H E N T I C AT I O N
Traditional authentication systems provide point-of-entry authentication, e.g., the
username and password combination, where the user’s identity is not verified
subsequently after the initial authentication. In many situations, such discrete
authentication mechanisms are not sufficient. Corner and Noble [20] [21] [22]
investigate this problem and define traditional authentication mechanisms as per-
sistent because they rarely limit the duration that the authentication is valid. As
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a result, a user may leave a device logged in for a prolonged period of time and
anyone who gains physical access to the device may usurp the authentication of
the original user.
Consequently, Corner and Noble define a continuous authentication mecha-
nism, where all data in the system are encrypted and a small authentication token,
worn by the user, is required to provide access to the encrypted data. The token
stores the cryptographic keys and continuously authenticate the user’s presence
over a short-range, wireless link. This combination of continuous authentication
with the evaluation of the user’s location ensures that access is only granted when
the user and the token is in close proximity to the system. Conversely, Corner and
Noble define this authentication approach as transient as the system can react to
any changes that might affect the user’s authentication session.
Typically, continuous authentication systems implement multi-factor authen-
tication to increase the level of security and to lessen intrusiveness. To min-
imise the disruption of the user’s work, Corner and Noble propose the use of
a knowledge-based factor for point-of-entry authentication and an unobtrusive
possession-based factor for all subsequent verifications. As a result, we can dis-
tinguish between the active stage of continuous authentication, where the initial
authentication of the user occurs, and the passive stage, where the continuing
presentation and evaluation of the user’s identity are performed.
The definitions of continuous authentication by Corner and Noble and the con-
cept of location-based authentication by Bardram et al., are device-centric as both
require the presence of an authentication token. This puts additional restrictions
on the users, e.g., that they have to wear the authentication token and creates
problems when tokens are forgotten, borrowed, lost, or stolen. Furthermore, it
shifts the problem of authentication from the user to the token, which introduces
additional vulnerabilities in the system concerning the integrity of the device and
its communication.
Wireless communications are susceptible to a range of attacks, including man-
in-the-middle, proxy and replay attacks from adversaries intercepting data trans-
mitted between devices. A detailed discussion of these vulnerabilities are beyond
the scope of this thesis, but it is noted that the impact of these attacks are well
studied in the field of computer security and that the severity of these vulnerabil-
ities can be mitigated by implementing secure protocols, for instance based on
distance bounding [23], verifiable multilateration [24] [25] or constrained chan-
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nels [26]. Still, any form of possession-based authentication will provide a lower
level of assurance compared to an user-centric authentication scheme. Even so,
recent research [27] are exploring the viability of tokens implanted directly into
the human body, which makes these tokens considerably harder to lose.
User-centric authentication may be based on knowledge-, inherence-, or lo-
cation based factors. For a calm authentication process, the factors have to be
presented and evaluated in an unobtrusive way, which, as noted by Bardram et
al., makes knowledge-based factors ill suited for calm authentication, as present-
ing knowledge-based factors requires active participation from the user. Conse-
quently, most approaches utilise inherence- and location-based factors. Facial
recognition is one of the more common methods and can be used both in the
active stage, as point-of-entry authentication, or in the passive stage as a remote
biometric, i.e., sampled remotely at regular intervals and used for continuous
authentication.
2.2 B I O M E T R I C AU T H E N T I C AT I O N
A biometric characteristic, such as a face or fingerprint, are the intrinsic traits
of humans and allow direct verification of users instead of relying on devices
that must be carried or passwords that must be remembered. The biometric char-
acteristic, also called the modality, has the discriminative power to differentiate
users in a large group. Fingerprints, palm prints, DNA, and iris patterns possess
high discriminative power and are defined as hard biometrics, while hair colour,
skin colour, gait, height, and weight have low discriminative power and are de-
fined as soft biometrics. In addition, soft biometrics such as gait, are considered
behavioural characteristics as they are related to the pattern of behaviour of a
person.
Biometric authentication is performed by processing a sample of the biomet-
ric characteristic with a specialised algorithm, know as a biometric expert. The
expert extracts a small amount of data containing the features of the character-
istic, e.g., the ridges and spurs of a fingerprint, which is called the biometric
feature. This feature represents the unique aspect of the modality and is used for
comparison against a biometric reference, which is part of the biometric enrol-
ment database. This database links the true identity of the person to previously
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captured biometric samples for that person. The result is a comparison score, or
similarity score, that reflects the expert’s confidence in the identity of the person.
In biometric authentication the objective is to verify the claimed identity of
a principal. Alternatively biometrics can be used to perform identification, i.e.,
comparing the acquired biometric sample with the entire enrolment database and
returning the best match.
Tistarelli et al. [28] state that currently one of the most urgent research topics
is in distributed sensor networks that transparently use biometrics that require no
actions from the end-user. Further, the authors note that one of the main limita-
tions of the precursors of today’s biometrics are the need to keep the device in
close contact with the subject to capture the biometric sample.
Klosterman and Ganger [29] define a continuous biometric-enhanced authenti-
cation mechanism, that uses biometric authentication based on facial recognition
to periodically re-authenticate users who are logged on to the system. If, at some
point, the biometrics of the user sitting in front of the monitor does not corre-
spond to the biometrics of the authenticated user, then the session is revoked and
a re-authentication required. In this way, facial recognition is used in a similar
fashion as the cryptographic tokens proposed by Corner and Noble for device-
centric continuous authentication.
Klosterman and Ganger note that biometrics differ from most knowledge- and
possession-based factors in the way they are evaluated. Knowledge-based fac-
tors, such as passwords, are encrypted and compared on a byte-by-byte basis and
possession-based factors rely on digital inter-device communication, which both
returns a boolean result: true or false. In contrast, evaluation of biometric char-
acteristics does not produce such clear results due to variations in the measured
features and in the measurement environment, such as variation in facial expres-
sion, illumination or background for a facial recognition system. Rather than a
boolean answer, then the similarity score resulting from a biometric evaluation
is dependent on the similarity between the presented biometric sample and the
samples captured during the enrolment phase.
A biometric system authenticates a principal by comparing the similarity score
with the system’s operating threshold . If the similarity score generated by the
biometric expert meets this threshold then the principal is considered a genuine
user and authenticated. Conversely, if the similarity score does not meet the
threshold then the person is considered an impostor and the request is rejected.
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In this process, two types of error can be committed: falsely rejecting a genuine
user or falsely accepting an impostor. The associated error rates are called the
False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) respectively,
and are important measures to assess the system’s performance.
Point-of-entry authentication may utilise intrusive biometrics, such as finger-
prints, iris- or retina-scans, which have very high discriminative power, whereas
continuous authentication requires remote biometrics, captured in an unobtrusive
fashion. In the active stage of continuous authentication the setup and capturing
environment can be controlled to ensure more homogeneous capture of biomet-
ric samples, this may include enforcing restrictions on the position, pose and
expression of the user or to ensure that the illumination and background of the
scene is constant. In contrast, in the passive stage of continuous authentication no
restrictions are placed on the users or the environment and consequently the pas-
sive stage will have a higher level of false rejections and false acceptances [30].
Typical a multi-factor approach is used in the passive stage of continuous authen-
tication to reduce the overall error-rate.
2.3 M U LT I - F AC T O R B I O M E T R I C AU T H E N T I C AT I O N
The main challenge in biometric authentication is that the process is not reliable:
an expert may reject a genuine user, or conversely, an expert may accept an im-
postor. A biometric expert may have insufficient discriminative power, especially
within a large group [31], or adverse environmental conditions, such as dust or
poor luminosity, can affect the quality of biometric acquisition. These factors
are further compounded when using remote biometrics as the quality and reso-
lution of the biometric acquisition is significantly lower due to the uncontrolled
acquisition process.
The reliability of biometric authentication can be improved by employing mul-
tiple biometric experts and combining their outputs. Common for such an ap-
proach is that the combined system is generally more robust than each of the
individual components. According to the standard report ISO/IEC TR 24722
2007 [32] the combination can be any of the following types:
• Multimodal: using multiple different biometric modalities, e.g., combining
capture of fingerprints and faces.
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• Multi-sensor: using multiple sensors for capturing samples of one biomet-
ric instance, e.g., capturing faces in both the infrared spectrum and the
visible light spectrum.
• Multi-presentation: using multiple presentation samples of one instance of
a biometric characteristic, e.g., several frames from a video camera of a
face image (possibly but not necessarily consecutive).
• Multi-instance: using multiple biometric instances within one biometric
modality, e.g., capture of both the left and right iris.
• Multi-algorithmic: using multiple algorithms for processing the same bio-
metric sample.
Sim et al. [33] present a continuous authentication system based on multi-
modal biometrics in a Bayesian framework. Their approach integrates results
from a fingerprint reader and a facial recognition system. The authors combine
the biometric modalities with temporal information which allows the system to
evaluate the probability that a user is present even when there are no biometric
observation available. Muncaster and Turk [34] explore a similar approach as
Sim et al., but use a Dynamic Bayesian Network to achieve continuous authen-
tication with multimodal and multi-presentation biometrics. The advantage of a
dynamic Bayesian network is its ability to model more contextual information.
Both Sim et al., and Muncaster and Turk focus on a controlled environment, such
as a workstation, where an impostor hijacks a logged-in session.
Altinok and Turk [35] present an approach for temporal integration based
on uncertainty propagation over time for a multimodal biometric system. Their
method operates continuously by computing expected values as a function of
time differences. The system generates continuous results in terms of confidence
in the identity of the user, which makes it possible to adjust the security level
accordingly, in real time. Experimental results with simulated data of face, voice,
and fingerprints have shown that the system can provide continuous authentica-
tion results, which are consistently better than the individual components of the
system. The authors conclude that comparing these preliminary results to a true
multimodal database is very important for continued work in the field.
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Niinuma and Park [36] propose a framework for continuous authentication
that uses soft biometrics, that is biometrics characteristics that have low discrim-
inative power, such as skin colour, height and weight. The proposed framework
automatically registers soft biometrics in the active stage of authentication, i.e.,
when the user login, and fuse the soft biometrics with conventional authentica-
tion schemes, namely password and face biometric. The experimental results
show that the proposed scheme has a high tolerance of the user’s posture and
the authors conjecture that the proposed method provides effective and robust
continuous authentication. However, the authors make a number of assumptions
about the pose of the users and the location of the body for appearance analysis,
furthermore, occlusions are handled on a very ad hoc basis.
The acquisition of biometric samples is subject to variations caused by the
changing conditions of the measurement environment and the evolving nature of
the human traits. Thus, biometric authentication is not completely reliable and
an expert may reject a genuine user or accept an impostor. The performance of a
biometric expert is reflected in the rate of which the experts falsely rejects and ac-
cepts principals. Multi-factor biometrics increases the reliability of the authenti-
cation process and biometric authentication system that uses characteristics with
high discriminative power are considered on par with traditional authentication
factors.
2.4 F U S I O N O F B I O M E T R I C E X P E RT S
Combining the output of multiple biometrics is called fusion, and the methods
used are known as fusion techniques. We distinguish between two broad cate-
gories of fusion techniques: feature level and score level fusion [37]. Feature
level fusion combines biometric samples before an expert computes a similar-
ity score and score level fusion takes place after the comparison stage. It is also
possible to combine scores at an abstract level, such as at the rank or decision
level [38], however, there is a risk of loss of information in such abstractions.
Although there is more information at the feature level, properly exploiting
this information in fusion may result in the curse of dimensionality, i.e., as the
dimensionality increases, the volume of the space increases so fast that the avail-
able data becomes sparse, and thus the problem becomes very difficult to solve.
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Furthermore, not all biometrics are compatible at feature level as they do not
have the same dimension, type or sampling rate, e.g., gait and fingerprint, or iris
and hair colour. In addition, if the relationship between the feature spaces of the
different biometrics is unknown, then the additional information available at fea-
ture level cannot be properly exploited and feature level fusion will not provide
any advantage over score level fusion.
Score level fusion combines scores from multiple experts into a single score,
upon which the verification decision is made. Score level fusion reduces the prob-
lem of complexity and allows different biometric experts to be used indepen-
dently of each other. Consequently, score level fusion is generally the preferred
technique as it provides a good trade-off in terms of complexity and information.
Further, one can freely change sensors, algorithms, and data representations in
the implementation of individual experts.
A basic problem exists in score level fusion: the scores of individual experts
have different score ranges as well as different probability distributions, e.g., a
fingerprint expert may return scores in the range [0,1000], and a facial recogni-
tion expert might return scores in the range [−1,1]. Many researchers address
this problem by normalising the score ranges and then combine the scores with a
scalar function, such as the product or sum of scores. In other approaches, prob-
ability density functions of scores are estimated, and the results combined as
product of likelihood ratios. Machine learning algorithms can also be trained on
the concatenation of similarity scores to compute the combined score.
Nandakumar et al. [39], state that score level fusion can be divided into the
following three categories:
Transformation-based score fusion: The match scores are first nor-
malised (transformed) to a common domain and then combined. The
choice of normalisation scheme and combination weights is data-
dependent and requires empirical evaluation.
Classifier-based score fusion: Scores from multiple matchers are
treated as a feature vector and a classifier is constructed to discrimi-
nate genuine and impostor scores.
Density-based score fusion: Scores are converted to likelihood ratios
which requires explicit estimation of the genuine and impostor score
densities. The advantage is that density-based score fusion directly
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achieves optimal performance at any desired operating point (FAR),
provided the score densities are estimated accurately.
Kittler et al. [40] [41] developed a theoretical framework of simple transformation-
based score fusion strategies, namely the sum, product, minimum, maximum,
median, and majority vote rules. They show that these simple strategies are ob-
tained from their framework under different assumptions, e.g., the sum rule is
obtained if one assumes that experts are independent and a-posteriori confidence
in a claimed identity is close to the a-priori confidence. They show that, among
these simple strategies, the sum rule is the most resilient to estimation errors if
Gaussian distributions of errors are assumed. Later, Kittler and Alkoot [42] show
that, for heavy tail distributions of errors, the majority vote rule may outperform
the sum rule.
Due to their attractive properties these simple fusion strategies are the foun-
dation of many of the more advanced fusion techniques. In addition, they are
commonly used as benchmarks for comparative purposes.
Kryszczuk et al. [43] combine voice and face recognition using a fixed rule,
in which the quality of the biometrics are used when making an authentication
decision. Fierrez-Aguilar et al. [44] propose a fusion method using support vec-
tor machine (SVM) based classifiers. In their approach, the fusion method es-
sentially corresponds to the sum rule. Nandakumar et al. [45] propose a quality
based fusion method, in which the fusion is implemented as the product of likeli-
hood ratios. Similarly, Maurer and Baker [46] propose a fusion framework based
on Bayesian networks. Fusion in this framework is proposed by multiplication
of likelihood ratios from different experts.
Toh et al. [47] [48] propose the use of a multivariate polynomial as a fusion
strategy to linearly combine experts scores. The training phase consists of pro-
gressively adding individual polynomial terms and testing whether the new terms
reduce the error in the fusion process. This model can be considered as a gen-
eralisation of product, sum, and power rules. As a complementary work, Toh
and Yau [49] propose the use of hyperbolic functions for score normalisation in
the multivariate polynomial. The multivariate polynomial model is used in later
work, where Toh [50], and Toh et al. [51] explore the total error counting rate for
supervised classifier learning. By utilising a smooth functional approximation
to the error counting objective, they are able to formulate a single-step solution,
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which in empirical evaluations show promising potential in terms of decision
accuracy and computing efficiency.
Density-based score fusion techniques, as the approach used by Toh et al.,
have interesting properties, as the performance of a biometric experts usually are
expressed by their error rates. Thus fusion of experts can be based on combining
error rates, rather than normalising scores.
Hanmandlu et al. [52] presents a multimodal biometric system based on er-
ror level fusion. They present two error level fusion strategies, one utilising the
Choquet integral and another utilising t-norms. Their strategy is more similar to
decision level fusion as the error rates are derived from the decisions made on in-
dividual modalities. However, their formulation of the Choquet integral mitigates
several of the drawbacks associated with decision level fusion. The non-additive
aspect of the Choquet integral is capitalised in the interaction between the error
rates of two modalities at a time and additionally helps decide the order in which
the decisions should be combined to yield better accuracy.
Li et al. [53] propose a fusion function, which is a ratio of FRR to the error
rate (i.e., FRR and FAR combined). They transformed the problem of estimating
the distribution of scores to the distribution of FAR and FRR. The choice of the
fusion function is somewhat ad hoc.
The error rates of a biometric expert are closely linked to the quality of the bio-
metric acquisition. Especially for remote biometrics, the quality of the captured
samples may strongly affect the resulting similarity scores. Thus incorporating
quality in the fusion technique is an important step to ensure robust fusion.
Bengio et al. [54] suggest a classifier-based score fusion technique using ma-
chine learning algorithms for quality dependent biometric fusion. In their ap-
proach a machine learning algorithm is directly trained on a training dataset,
which consists of matching scores from all experts as well as the respective qual-
ity measures. They suggest a number of methods to estimate the quality measures
from the training data. Poh and Bengio [55] propose quality measures based on
the absolute difference between false acceptance rates (FAR) and false rejection
rates (FRR) distributions (i.e., FAR and FRR computed as the functions of sim-
ilarity scores), however, computing the difference this way causes a loss of the
information present in the values of FAR and FRR. In follow-up work Poh and
Bengio [56] address this, and propose to also include client dependent informa-
tion in the fused score.
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Chatzis et al. [57] describe several decision-level supervisors, which also take
into account the quality of expert decisions. The proposed supervisors are con-
structed using clustering algorithms. A clustering algorithm attempts to divide
a dataset into subsets, which are called clusters. In the author’s approach, these
clusters are considered as fuzzy sets, where fuzziness represents the quality of
an expert decision.
Bigün et al. [58] [59] propose a fusing strategy, which is based on Bigün’s
earlier work [60], and have roots in risk analysis. They designed, what they call,
an expert conciliation system, which takes into account the accuracy and the
quality of biometric signals. The authors also propose adaptive fusion, where
adaptivity is a function of quality of input signals. In follow-up work, fierrez-
Aguilar et al. [44] and Fronthaler et al. [61] subject the proposed method to
a wide range of experimental data to test the performance and viability of the
approach.
Poh and Kittler [62] propose an unified Bayesian framework for expert fusion,
which incorporates quality measures. This framework encompasses many pre-
viously proposed quality-based fusion approaches. The unified model consists
of two sets of Bayesian networks. One of the sets represents generative experts
while the other represents discriminative experts. A generative expert first com-
putes the similarity scores and then computes the class using Bayesian inference.
A discriminative expert directly computes the class, and such an expert is usu-
ally based on a machine learning algorithm. Both generative and discriminative
experts are further classified as non-quality, feature-based quality, and cluster-
based quality experts. In all types of experts, fusion among multiple experts is
proposed using the sum of normalised log likelihood ratio scores.
Rodrigues et al. [63] explore the security of multimodal biometric systems
when one experts is spoofed. Their experiments show that for traditional fusion
schemes, i.e., log likelihood ratio (LLR) or sum rule, a forger can crack a mul-
timodal system by spoofing only one of the biometrics. This has implications
for all multi-factor systems, however, the authors found that hardening the fu-
sion process creates a trade-off between security and accuracy. Spoofed samples
can be assumed to be of poorer quality than genuine samples, thus considering
quality in the fusion strategy may mitigate some of the risk.
We note that most of the existing solutions for score level fusion are either
based on ad hoc assumption or not well-understood in terms of fusion optimality.
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For instance, a density-based fusion approach is typically based on a parametric
model that serves as an analytical tool for converting raw scores to the probability
of being genuine (or impostor). Similarly, it is difficult to prove that a machine
learning algorithm is the optimum strategy to combine scores. Furthermore, the
choice of normalisation scheme and combination of weights is data-dependent
and requires extensive empirical evaluation.
2.5 S U M M A RY
In authentication the claimed identity of a user is verified to ensure the integrity,
confidentiality, and availability of a system. Existing authentication methodolo-
gies outline three basic authentication factors: something the user knows, (e.g., a
password or passphrase), something the user has (e.g., an access card or smart-
card) and something the user is (e.g., biometric characteristics, such as a finger-
print). In smart environments an additional fourth authentication factor is consid-
ered, namely the location of the user.
Traditional authentication systems are considered persistent as they rarely limit
the validity of the authentication session. Conversely, sensor-based authentica-
tion systems are considered transient as they allow continuous authentication of
the users. Continuous authentication systems typically implement multi-factor
authentication to increase the level of security and to lessen intrusiveness. For a
calm authentication process, these factors have to be presented and evaluated in
an unobtrusive way, which lends itself to the use of user-centric authentication
factors such as knowledge-, inherence-, or location-based factors.
Biometric characteristic, such as a face or fingerprint, are the intrinsic traits
of humans and allow direct verification of users. Fingerprints, palm prints, DNA,
and iris patterns possess high discriminative power and are defined as hard bio-
metrics, while hair colour, skin colour, gait, height, and weight have low dis-
criminative power and are defined as soft biometrics. The reliability of biometric
authentication can be improved by employing multiple biometric experts and
combining their output.
Combining the output of multiple biometrics is called fusion, and the methods
used are known as fusion techniques. The main challenge in biometric fusion is
that different experts generate matching scores in different domains, and these do-
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mains usually follow different probability distributions. Therefore, score normal-
isation and transformation are required to make the scores compatible, which are
error prone processes. Moreover, the existing parametric models assume a cer-
tain distribution of scores, such as a normal distribution, which also introduces
errors in the fusion process.
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In its simplest form, tracking can be defined as the problem of estimating the
trajectory of a principal moving through a smart environment. The trajectory
is estimated by finding the state of the principal in each sensor measurement.
The state represents the principal by a number of parameters such as position
and, depending on the tracker domain, acceleration, velocity, orientation, and
appearance.
The first step in tracking is to initialise the tracker, e.g., an appropriate model
containing the position and other contextual information of the principal, must
be established. Next, the motion of the principal is tracked. This implies a way
of establishing the new locations of the principal and determining the corre-
spondences between these in consecutive sensor measurements. Finally, as any
tracker eventually fails, detecting the occurrence of these failures and reacting ac-
cordingly is important for the robustness of the tracker. Consequently, a tracker
consists of the following:
Model. The tracking algorithm represents the state of the target prin-
cipal by a model. This model can be either static, thus remaining
fixed during tracking, or it can be adaptive, meaning it accepts new
information and updates during tracking.
Motion estimation. Given the state of the principal in previous frames
and the model, tracking estimates the motion of the principal by fit-
ting the model to the current measurement using some estimation
algorithm. Generally, only the vicinity of the previous state is ex-
plored in this step.
Failure. Tracking failure is a sudden incorrect estimation of the prin-
cipal’s state. Tracking failures are typically caused by poor sensor
measurements, due to environmental factors, such as reflections, oc-
clusions or appearance changes. Furthermore, the principal may move
outside the range of the sensors, thus terminating the tracking.
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In state-of-the-art trackers, the model is often adaptive and thus updated with
new information during tracking. This allow the trackers to handle changes in
the state of the principals or in the environment. The drawback of adaptation
is drift, i.e., that errors in the update may accumulate over time, reducing the
correspondence between the target and the model.
Thus, formally put, trackers characterise the target principal in every sen-
sor measurement by several parameters (e.g. position, orientation, appearance),
which forms the state of the principal. A temporal sequence of such states defines
the trajectory of the principal and the difference between two consecutive states
defines the motion of the principal [64]. An illustration showing the trajectory of
principal a (solid line) and the estimated trajectory (dotted line) derived from a
number of noisy sensor measurements (t0, . . . , t7) is seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1.: Illustration of the actual and estimated trajectory of principal a.
To determine the state of the principals, smart environments prevalently em-
ploy either a device-centric approach based on wireless devices [65] or a user-
centric approach using vision-based devices [66]. Wireless devices rely on hard-
ware level communication between signal transmitters and measuring units, with
the transmitters either placed in the environment or carried by the users. The con-
text of the users are determined based on signal measurements such as time of
flight, angle, and signal strength. Vision-based devices are a diverse field and in-
clude closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), stereo-vision cameras, infrared
time-of-flight (TOF) cameras and lasers. Vision-based systems rely on segmen-
tation and feature extraction techniques to determine the context of the users. In
addition, several less common, but novel, approaches can be used to determine
the state of the principals in smart environments, namely: passive infrared mo-
30
3.1 T R AC K I N G W I T H W I R E L E S S - B A S E D D E V I C E S
tion detectors; acoustic detectors similar to sonars or based on triangulation [67],
and pressure sensitive floors [68].
3.1 T R AC K I N G W I T H W I R E L E S S - B A S E D D E V I C E S
Wireless tracking systems consists of at least two separate hardware components:
a signal transmitter and a measuring unit. Communication involves the transmis-
sion and reception of signals between these components.
In early work on wireless devices Drane et al. [69] state that positioning sys-
tems may be classified based on either: the location positioning algorithm, i.e.,
the method of determining location of users using various signal measurements,
such as time of flight, angle, and signal strength; or the sensor infrastructure, i.e.,
the wireless technology used to communicate with the devices in the environ-
ment or carried by the users.
Based on this classification Drane et al., define three different system topolo-
gies for positioning systems:
1. Remote positioning, where receivers at one or more static locations mea-
sure a signal originating from, or reflecting off, the object to be positioned.
These measurements are communicated to a central site where they are
combined to give an estimate of the position of the object.
2. Self-positioning, where the positioning receiver makes the appropriate sig-
nal measurements from geographically distributed transmitters and uses
these measurements to determine its position.
3. Indirect positioning, where a data link is used to send position measure-
ments from the self-positioning receiver to a remote site or vice versa. A
self-positioning system that sends position data to a remote location is re-
ferred to as indirect remote positioning, and a remote positioning system
transmitting an object’s position to the object is referred to as indirect self-
positioning.
Fang [70] describes a remote positioning system that relies on the time of
arrival (TOA) of transmitted signals for positioning. The distance from a mobile
target to the measuring units is directly proportional to the propagation time,
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thus with at least three reference points it is possible to compute the intersection
points of circles formed by the time of arrival measurement. This computation is
solved either with a geometric method or by minimising the sum of squares of a
non-linear cost function.
Torrieri [71] propose a method to determine the relative position of a mobile
transmitter by measuring the time difference on arrival (TDOA) at which the
signal arrives at multiple measuring units. The TDOA measurements at two mea-
suring units are combined to restrict the possible transmitter location to a hyper-
boloid with the two units as foci. The transmitter location is estimated from the
intersections of three or more independently generated hyperboloids determined
from at least four measuring units.
Fang and Torrieri’s methods describe some of the early work in wireless posi-
tioning, which were developed to determine the location of cellphone users. Fang
and Torrieri assume line of sight between the signal transmitter and the receiver,
otherwise they suffer from the multipath effect, which decreases the accuracy
of the estimated location. As line of sight is difficult to guarantee in an indoor
positioning system, Ng et al. [72] instead propose to measure the attenuation of
the emitted signal strength. Location estimation is made possible by using mul-
tiple measurements at several base stations, with the position of the stations as
reference points. The accuracy of this method can be improved by utilising the
pre-measured received signal strength (RSS) contours centred at the receiver, to
mitigate the multipath effect [73].
Time of arrival, time difference on arrival and received signal strength form the
basis of wireless positioning systems. The wireless technology employed in the
systems are interchangeable, and can for instance be based on infrared light [74]
or radio frequency, such as WLANs [75], RfiD tags [76] [77] or Bluetooth [78].
Delafontaine et al. [79] consider the application of Bluetooth technology as
a tracking system. Their setup consists of a number of Bluetooth access nodes,
installed at fixed strategic locations throughout the area of interest. Each node
continuously searches for nearby devices. When a Bluetooth-enabled device is
found, its MAC address is logged, such that the presence of devices at nodes can
be recorded. From these records, the trajectory of an individual may be approxi-
mated as the spatiotemporal sequence of node observations of the device.
Fry et al. [80] propose a system, MASCAL, for enhancing the management
of resources at hospitals during mass casualty situations. The system contains
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three components: 802.11b RfiD tags, fixed transceivers that measure ambient
802.11b signal strength and a central geolocation server that computes location.
The transceivers periodically measure the ambient signal strength between them-
selves and any other devices detected in the area. The geolocation server then
calculates a reference signal strength topology for the coverage area, allowing
the system to track patients, equipment and staff.
Device-centric tracking suffers from the same problems and limitations as
device-centric authentication; it puts additional restrictions on the users and cre-
ates problems when the devices are forgotten, lost, or stolen. However, the preva-
lence of personal smart devices means that many users are willingly carrying
wireless devices on their person at all times. This creates a number of interesting
applications for device-centric tracking, especially with regards to classifying
users movement patterns and behaviours.
3.2 T R AC K I N G W I T H V I S I O N - B A S E D D E V I C E S
Vision-based tracking is the process of following an image element in a sequence
of sensor readings. This may be accomplished by continuous, frame-by-frame,
analysis of the element, by estimating the motion with respect to the target by
tracking points or features on the target itself, or by analysing the change in
every pixel from frame to frame.
Trucco et al. [81] formulate this process in terms of the motion problem, that is
predicting the location of a tracked principal in the next frame, and the matching
problem, that is re-identifying the principal within a designated search region.
The motion and matching problems are the foundation of the predict-match-
update framework, which forms the basis of many vision-based tracking algo-
rithms.
In the predict-match-update framework, the state of the target principal in the
current frame is used to predict the location in the next frame. The prediction
returns a search region, also known as a region of interest (ROI), within which
the principal will likely be. The search region is analysed and a match between
the target principal and the region is found. In multi-target tracking, this match
score is used to describe which principal best match each of the respective search
regions. In essence, this is a data association problem where a similarity metric is
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used to assign the respective trajectory to each of the tracked principals. Finally,
as noise will almost always factor in the sensor measurements, an update of the
current state combined with the previous states are performed to increase the
robustness of the tracker. Figure 2 shows a model of the predict-match-update
framework.
Figure 2.: Predict-match-update tracking framework
Trucco et al. formulate a set of design requirements for vision-based tracking
applications such as the predict-match-update framework. These requirements
are:
Robustness to clutter: the tracker should not be distracted by image
elements resembling the target being tracked.
False positives/negatives: only valid targets should be classified as
such, and any other image element ignored (in practice, the number
of false alarms should be as small as possible).
Agility: the tracker should follow targets moving with significant
speed and acceleration.
Robustness to occlusion: tracking should not be definitely lost be-
cause of temporary target occlusion (drop-out), but resumed cor-
rectly when the target reappears (drop-in).
Stability: the lock and accuracy should be maintained indefinitely
over time.
Consequently, a tracker needs to consider that a tracked principal may appear
in cluttered environments and may be surrounded by other principals. The tracker
needs to accommodate for this, and should not get distracted by background
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clutter. In addition, the tracked principal may get occluded or disappear from the
camera view for an arbitrarily long time and then reappear at any time and at
any location. Finally, to be useful in interactive environments, the tracker needs
to work in real time, at full frame rate. Therefore, the tracker must be extremely
efficient.
The first three design requirements require robust detection of the principals in
the first step of the predict-match-update framework. This is a classical computer
vision problem and we give an overview of some of the different approaches in
subsection 3.2.1. Next, for occlusions a common approach is to try and reduce
the occurrence of occlusions by appropriate selection of camera positions, e.g.,
with ceiling mounted cameras most occlusions can be eliminated. Even though,
occlusions cannot be completely avoided. One approach for dealing with the
remaining occlusions is to leverage motion consistency, i.e., the trajectory and
velocity of principals rarely change drastically from one frame to the next. Thus
if an occlusion is detected, the tracker can predict the location of the principals
after the occlusion. In subsection 3.2.2 we give an overview of some of the com-
mon approaches for mitigating the effect of occlusions through motion estima-
tion. Finally, in subsection 3.2.3 we present notable related work with regards to
vision-based tracking.
3.2.1 Image Segmentation
Image segmentation is the process of identifying and delineating objects in an
image or video that share certain characteristics. Segmentation is based on ob-
served data and relies on information present in each pixel in the image. This
typically include the pixel values, the (x,y) position of the pixel and other infor-
mation characterising local texture. The result of image segmentation is a set of
segments that collectively cover the entire image, where each segment are similar
with respect to some characteristic, for instance colour, intensity, or texture.
In person tracking, background subtraction is typically used as a method to
segment moving regions in image sequences taken from a static camera, by com-
paring each new frame to a model of the scene background. The segmentation
is performed by assigning one label to the principals and another label to their
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surroundings. The principals are then referred to as the image foreground and
their surroundings as the image background.
As an example, consider a binary label wi ∈ {0,1} that is assigned to each
pixel xi in an image, indicating whether it is part of a known background (w= 0)
or if it belongs to the foreground (w = 1), determined by the recent history of
each pixel x1, ...,xn. A typical result of such a foreground/background segmenta-
tion is shown in Figure 3. The top image shows a complex scene, captured by a
surveillance camera, containing five principals annotated with circles. The bot-
tom image shows the output, a black-and-white (w = 0 and w = 1 respectively)
binary image. The white pixels in the binary image, known as the blobs, indicate
the presence of a principal. The figure shows that all five principals have been
correctly identified.
The quality of the labelling process is of great importance for the accuracy
of the tracker, thus special care must be taken in assigning the labels. The first
step in this process is to select an appropriate method for background modelling
that fits the chosen application. Many background modelling methods have been
proposed, each with their own strengths, weaknesses and intended applications.
In a recent survey Bouwman [82] evaluates the notable advances in image seg-
mentation and introduces a classification based on the following categories:
Basic Background Modelling: in which the background is modelled
using the average [83] or the median [84] or histogram analysis over
time [85].
Statistical Background Modelling: where the background is mod-
elled using a single Gaussian [86] or a mixture of Gaussians [87] [88]
or a Kernel Density Estimation [89]. Statistical models are used to
classify the pixels as foreground or background.
Fuzzy Background Modelling: which models the background using
a fuzzy running average [90] or Type–2 fuzzy mixture of Gaus-
sians, where the foreground detection is made using the Choquet
integral [91] [92].
Background Clustering: which assumes that each pixel in the frame
can be represented temporally by clusters. Incoming pixels are matched
against the corresponding cluster group and are classified according
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Figure 3.: Background segmentation. For each pixel in the image a label w is
inferred denoting the absence or presence of a foreground object.
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to whether the matching cluster is considered part of the background.
The clustering approach can be based on the K-mean algorithm [93].
Wavelet Background Modelling: which defines the background model
in the temporal domain, utilising the coefficients of discrete wavelet
transform (DWT) [94].
Background Estimation: where the background is estimated using a
filter, such as the Kalman filter [95]. Any pixel of the current im-
age that deviates significantly from its predicted value is declared
foreground.
In the context of image segmentation Bouwman notes that these modelling
approaches must consider the following issues: background initialisation, back-
ground maintenance, foreground detection, choice of the feature type (colour
features, motion features, edge features or texture features) and the feature size
(pixel, block or cluster).
When selecting an image segmentation method these issues determine the ro-
bustness of the method with regards to the critical situations faced in tracking
using vision-based devices. The performance of the segmentation process deteri-
orates with dynamic changes to the background or the illumination of the scene,
the appearance and pose of the principals, occlusions and obstructions in the
field of view of the camera, and a number of other factors that affect the image
acquisition. We identify four types of factors that affect performance: (1) tech-
nology, (2) environment, (3) user, and (4) user-system interaction, summarised
in Table 1.
Image quality, compression algorithms and the variations between images ac-
quired on different devices or the slight variations arising from multiple acquisi-
tions on the same device all affect how the objects appear in the image. Similarly,
changes in the illumination due to variations in natural or artificial lighting, and
the presence of shadows and reflections makes similar objects appear less homo-
geneous, and, as a result, makes the task of correctly delineating these objects
more difficult.
In addition, for tracking purposes, the movement of users, their appearance
and pose, all affect the performance of the segmentation process. Additionally,
occlusions, caused by interposing users or objects, makes delineating objects
very challenging and may require additional information such as the depth of the
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Table 1.: Factors affecting image segmentation
Type Factor
Technology Image quality, compression,
heterogeneous acquisition.
Environment Illumination (indoor, outdoor), shadows,
reflections.
User Movement, pose, appearance,
cooperation.
User-System Occlusions, alignment between camera
axis and user.
image. This effect is further compounded as users, either on purpose or unknow-
ingly, may create situations that maximises the impact of these factors.
One of the most prevalent methods for image segmentation is the Gaussian
Mixture Model. This approach was originally proposed by Friedman et al. [96]
and later Stauffer et al. [87] [88] extended this work by introducing efficient
update equations.
A Gaussian Mixture Model is a pixel-level image segmentation method, in
which the background model has a probability density function for all pixels in
the image. Pixels from a new image is considered part of the background if their
values are well described by the corresponding density functions. This approach
requires appropriate values for the variances of the pixel intensity levels, since
the variances can vary from pixel to pixel. In addition the pixel values often have
complex distributions.
The Gaussian Mixture Model states that the probability that a new pixel x
belongs to the foreground (w = 1) is given by:
Pr(x|w = 1) =
M
∑
k=1
λkN (µk,Σk) (1)
where M is the number of Gaussians, µ1...M and Σ1...M are the means and co-
variances of the normal distributions and λ1...M are positive valued weights that
sum to one.
The combination of these normal distributions allows the Gaussian Mixture
Model to describe multimodal probability densities. The multimodality of the
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model means that complex backgrounds can be modelled and that the approach
is robust to noise and gradual changes in environmental factors, such as illumi-
nation. However, the model present some disadvantages. Firstly, the number of
Gaussians must be predetermined, which is a problem as using too few Gaus-
sians means the method cannot accurately model backgrounds with fast varia-
tions. Conversely, using too many Gaussians unnecessarily increases memory
and computation time. Secondly, the model requires good initialisations and is
dependent on a series of training frames absent of moving objects.
To alleviate these limitations, numerous improvements have been proposed.
These include intrinsic and extrinsic improvements to the model, dynamic selec-
tion of the optimal number of Gaussians, enhancements to the foreground detec-
tion and significant reduction in computation time and memory consumption. In
the survey by Bouwman [82] the author presents an overview of these improve-
ments to the original Gaussian Mixture Model method and evaluates the impact
of the different approaches. The conclusion is that with the improvements the
Gaussian Mixture Model presents a robust and accurate approach, that is shown
to perform reliably in a number of different settings, and provides a good bal-
ance between performance and complexity compared to other image segmenta-
tion techniques. These findings are also reflected in work by Brutzer et al. [97] in
their evaluation of background subtraction techniques for video surveillance and
in work by Parks et al. [98] in their investigation and evaluation of the impact of
post-processing on background modelling techniques. As a result, the Gaussian
Mixture Model is widely used and is particularly suited for indoor surveillance
applications where changes in the background and illumination occurs gradually.
Cucchiara et al. [99] propose a computationally lighter algorithm, that uses a
running average to model the background. This model bases the value of each
pixel in the background model on the recent history of images, either the previ-
ous n frames or a weighted average with the most recent frames having a higher
weight. In essence, the background model is computed as a chronological aver-
age of each pixel’s history. In their evaluation of background modelling methods
Parks et al. [98] show that such simple modelling techniques can perform nearly
as well as the more complex methods under the right conditions.
Oliver et al. [100] propose to use an eigenspace representation of the back-
ground. A principal component analysis is used on a sequence of n images to
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compute the eigenbackgrounds. New objects are detected by comparing the in-
put image with an image reconstructed via the eigenspace.
Elgammal et al. [89] propose the Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) method to
deal with dynamic backgrounds like waving trees and rippling water by estimat-
ing the probability density function for each pixel using the kernel estimator, K,
for the n, recent samples of intensity values, x1, ...,xn, taken consecutively in a
time size window W. For foreground detection, the parameters of the model must
be updated. Elgammal et al. propose to use two background models: a short term
model and a long term model. The short term model adapts quickly to allow very
sensitive detection and consists of the most recent n background sample values.
The long term model captures a more stable representation of the scene back-
ground consisting of n sample pixels taken from a much larger time size window
and thus adapts to changes slowly. Foreground detection is obtained by taking the
intersection of the outputs of the short term model and the long term model as
this eliminates false positives that are described in either model. Bouwman [82]
note that the KDE method is more adapted for outdoor scenes where dynamic
backgrounds appear but less suited for illumination changes.
3.2.2 Motion estimation
Knowing the current position of a principal and being able to anticipate that
principal’s trajectory is an important step for person tracking in highly populated
areas. Trackers generally perform well when it is possible to observe the tracked
principal in each time step. However, in real world environments, the trajectories
of tracked principals often intertwine and the principals may become partially
occluded. Long periods of occlusion can cause a tracker to lose a principal, or
worse, the tracker may falsely identify the principal as a different person. In
many situations, this problem can be avoided by using a motion model that gives
an estimation of where the principal might be after the occlusion.
In vision-based tracking, motion may be determined using optical flow analy-
sis [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] which calculates the motion vectors of pixels
in the image. The algorithms assume that when a pixel moves from one frame to
another, its intensity or colour does not change. This is a combination of a num-
ber of assumption about the reflectance properties and illumination of the scene
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and is known as the brightness constancy. Defining I(x,y,t) as the intensity of a
pixel (x,y) at a given time t, then the brightness constancy with flow u(x, y, t), v(x,
y, t) can be written as:
I(x,y, t) = I(x+ u,y+ v, t + 1) (2)
This equation can be linearised by applying a first-order Taylor expansion to
the right-hand side yielding the optical flow constraint:
∂ I
∂x
u+
∂ I
∂y
v+
∂ I
∂ t
= 0 (3)
In dense algorithms, solving the optical flow constraint yields the magnitude
and direction of motion for every pixel in the image, whereas for sparse methods,
only a region of the image is investigated.
When principals are occluded it is not possible to accurately calculate their
motion, thus it is necessary to rely on a motion model to predict their position.
One such model is the Kalman filter [95] [106], a well-known approach from
control theory, which provides an optimal, recursive estimator of the state of a
dynamic system.
The Kalman filter model assumes that the state vector xt , which contains the
terms of interest for the system, at time t is evolved from the previous state (t–1)
according to the equation:
xt = Ftxt−1+Btut +wt (4)
With a measurement zt given by:
zt = Htxt + vt (5)
Where Ft is the state transition matrix that relates the current time step to
the previous one and Ht is the measurement model that relates the state to the
measurement. ut is the control input vector and Bt is the control input matrix
which applies the effect of each control input parameter on the state vector. wt
and vt represents the process and measurement noise and are assumed to be
independent normal probability distributions.
Kalman filters are widely used in computer vision for video tracking [107]
and have been adapted [108] [109] to accommodate a variety of uses. However,
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a basic problem with the Kalman filter remains, namely, that it is based on Gaus-
sian densities which, being unimodal, cannot represent simultaneous alternative
hypotheses. The observation models and target distributions can be highly non-
linear and non-Gaussian, and, in addition, occlusions and complex interactions
between users create ambiguities and overlap. To overcome these difficulties,
the non-linear state dynamics can be solved with analytical linearisation [110],
which is known as the Extended Kalman filter (EKF), or with statistical transfor-
mations [111], known as the Unscented Kalman filter (UKF).
The differences between the performance of the EKF and UKF are shown to
be small [112] [113], and a thorough sensitivity analysis of both filters for the
problem of GPS/INS attitude estimation revealed that the two filters give similar
results even as a function of various design parameters such as noise, covariance
tuning, sampling rate, and initialisation error [114]. Basically, the differences
between the EKF and UKF become more significant as the non-linearity in the
system increases [115].
Isard et al. [116] propose another solution to non-linear state estimation called
particle filters, which are also known as condensation or sequential Monte Carlo,
which aim to dissolve the ambiguity created by occlusions and overlap by ap-
plying probabilistic models of the targets shape and motion. The strength of this
method lies in its systematic treatment of non-linearity and non-Gaussianity. The
algorithm proposed by Isard et al., is a fusion of a statistical factored sampling
algorithm for static, non-Gaussian problems with a stochastic model for object
motion. The result is an algorithm for tracking rigid and non-rigid motion that
uses learned dynamical models, together with visual observations, to propagate
the random set over time.
Breitenstein et al. [117] propose to extend the condensation algorithm with
continuous confidence updates from pedestrian detectors and online trained, instance-
specific classifiers as a graded observation model. Their main contribution is the
exploration of how these unreliable information sources can be used for multi-
person tracking in a particle filter framework. The resulting algorithm robustly
tracks a large number of dynamically moving persons in complex scenes that
contains occlusions. Their approach does not rely on background modelling, and
operates entirely in 2D, thus requires no camera or ground plane calibration.
Lee et al. [118] compare the performance of non-linear Kalman filters and par-
ticle filters for a multi-vehicle flocking system using range measurements. The
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authors use a distributed version of the Extended Kalman filter and a distributed
Markov Chain particle filter, where the distributed implementation in both cases
is done using consensus-type algorithms. The performance of the estimators are
compared as the system complexity (number of vehicles) and measurement fre-
quency are varied. The authors show that for simple systems (few vehicles) or
high measurement frequency the Kalman filter method has lower expected error
than particle filters, while for complex systems (many vehicles) or low measure-
ment frequency the particle filter method is both more robust and more accurate.
Won et al. [119] presents an approach that combines Kalman and particle fil-
ters. The authors estimates position and orientation using one position sensor and
one inertial measurement unit. The orientation is estimated using a particle filter
and the position and velocity using a Kalman filter. The authors show that the
orientation errors using the proposed method are significantly reduced compared
to the errors obtained from using only Kalman filter. In addition the authors note
that the proposed method can estimate orientation even in the presence of Gaus-
sian position sensor noise.
To summarise, Kalman filters are an optimum observer that estimates the
states of linear Gaussian state-space models. The Kalman filter and its variants
and extensions are the most commonly used filtering techniques, however, when
the model is highly non-linear or the noise is non-Gaussian, particle filters are
more suitable. To reduce the computational complexity, Kalman and particle fil-
ters can be combined, where the linear Gaussian part of a system are solved using
a Kalman filter and the remaining parts are solved using particle filters. Finally,
Kalman filters have been shown to outperform particle filters when the system
complexity is low and the measurement frequency high.
3.2.3 Tracking algorithms
Long-term tracking in real-world conditions is a challenging proposition - made
more difficult by a multitude of external factors. The two main challenges for
trackers are handling the similarity of appearance between the target and other
objects in the scene, and the appearance variations of the target itself. Most
vision-based trackers follow the predict-match-update paradigm, in which an
internal representation of the target is relied upon. This representation is com-
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pared to measurements extracted from incoming frames at predicted positions to
estimate the most likely target location.
The representation encodes the appearance and the shape of a principal into
the model state. In general, the representation is a trade-off between accuracy of
the description and invariance. The state must be descriptive enough to discrim-
inate the target principal in cluttered scenes and when faced with other princi-
pals, while allowing a certain degree of flexibility to cope with deviations in the
appearance of the principal, caused by changes in scale, pose, illumination or
partial occlusions.
Trackers need a method to propagate the state of the target over time. This
requires the tracker to recursively use state information to form a trajectory for
each tracked principal. This links different instances of the same target over time,
requiring the tracker to have a strategy to manage these trajectories when targets
appear and disappear from the scene. Thus a tracker must initialise a track for
an incoming principal and terminate the trajectory associated with a disappeared
target. An initialisation usually occurs at the image boundaries or at specific
entry areas such as doors or entryways. Similarly, a trajectory must be terminated
when the target leaves the field of view of the camera, or when the tracking
performance degrades under a predefined level.
Trackers may use different representations of the state. At the most basic level,
the state of the principal can be represented by points, where the tracker esti-
mate the translation of the principal. This estimation can be performed using
frame-to-frame tracking, for instance using the Lucas-Kanade tracker [101] and
extensions [120], which forms the basis of many point trackers. Recent work is
directed towards optimising performance of these methods. The Kanade-Lucas-
Tomasi (KLT) tracker [121] locates good features by examining the minimum
eigenvalue in a gradient matrix, and track these features using a Newton-Raphson
method of minimising the difference between the frames. Takacs et al. [122]
present a method that unifies tracking and video content recognition by intro-
ducing radial gradient transforms as a fast, high-quality feature descriptor. The
authors combine tracking and recognition by using the same descriptors for both
tasks.
Fukunaga et al. [123] propose the mean shift method as non-parametric feature-
space analysis technique. It locates the maxima of a density function given a dis-
crete data sampled from that function. Starting with an initial estimate x, let a
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kernel function K(xi− x) iteratively determine the weight of nearby points for
re-estimation of the mean m(x), as follows:
m(x) =
Σxi∈N(x)K(x− xi)xi
Σxi∈N(x)K(x− xi)
(6)
where N(x) is the neighbourhood of x. In image segmentation, Comaniciu et
al. [124] use mean shift as the computational module to provide a robust fea-
ture space analysis. In later work by Elgammal et al. [125] and Duraiswami et
al. [126] the authors explore the use of the kernel density estimation with the fast
Gauss transform to increase the frame rate of the mean shift implementation.
Kalal et al. [64] [127] propose a tracker that reformulates the predict-match-
update framework into the tasks: tracking, learning and detection. The tracker
follows the object from frame to frame. The detector locates appearances that
have been observed during tracking and corrects the tracker if necessary. The
learning component estimates errors performed by the detector and updates it
to avoid these errors in the future. For the tracking component the authors use
a median-flow tracker, where the principals are represented by a bounding box,
within which a sparse motion field is estimated.
3.3 S U M M A RY
The smart devices used in positioning systems are prevalently based on wireless
or vision-based devices. Wireless devices rely on hardware level communication
between signal transmitters and measuring units where the location of users are
determined based on signal measurements such as time of flight, angle, and sig-
nal strength. Vision-based devices are a diverse field and rely on detection, seg-
mentation and feature extraction techniques to determine the position of users.
Segmentation is the process of identifying and delineating objects in images or
videos that share certain characteristics and feature extraction is the process of
extracting the relevant parts.
The objective of tracking is to associate location information with the target
principal over consecutive device readings. This association can be especially
difficult when multiple principals are in the environment, when principals are
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occluded, or when the quality of the readings are poor due to environmental
factors.
Tracking methods must solve two basic problems: the motion problem, i.e.,
predicting the location of an element being tracked in the next frame, and the
matching problem, i.e., identifying the element in the next frame within the des-
ignated search region.
Tracking combined with point-of-entry or continuous authentication offers a
novel approach to calm authentication. Principals are tracked from the point of
initial authentication to the point where authorisation is requested. This approach
relies heavily on accurate tracking information, which may require considerable
effort to obtain. Nevertheless, for location-based services, where the location of
principals is already of interest, this approach offers a good balance between
accuracy, security and usability.
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P E R S I S T E N T AU T H E N T I C AT I O N
Traditional authentication systems are considered persistent as they only provide
point-of-entry authentication; after the initial authentication the validity of the
user’s authentication session is not considered. Conversely, sensor-based authen-
tication methodologies are considered transient as they continuously monitor the
user’s context and can react to any changes that might affect the user’s authenti-
cation session. In persistent authentication we combine the persistence of tradi-
tional authentication systems with the transience of sensor-based methodologies.
The goal in persistent authentication is to extend authentication from a sin-
gle discrete event to a persistent session by utilising the contextual awareness
provided by smart environments. Persistent authentication tracks users from the
authentication at a point-of-entry system, to the point where the authentication
is needed. The sensors in the environment are used to provide location informa-
tion and to subsequently validate the identity of the principals by performing
continuous authentication.
In this way, persistent authentication provides contextual awareness to location-
based services and serve as an integrated protection measure, distributed directly
in the facility. Persistent authentication ensures the secure provision of services
and provides a mean to detect unauthorised entry and access. Persistent authenti-
cation is non-intrusive and the service provision is completely transparent to the
users, who simply observe that services are available as they are needed.
At its core, persistent authentication combines data from an authentication
system, a smart environment and a set of biometric experts. Based on this in-
formation the system tracks authenticated principals and provides authorisation
information to a location-based service. An overview of the components in the
persistent authentication system is given in Figure 4. The figure shows how the
sensor data and initial authentication are used as input in the persistent authen-
tication component, which then interacts with the biometric experts to provide
a confidence measure of the relationship between a blob and the identity of the
corresponding principal. Here the term blob is used to describe the logical rep-
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resentation of a principal provided by the smart environment. For a vision-based
system this could mean the image region containing the principal, for a wireless-
based system this could mean the contour describing the transmitter, and for a
pressure sensitive floor this could mean the area currently occupied by the prin-
cipal.
Figure 4.: Persistent authentication model
The process of providing the initial authentication of a principal is indepen-
dent from the persistent authentication system. As such, the authentication can be
performed by any authentication mechanism, including intrusive point-of-entry
systems, biometrics or token-based systems. Once a principal has been authenti-
cated the session is passed on to the persistent authentication system.
The smart environment provides the sensor data needed for tracking and con-
tinuous authentication of the principals. Conceptually, the persistent authentica-
tion model is independent from the sensor types used in the underlying smart
environment, and requires only the location of principals and a method to peri-
odically verify their identity.
The output of the persistent authentication component is the location of each
blob in the scene, the identity of the corresponding principals and a confidence
score, which describes the level of assurance that this assertion is correct.
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4.1 AU T H E N T I C AT I O N A N D AU T H O R I S AT I O N Z O N E S
In persistent authentication we define authentication zones and authorisation
zones as the points where information regarding the principals transition from
either the physical to the logical domain or vice versa. In the physical domain
the zones represent the space in which principals interact with the authentica-
tion mechanisms and the location-based services. In the logical domain this is
represented as the identity and credentials associated with each principal. The
zones are defined such that the transition between the physical and logical do-
main can be performed reliably. In most cases, this is accomplished by restricting
the physical space of these zones to hold only a single principal at the time, e.g.,
turnstiles used in the public transportation system and in large office buildings.
Alternatively, additional sensors can be added to the smart environment, allowing
the persistent authentication system to identify single principals, even in densely
populated areas.
Figure 5 shows an example of how these zones can be defined and illustrates
the authentication and authorisation process. A principal (grey/green dot) enters
an authentication zone (dashed circle) and an authorisation zone (dashed square).
The authentication and authorisation only succeeds if no other principals (red
dots) are present in the zone.
Figure 5.: Authentication and authorisation zones
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4.2 M O D E L A N D W O R L D S TAT E
In persistent authentication the physical representation of information is known
as the world state, and concerns the location of principals in the environment,
their identity, and any other security relevant situational information that is cap-
tured by the smart environment or used in the authentication process. The logical
side is known as the model, and concerns the model representation of the physi-
cal domain and any appurtenant contextual information.
The distinction between the model and the world state can be seen as a statis-
tical relationship between the measurements and the environment. In a camera,
for instance, the three-dimensional world is projected into a two-dimensional
set of measurements to form an image, which is a representation of the world.
The objective of persistent authentication is to support mechanisms that use this
representation of the world to make informed decisions that merges logical and
physical information. However, there are two problems. First, the measurement
process is noisy; what we observe is not a perfect representation of the world
state but a noisy estimate. Second, the relationship between the world and mea-
surements is generally many to one: many real-world configurations may pro-
duce the same measurements, e.g., two different principals may have the same
appearance, speed or trajectory. We use probability to describe this relationship
and to take noise in the data into account.
Let a continuous random variable y denote a real-world measurement that may
be uncertain. If the random variable is observed over several instances {yi}Ii=1,
it might take a different value on each occasion. Some values may occur more
often than others, which is described by the probability distribution Pr(y) of
the random variable. The conditional probability of another random variable x
given that y takes value y∗ tells us the relative propensity of the variable x. The
conditional probability is written as Pr(x|y = y∗) and describes the relative prob-
ability that x takes various values after having observed y = y∗. For brevity, we
will in the following write the conditional probability relation as Pr(x|y), with-
out explicitly defining the value y = y∗ to give a more compact notation. The
notation and definitions introduced in the above and used throughout this thesis
is presented as recommended by Price in [128].
The calculation of the conditional probability, Pr(x|y), is done using Bayes’
rule, which states the following:
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Pr(x|y) =Pr(y|x)Pr(x)
Pr(y)
(7)
The left-hand side of Equation 7 is the a-posterior. It represents the probability
of x given the observed measurement y. On the right-hand side, the prior, Pr(x),
is the initial degree of belief in x and the quotient Pr(y|x)/Pr(y) represents the
support y provides for x, where the numerator is known as the likelihood and the
denominator known as the evidence.
In this thesis we use random variables, starting at the beginning of the alphabet,
a,b,c, ... to refer to principals in the model. A principal who authenticates using
the i-th authentication zone, Authi, generates an authentication score si, which is
the logical representation of the physical authentication. The confidence in the
identity of a principal is given by the probability that the logical representation
is equal to the physical representation and expressed as Pr(a).
The confidence in the identity of a principal after receiving the authentication
score si is expressed as the conditional probability Pr(a|si), likewise the confi-
dence in identity after receiving a biometric similarity score, yi, is expressed as
Pr(a|yi). This biometric score may be from the i-th biometric expert, Expti, or
alternatively it may be a fused score that combines multiple biometric experts.
Finally, we use ei to express the noise that will invariably occur in some of the
measurements, and we express the confidence in the identity of a principal after
observing a noisy measurement in a similar fashion Pr(a|ei). Table 2 shows a
summary of the notation used in the persistent authentication model.
Given an authentication score si for a principal a we can compute the con-
fidence score Pr(a|si) as the a-posteriori probability using Bayesian inference.
The confidence score depends on the error rate associated with the underlying
authentication factor, described by the likelihood Pr(si|a), the confidence in the
authentication model described by the model evidence Pr(si), and the prior confi-
dence Pr(a). In the active stage of authentication, where the initial authentication
of the user occurs, the prior is equal to the operational parameters of the chosen
authentication system, whereas, in the passive stage, where continuous authenti-
cation occur, the prior is equal to the previous confidence score. Thus, given an
authentication score of a principal we express Equation 7 using our definitions:
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Table 2.: Notation used in the persistent authentication model
Description Notation
Principals a, b, c, . . .
Authentication zone Authi
Authentication score si
Biometric expert Expti
Biometric score yi
Event ei
Confidence in identity Pr(a)
Confidence given authentication score si Pr(a|si)
Confidence given biometric score yi Pr(a|yi)
Confidence given noisy measurement ei Pr(a|ei)
Pr(a|si) =Pr(si|a)Pr(a)Pr(si) (8)
The confidence in the identity of a principal is adjusted based on environmen-
tal factors such as, noise, changes in illumination or occlusions. The variable ei
represents an uncertain or noisy measurement caused by an environmental factor
and results in a decrease in the confidence score Pr(a|ei). Conversely, a positive
biometric comparison yi, will result in an increased confidence score given by
Pr(a|yi). Both of these scores are expressed by substituting the corresponding
terms in Equation 8.
To ensure the secure provision of location-based services, the persistent au-
thentication model will revert to a failsafe state when tracking is lost or there is
uncertainty in the identity of a principal. In these cases, Pr(a) is either set to
zero, thus effectively revoking the authentication session, or set to a fraction of
the likely candidates, e.g., Pr(a) would be set to 0.5 if two principals are equally
likely.
Ultimately, the updated score reflects the system’s confidence in the identity
of the principal and determines the provision of location-based services.
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4.3 A L G O R I T H M
In the following we present an overview of the persistent authentication algo-
rithm. The persistent authentication system is initiated with the initial authentica-
tion of a principal as input. From this point on, the principal is tracked through-
out the environment, using the sensors of the smart environment. Tracking is
done by processing the sensor data and extracting the blobs corresponding to the
principals. Probability is used to describe the confidence in the correspondence
between the model and the world state, and thus the confidence in the identity of
a principal.
The pseudo code for persistent authentication is presented in algorithm 1.
Input: Initial authentication Pr(a|si)
while sensor data do
label blobs in the sensor data throws ei
track the position of principal a throws ei
if Expti generates similarity score yi then
update confidence Pr(a|yi)
end
if principal in Authi generates authentication score si then
update confidence Pr(a|si)
end
if service requested then
return Pr(a)
end
catch ei: update confidence Pr(a|ei)
end
Algorithm 1: Persistent Authentication
Persistent authentication requires accurate labelling of the sensor data and a
tracking methodology that can take noise and measurement errors into account.
The challenge in persistent authentication is to generate a robust tracking score
for all authenticated principals. This is made more difficult as the tracking scores
must be generated in real-time, which requires very fast computations, often on
embedded or limited hardware.
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The first step of the loop, label, processes the sensor data and extracts the
blobs corresponding to the principals in the scene. To ensure the accuracy and ef-
ficiency of the labelling, state of the art processing and segmentation techniques
are considered. The labels are used in the next step of the algorithm, track, which
solves the motion and correspondence problems for each detected blob in the
scene. If an uncertain or noisy measurement occurs in either the label or track
step, the algorithm throws an event, ei, which is caught and the confidence score
Pr(a|ei) updated accordingly.
In addition, the confidence score is adjusted when a principal enters an au-
thentication zone and re-authenticates or when a biometric expert generates a
similarity score for the principal. A re-authentication will generally result in a
very high confidence score, as most point-of-entry authentication systems have
a low or even negligible false acceptance rate. In contrast, a biometric authenti-
cation depends on the quality of the biometric sample and, as we do not impose
any restriction on the capture of these samples, the result may only be a slight
increase of the confidence score.
Finally, if service is requested the confidence in the identity of the principal
is passed on to the location-based service, which can make an informed deci-
sion based on the situational awareness provided by the persistent authentication
system.
The adjustments of the confidence score allows the system to operate in envi-
ronments where occlusions, illumination changes and other noisy measurements
affect the tracking accuracy, such that the confidence in the identity of a principal
changes based on the quality of the tracking. An example is shown in Figure 6.
The figure shows two paths, a solid line that corresponds to the motion of a prin-
cipal a and a dashed lined that corresponds to the motion of principal b. Events
on the paths have timestamps, and the time t0 corresponds to the initial authen-
tication, where a authenticate using a point-of-entry authentication mechanism,
giving an initial confidence of 1.
Both principals are reliably tracked from the point of initial authentication
until the time t1, where the occlusions of the principals causes uncertainty in
which of the paths the tracked principal a is following. As a result, the confidence
in the identity of a is lowered. The magnitude of this decrease in confidence
depends on the evaluation of Pr(a|ei), but for the sake of the example, we assume
that there is an equal chance of a following either path.
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Figure 6.: The confidence in a’s identity decreases when the paths of a and b
intersect and increases with positive biometric signatures.
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The remote biometrics of the principals are continuously measured and at time
t2, t3 and t4 positive signatures for a are captured. The resulting biometric eval-
uation is used to increase the confidence in the identity of a. The increase in
confidence depends on the quality of the biometric sample and the output of the
biometric experts. This cycle of decreasing confidence due to noise or occlusions
and increasing confidence with positive signatures continues as long as a is in the
environment.
4.4 S E C U R I T Y P O L I C I E S
In all critical environments there is a need to limit access to resources and to
place restrictions on the availability of services. These limitations and restric-
tions are formalised into security policies that indicate who are allowed access
or service. One of the most interesting applications for location-based services
are the development of location-based access control. Access control represents
a key aspect that can be radically changed by the availability of location informa-
tion. Verifying the location of a principal in addition to the checks performed by
traditional authentication methods can greatly improve the security of a facility.
The location-based conditions that are particularly interesting for access con-
trol policies are the following [129]:
• Position-based conditions related to the location of the users, e.g., the eval-
uation of whether the user is in a certain area or in a specific room in a
building, or alternatively, if the user is in the proximity of other users.
• Movement-based conditions related to the mobility of the users, e.g., their
velocity, acceleration, or direction.
• Interaction-based conditions related to the relationships between multiple
users or entities, e.g., the number of users within a given area.
The first step to support location-based access control is to identify how loca-
tion information is queried and what kind of response the location-based service
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returns. Traditional location-based services [130] usually model this as functions
of the form:
predicate(parameters, value)→ [return value, confidence, timeout] (9)
This function states that the evaluation of a location predicate over the pa-
rameters has the stated value. The result is a return value with a corresponding
confidence and timeout. The confidence value expresses the level of reliability
associated with the assessment, which is given by the confidence in the iden-
tity of the principal in the persistent authentication model. Finally, the timeout
represents the time validity of the result.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the queries in our model to return a
boolean value. For instance, a query can evaluate whether a user is located in
an authorisation zone, where the result (true or false) and the confidence in this
assessment are used for service provision.
Table 3 presents a few examples of specific predicates that utilise location-
based information. The predicates inarea and disjoint evaluate the location of the
users with regards to a given area. The areas are defined as a geometric model
that describe either the vicinity of the user or refer to specific entities such as au-
thentication zones, rooms in the building, etc. The predicate distance and velocity
evaluates the position and mobility of the users and density and local density eval-
uate the spatial relationships between users in a given area. For a full overview
of the research issues and emerging trends related to location-based information
we refer to work by Bettini et al [129].
4.4.1 Location-based Access Control
The location-based predicates are used in conjunction with persistent authenti-
cation to allow physical security policies to be described logically. An example
of a common security policy concerns the physical security of a restricted area,
protected with an access control mechanism.
We formulate such a policy using persistent authentication and the location-
based predicates by expressing the provision of a location-based service at the
j-th authorisation zone, Atho j, as the function S j. The evaluation of the function
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Table 3.: Examples of location-based predicates
Predicate Description
inarea(user, area) Evaluate whether a user is located within
the given area.
disjoint(user, area) Evaluate whether a user is outside a given
area.
distance(user, entity, min, max) Evaluate whether the distance between the
user and entity is within the given interval.
velocity(user, min, max) Evaluate whether the user’s speed falls
within the given range.
density(area, min, max) Evaluate whether the number of users in
the area falls within the given interval.
local_density(user, area, min, max) Evaluate the density within a relative area
surrounding user.
S j(a) uses the location-based predicate inarea(a, j) to define the area of the
authorisation zone. The result of the evaluation is a binary decision, accept or
reject, depending on whether the confidence returned by the predicate inarea
exceeds a service provision threshold ∆ j. These service provision thresholds ∆ j
are defined for the location-based services and authorisation zones to dictate the
level of confidence required for service provision. The notation is summarised in
Table 4.
Table 4.: Notation used for service provision in persistent authentication
Description Notation
Authorisation zone Atho j
Service provision function S j
Service provision threshold ∆ j
The evaluation of the function S j(a), for a location-based service at the j-th
authorisation zone, is thus defined as follows:
S j(a) =
{
accept Pr(a) > ∆ j
reject otherwise
(10)
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As an example, consider a physical security policy concerning a location-
based service represented by a context-aware access control mechanism. To de-
fine this policy using the above notation we present the following criteria:
Authentication: Principals that enter the authentication zone Authi
and present their credentials, generate authentication scores {si}Ii=1.
The principals are authenticated and their privileges associated with
the sessions. If no credentials are presented the principals remain
unauthenticated.
Privileges: An access control list is used to determine the privileges
of the principals. If the principals exit the surveilled area, or if they
are lost/occluded and the tracking algorithm is unable to re-associate
the session, then the authentication session is rendered void.
Access: Principals are granted access to the restricted area if the cor-
rect privileges are associated with their session and they are fully
within the authorisation zone Atho j and the confidence Pr(a) meets
the threshold defined in the service provision function S j(a). In ad-
dition, an evaluation of density(j, 1, 1) is used to ensure that if any
unauthorised principals are present in the zone, access is denied.
While this security policy is quite simple, it suffices to illustrate the advan-
tage of persistent authentication in smart environments. Persistent authentication
solves a common problem that exists with physical security policies, namely,
that in practice these policies are very difficult to maintain. For example, with
traditional access control mechanisms, authenticated principals can allow unau-
thorised people into the restricted area - either willingly or as a result of intrud-
ers that tailgate the authenticated principals. Persistent authentication solves this
problems by evaluating the density predicate in the authorisation zones and if any
unauthorised principals are detected in the zone, access is denied. This ensures
that only authenticated principals are allowed access into the restricted area and
prevents tailgating. Conversely, if the usability of the system are of concern, the
security policy can be modified to allow multiple authenticated principals to en-
ter the restricted area at the same time. This speeds up the authorisation time and
increases the usability of the access control system.
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Rejection of service may occur, either because the confidence in the identity
of the principal is not high enough to meet a given service provision threshold,
∆ j, or because the authentication session have been completely revoked. In these
cases the principal has to re-authenticate at the nearest authentication zone to re-
ceive further services. It must be emphasised that this will be a rare occurrence if
the tracking methodology is robust. Moreover, it is possible to place authentica-
tion zones at several strategically selected locations to lessen the inconvenience
of re-authentications.
The flexible design of persistent authentication makes it easy to change or
replace parts of the policy. For instance replacing the authentication mechanism
(Authentication) and the access control mechanism (Privileges and Access) to
reflect other location-based services. Similarly, the Access policy can be changed,
for instance, to allow authenticated principals to escort guests into the protected
area.
In this way, the system acts like a sensor enhanced access control system [131],
where persistent authentication has the role of the context manager. This setup
results in a fine-grained and flexible access control mechanism that provides sit-
uational awareness to a location-based service and takes both the logical entities
and the physical relationship between principals and environment into consider-
ation.
4.4.2 Virtual Walls
As an interesting aside, persistent authentication allows the enforcement of phys-
ical access control policies based on the concept of virtual walls [132]. Virtual
walls extends the protection provided by physical walls into the virtual realm.
For instance, we intuitively assume that if we lock the front door of our home
it is safe from intruders. Thus, we rely on the physical security offered by the
confines of our home, and assume the walls of our homes to be impenetrable to
all, but the most enduring intruders. With persistent authentication we can extend
this intuitive notion of security by introducing virtual walls in the environment.
Virtual walls are particularly interesting in cases where traditional access con-
trol is difficult or even impossible to implement. With the rise of open plan offices
we witnessed a shift in paradigms to focus on open, accessible, spaces where
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workers, visitors and inhabitants are free to roam and interact with each other.
Whilst it can be argued that open place offices foster more communication be-
tween staff and boost the community spirit then, from an access control point of
view, a new approach is needed to ensure the same level of protection as offered
by traditional layouts.
Consider the floor plan shown in Figure 7. This illustrates a typical open plan
office, with a reception, a waiting area, some private offices and a conference
room. After entering the premise there is no additional access control. Hence,
it is up to the staff and the receptionist to ensure visitors do not gain unwanted
entry into the private areas of the office.
In persistent authentication we propose a policy framework that introduces vir-
tual walls in an environment to provide location-based access control. We define
virtual walls as follows: A virtual wall wi = 〈area, {users}, response〉 covers a
given area and optionally concerns a list of users. Based on this information a
response is formed, indicating the action required of the underlying system.
The area is defined as a geometric model that describes specific entities, such
as the waiting area or the conference room as seen on Figure 7. The list of users
can be defined for each virtual wall or obtained from an access control list. Fi-
nally, the response is used to indicate the action required of the underlying sys-
tem. This response is mapped to actions such as unauthorised access, or occu-
pancy limited reached (for instance due to fire regulations). This adds flexibility,
and allows a finer control over the dissemination of the virtual walls.
Virtual walls, in contrast to physical walls, do not provide or enforce any phys-
ical security. Thus, in essence virtual walls are a means to raise specific actions
required of the underlying systems to ensure the physical security of a premise.
For instance raising alarms if unauthorised people are to enter one of the private
offices in Figure 7, or notifying the receptionist if visitors do not wait for an
escort in the waiting area.
4.5 D E T E C T I N G I N T RU S I O N S A N D H O S T I L E R E C O N N A I S S A N C E
Detecting illegitimate access and hostile reconnaissance is of interest to any se-
curity system. In the persistent authentication framework we conjecture that such
attacks are distinguishable from normal patterns in a suitable feature space, but
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Figure 7.: Example of an open plan office
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detection is difficult as the malicious adversaries often seek to mask their be-
haviour to appear normal.
While adversaries mask their behaviour before attacks, then the occurrence
of intrusions, infiltration, bombings, robberies, etc., create noticeable disruption,
either as an objective or as a byproduct. Hence, it is trivial to identify attack pat-
terns in the dataset post incident. It is then possible to use the identified patterns
as a labeled dataset to either define heuristics or as training data for machine
learning techniques. The drawback of this approach is that only known incidents
can be leveraged in detection and that the labeled dataset needs to be manually
revisited with each new attack, which is an ineffective and expensive procedure.
Furthermore, false positives and negatives may occur if the training dataset is
insufficient for the chosen application, or if the dataset is lacking some aspect
of normal activity. These errors are further compounded if the chosen evaluation
methods or heuristics are not well defined. Thus detecting intrusions and hostile
reconnaissance in the persistent authentication framework requires additional in-
formation regarding the behaviour of principals and their interactions with the
environment.
As a result, we integrate our efforts in persistent authentication with the analy-
sis of architectural morphology. Architectural morphology is part of the general
field of infrastructure analysis and can be understood as the analysis of intercon-
nected spaces. The general idea in this field is based on the rationale that a space
can be analysed as a series of components that form a network of choices. These
choices can then be represented as maps and graphs that describe the relative
connectivity and integration of the space.
This approach of understanding space as a set of relations described, limited,
or promoted by architecture is deeply rooted in the basic notion that spatial struc-
tures contain social structures and vice versa. These structures promote patterns
in people’s behaviour, with regards to their relation to environment. When people
move through familiar environments their motion is goal oriented. Typically, peo-
ple in public buildings walk between a finite number of points of interest (doors,
corridors, etc.) often following set paths that are determined by a combination
of practicality and unwritten social rules. In addition people generally adhere to
the general closeness measure, which means they take the shortest route to their
destination. Conversely, in private and more organised spaces, occupation and
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movement are dominated by employees, which instead conform to the organisa-
tional and functional layouts that are mediated through the space.
From a security perspective the arrangement of space in an organisation should
ensure that there are limited opportunities to overview sensitive areas of the oper-
ations, and from where to undisturbed and unrecognised perform or plan attacks.
Without a structured public-to-private interface, detecting intruders and illegit-
imate access becomes considerably harder, and adversaries performing hostile
reconnaissance can more easily map behaviour and habits of personnel, man-
agers, and other sensitive resources of the organisation. Thus the arrangement of
space in an organisation should ensure the spatial resilience of the building and
reduce the number of points from which reconnaissance can be performed.
The points that may be targeted for hostile reconnaissance includes (1) crowded
locations, (2) locations through where movement is guided, (3) locations of im-
portant functions or service interactions, and (4) locations of internal and/or pri-
vate operations potentially exposed to the public or publicly accessible spaces.
The arrangement of public space should integrate these points and structure
the network of choices such that visitor flows form recognisable patterns. This
makes points of potential reconnaissance more easily detected and deviations
from the patterns more easily recognised.
The process of identifying deviations are known as anomaly detection and
refers to the problem of finding patterns in data that do not conform to expected
behaviour. While anomaly detection is widely used in multiple fields, most peo-
ple with a computer science background will associate anomaly detection with
network intrusion detection systems (IDS). An IDS monitors network traffic and
classifies it as being either normal or anomalous. This classification can be based
on heuristics, rules, patterns or predefined signatures. The anomalies in the data
indicate the presence of significant, actionable, information, e.g., if an IDS de-
tects an anomalous traffic pattern it may mean that a computer on the network
has been compromised.
Anomaly detection is straightforward on an abstract level; define a region rep-
resenting normal behaviour and classify any observation in the data which does
not belong to this region as an anomaly. However, several factors make this ap-
parently simple approach very challenging. Chandola et al. [133], outline the
following challenges in anomaly detection:
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• Defining a normal region which encompasses every possible normal be-
haviour is very difficult. In addition, the boundary between normal and
anomalous behaviour is often not precise. Thus an anomalous observation
which lies close to the boundary can actually be normal, and vice versa.
• When anomalies are the result of malicious actions, the malicious adver-
saries often adapt to make the anomalous observations appear like normal,
thereby making the task of defining normal behaviour more difficult.
• In many domains normal behaviour keeps evolving and a current notion of
normal behaviour might not be sufficiently representative in the future.
• Availability of labeled data for training and validation of models used by
anomaly detection techniques is usually a major issue.
• Often the data contains noise which tends to be similar to the actual anoma-
lies and hence is difficult to distinguish and remove.
Due to these challenges, the anomaly detection problem is not easily solved
and instead it is necessary to formulate the problem to include a set of assump-
tions. These assumptions may include factors such as the nature of the data, the
availability of labeled data, the type of anomalies to be detected, etc.
Depending on the assumptions, the re-formulated problem may be solved sta-
tistically or using data exploration techniques. Statistical approaches may use
heuristics and semi-supervised learning, whereas data exploration techniques
process and structure the acquired data in different ways to visualise the different
normal classes and detect the prevalent patterns to reveal anomalies in the data.
In the persistent authentication framework we focus on data exploration tech-
niques to detect anomalies. We use data exploration techniques to detect patterns
in the movement and flow of people in the environment. These patterns are used
to detect people that exhibit unusual behaviour or behaviour that does not con-
form to the spatial configuration of the facility. We combine the data exploration
with the evaluation of virtual walls as discussed in subsection 4.4.2. We define
a set of virtual walls, based on the parameters of the location-based system, e.g.,
using the location and authentication session of the principals, to detect undesir-
able situations occurring in the building.
69
P E R S I S T E N T AU T H E N T I C AT I O N
To support the evaluation we develop a dedicated tool that is capable of pro-
cessing and structuring very large quantities of data, while taking the spatial
configurations into consideration. To visualise the prevalent patterns in the data
we integrate our findings with state of the art data visualisation tools to present
the information in a meaningful way.
4.6 P R I VAC Y A N D E T H I C S
The pervasive nature of smart environments combined with the technological
advances such as identification and tracking have the potential to disrupt the bal-
ance between the need for context-aware systems and the privacy of individuals.
Here privacy is used to describe how far one can intrude into the personal af-
fairs of an individual. As Alan Westin defines it, privacy is “the desire of people
to choose freely under what circumstances and to what extent they will expose
themselves, their attitude and their behaviour to others” [134], [135].
Delivery of location-based services require tracking of principals in the en-
vironment, often with the use of camera-based sensors, and raises a number of
privacy and ethical challenges. Location information has the potential to allow
an adversary to physically locate a person. As such, the principals have legiti-
mate concerns about their personal safety, if such information should fall into
the wrong hands. In addition, the identification of patterns in the behaviour of
the principals can compromise the privacy of the inhabitants if the profiles are
revealed to unintended users. Therefore, it is important that all sensitive informa-
tion is revealed only on the need-to-know basis.
In the persistent authentication framework we seek to protect against any un-
necessary privacy intrusions. We recognise that it is impractical to obtain in-
formed consent from all observed principals, and thus have to accept some risk
to privacy. We seek to only accept minimal, proportional and necessary risks
and we shall at all times minimise these risks using all methods at our disposal,
including but not restricted to:
• The anonymisation of individuals through not collecting or storing per-
sonal details. It should be noted that in cases where informed consent can
be obtained from the principals, then anonymisation of individuals are not
necessary and the collection and storage of personal information allowed.
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• Using the minimal sensor resolution necessary to conduct our research.
• When possible and practical, transforming the data captured from the sen-
sor into alternative formats, such as spatial representations.
• Deleting the original sensor recordings as soon as the data has been trans-
formed or, alternatively, when the recordings are no longer necessary to
hold.
• Any collection of data will conform to any and all national legislation
affecting such collection, and it is the responsibility of those collecting
or using such data to ensure they have made themselves aware of such
legislation and are adhering to them at all times.
• Any data collected that is transferred outside of the EU, including to part-
ners of the RIBS project situated outside the EU, must comply with rele-
vant EU rules and international/bilateral agreements incorporated into EU
law. Data collection will comply with relevant national and EU legislation
on data storage, collection and privacy as well as the Fair Use Principles.
As a point of departure we consider the application of the Danish laws and
regulations to our research. We refer interested readers to the international survey
on privacy and data protection by Banisar et al. [136], which gives an overview
of the differences in national legislation and regulation.
In Denmark the right of privacy is recognised in the constitution and there
exists a regulatory body to oversee and enforce that the regulations are imple-
mented and upheld. In addition to the constitutional rights, the main legislation
in the area are The Act on Processing of Personal Data (Act No. 429 of 31 May
2000) which entered into force on 1 July 2000. The act implements Directive
95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data and on the free movement of such data. By only accepting minimal,
proportional risks using the methods outlined above, the Danish Data Protection
Agency found persistent authentication to comply with all rules and regulations.
As a result, persistent authentication is approved for installation in all private
premises and requires only proper signage indicating the operation.
Further, the RIBS project encompasses a truly multidisciplinary approach to
research incorporating engineers, natural scientists and social scientists, all work-
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ing in disparate fields and from both academia and industry. As such there is no
single research or professional code of practice which is bespoke to such encom-
passing research.
However, it is acknowledged that all those involved in the RIBS project should
be conducting their research in accordance with the highest ethical codes of
conduct. It is envisioned that all those involved with RIBS are operating under
suitable ethical codes in this regards. Academics from the various universities
involved will be operating under their institutions’ ethical codes of research prac-
tice and thereby bound by them as well as bound by their professional codes of
practice.
4.7 S U M M A RY
Persistent authentication presents a new approach to authentication that enables
the secure provision of location-based services through calm authentication of
mobile users in a smart environment. The objective is to shift the current authen-
tication paradigm from a single discrete event to a continuous session. This is
accomplished by utilising the contextual awareness provided by the smart envi-
ronment to track principals from the point of initial authentication to the point
where authorisation is requested by the location-based service.
Authentication zones and authorisation zones are defined as the points where
information regarding the principals transition from either the physical to the
logical domain or vice versa. This transition is a noisy process, thus probability
is introduced to describe the relationship between the persistent authentication
model and the measurements.
Data exploration techniques are considered to detect patterns in the behaviour
of the occupants and identify principals that exhibit unusual behaviour. Virtual
walls, based on the parameters of the persistent authentication system, are con-
sidered to raise alarms if undesirable situations are occurring in the building.
In the persistent authentication framework we seek to protect against any un-
necessary privacy intrusions by only accepting minimal, proportional risks. As a
point of departure we consider the Danish laws and regulations and their appli-
cations to our research.
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In this chapter we present Error-Rate-based Fusion, a novel fusion strategy that
transforms the output of individual biometric experts into objective evidences
and combine them using Bayesian inference.
In more details, let us assume that a biometric expert generates a similarity
score yi and the expert makes the decision that the claimant is genuine. This de-
cision is not completely reliable, as the false acceptance rate of the expert, given
the similarity score yi, represents the probability that the claimant is an impos-
tor. Similarly, the false rejection rate for the given score represents the intrinsic
probability of incorrectly rejecting a genuine user. In our fusion strategy we use
Bayesian inference to combine these false acceptance and false rejection rates
from different scores, calculated by different experts, to generate a confidence
value representing the probability that the claimant is genuine.
For biometric verification we consider two class labels, A and A¯, where A is as-
signed when the expert concludes that a claimant is genuine, and A¯ is assigned if
the authentication status of the claimant is unknown. Note, that we use capital let-
ters to distinguish the class labels from the notation used to represent confidence
scores in the persistent authentication framework.
If the claimant is A but the expert wrongly labels him A¯ then this event is
called a false rejection (FR). Similarly, if the claimant is not A and an expert
wrongly labels him A then this event is called a false acceptance (FA). The false
acceptance and the false rejection rates (FAR and FRR) are calculated as the
fractions of, respectively, the false acceptances and the false rejections taken
over all the events.
5.1 O P E R AT I O N A L P H A S E S
We distinguish between three operational phases of a biometric expert. The first
phase is called the development phase, in which an expert operates on a develop-
ment dataset. The development dataset consists of a large number of biometric
73
E R RO R - R AT E - B A S E D F U S I O N
samples and the corresponding true class labels. The purpose of the development
phase is to optimise the values of different operational parameters within the ex-
pert algorithm, and thus the phase is not directly relevant to our fusion strategy.
The second phase is called the training phase, in which an expert is evalu-
ated by an evaluator on a training set, which does not contain the true labels of
claimants, however, the true labels are known to the evaluator. The purpose of
the training phase is to determine a-priori errors in the experts decisions, namely
a-priori FAR and FRR. This phase is essential for our fusion strategy, as our
strategy depends on these a-priori FAR and FRR values.
The third phase is called the test phase, in which a biometric system containing
multiple experts is tested on a test dataset. This phase models the working of the
biometric experts in an actual operating environment. The FAR and FRR values
that occur in this phase are called the a-posteriori FAR and a-posteriori FRR. It is
important that the training dataset does not overlap with the development and the
test datasets, because the derivation of FAR and FRR assumes the independence
of the training dataset.
5.2 F O R M A L M O D E L A N D N OTAT I O N S
Let us consider N biometrics experts. The output of the i-th expert is a similarity
score, yi ∈R, where 1≤ i≤N. For a decision threshold ∆i, the decision function
is defined as follows:
decision(∆i,yi) =
{
accept if yi ≥ ∆i
reject otherwise
(11)
For the training set of the i-th expert, let {yAi }Ii=1 be the number of A’s samples,
and let {yA¯i }Ii=1 be the number of the samples that are not from A. The size of the
training set is {yAi }Ii=1 + {yA¯i }Ii=1. For a given value of ∆i, the false acceptance
rate and false rejection rate are defined as follows:
FAR(∆i) =
Number of FA at ∆i
{yA¯i }Ii=1
(12)
FRR(∆i) =
Number of FR at ∆i
{yAi }Ii=1
(13)
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In a standalone operation, where there is only one expert and no need for score
fusion, ∆i is set to a fixed value, such that the cost of errors is minimum, e.g., if
both FAR and FRR are of equal concern then ∆i is set to the equal error rate
(EER).
In our fusion strategy, we are interested in a combined decision of N biometric
experts after fusion, and for this purpose we convert the similarity score yi into
the equivalent FAR and FRR values.
With the similarity score yi, let the functions FAR(yi) and FRR(yi) be the false
acceptance rate and false rejection rates of the i-th expert with ∆i = yi. Since
yi ∈R, these functions are continuous, such that FAR(yi) ∈R and FRR(yi) ∈R.
The parametric way of modelling these functions is to find an analytical expres-
sion, such as a Gaussian distribution. Usually, FAR(yi) and FRR(yi) are not as
smooth as a Gaussian distributions, and an approximation with simple analytical
expressions will introduce estimation errors.
For precise evaluation of FAR(yi) and FRR(yi), we use a non-parametric ap-
proach, and model them as step functions, in which ∆i can only take m different
values: ∆i ∈ {δ 1i , . . . ,δmi }, where δ 1i < · · ·< δmi . We call these values of ∆i error
decision thresholds (EDTs). This means that FAR(yi) and FRR(yi) are defined
over a set of m EDTs:
FAR(yi) =

FAR(δmi ) if yi ≥ δmi
FAR(δm−1i ) if δ
m
i > yi ≥ δm−1i
. . . . . .
FAR(δ 1i ) if δ 2i > yi ≥ δ 1i
1 Otherwise
(14)
FRR(yi) =

FRR(δmi ) if yi ≥ δmi
. . . . . .
FRR(δ 1i ) if δ 2i > yi ≥ δ 1i
0 Otherwise
(15)
The different values of ∆i are illustrated in Figure 8, with a typical plot of
the probability density functions (PDF) of expert scores. The figure illustrates
that the similarity scores for a genuine user are distributed on larger values as
compared to that of an impostor. The figure also shows the point of equal error
rate, where the false acceptances and false rejections have the same value.
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Figure 8.: Error Decision Thresholds (EDTs) and Probability Density Functions
(PDF) of typical expert scores.
We determine FAR(yi) and FRR(yi) from the training set on each value of
∆i. As yi falls somewhere in the range of an error decision threshold, then the
step functions over approximate actual FAR and FRR values, which, although a
pessimistic approach, is sound from a security perspective.
To illustrate an error-rate-based fusion system, consider a verification system
that contains N biometric experts. When biometric data of a claimant is avail-
able from the sensors, the system invokes the experts with the claimed identity
A. Each expert extracts the relevant biometric features from the data and com-
pares the extracted features with the biometric templates of A. Each expert then
generates a similarity score yi, and we compute FAR(yi) and FRR(yi) and fuse
the similarity score with Bayesian inference. As our approach fuse the FAR and
FRR values that have the same meanings across the different experts, there is no
need for pre-fusion normalisation.
As shown in Figure 9, when the i-th expert generates a similarity score yi, we
compute FAR(yi) and FRR(yi) and fuse them based on Bayesian inference. The
inputs from each of the N experts can be processed sequentially. This is due to
the fact, that the Bayesian inference is invariant to whether the similarity scores
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Figure 9.: Similarity scores are converted to equivalent FAR and FRR measures.
from all experts are processed in parallel or in a sequence. Similarly, the order of
experts in the sequential processing does not affect the fusion process.
The system has an a-priori confidence that the claimant is A, which is repre-
sented as the probability measure, Pr(A). The complementary confidence that the
claimant is not A is 1 - Pr(A). We compute a-posteriori confidence, Pr(A|yi≥∆i),
i.e., the probability that the claimant is A after receiving the evidence yi that meets
the decision threshold ∆i. For brevity, we do not include the decision threshold
in the probability expressions, and therefore we write Pr(A|yi ≥ ∆i) as Pr(A|yi).
The value of the a-posteriori confidence is computed as follows:
Pr(A|yi) =Pr(yi|A)Pr(A)Pr(yi)
=
Pr(yi|A)Pr(A)
Pr(yi|A)Pr(A)+Pr(yi|A¯)Pr(A¯)
=
Pr(yi|A)Pr(A)
Pr(yi|A)Pr(A)+Pr(yi|A¯)(1−Pr(A)) (16)
On the right hand side of Equation 16, Pr(yi|A) is the probability that the i-th
expert generates yi ≥ ∆i if the claimant is indeed A. This is determined by the
false rejection rate, FRR(yi), i.e., the probability that the i-th expert generates a
score that is less than yi even though the claimant is A. Therefore, we have:
Pr(yi|A) =
∫ ∞
yi
PDF(yi|A) = 1−FRR(yi) = TAR(yi) (17)
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Here, TAR is the true acceptance rate. Similarly, Pr(yi|A¯) is the probability
that the i-th expert generates yi ≥ ∆i if the claimant is not A, which is exactly the
probability of a false acceptance. Therefore, we have:
Pr(yi|A¯) =
∫ ∞
yi
PDF(yi|A¯) = FAR(yi) (18)
The relationship between the PDF of yi, FAR, FRR, and TAR from Equa-
tion 17 and Equation 18, is illustrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10.: The Areas of FAR, FRR, and TAR.
Next, we write Equation 16 in terms of FAR and TAR for Pr(A|yi) and Pr(A¯|yi):
78
5.3 E F F E C T O F Q UA L I T Y O N F U S I O N
Pr(A|yi) = TAR(yi)Pr(A)TAR(yi)Pr(A)+FAR(yi)(1−Pr(A)) (19)
Pr(A¯|yi) = FAR(yi)Pr(A¯)FAR(yi)Pr(A¯)+TAR(yi)(1−Pr(A¯)) (20)
Error-rate-based fusion uses Equation 19 and Equation 20 to fuse the outputs
of multiple biometric experts, by taking into account the prior confidence level.
As the scores are converted to probabilities these can be freely combined using
simple operators or used as a-prior information in further processing.
To get an intuitive feeling of these equations, let us consider a traditional veri-
fication expert, which is assumed to be error free, e.g., a password-based authen-
tication of claimant A, on a computer terminal. If the password is correct then
the computer has full confidence that the claimant is A. For such an expert, the
values of FAR and FRR are assumed to be zero. As expected, the confidence
is evaluated to 1 in Equation 19 independent of a-priori confidence. In fact, any
expert for which the value of FAR is zero will generate the confidence value of
1, which is consistent with the fact that with zero false acceptances no impostor
can ever be accepted by the expert.
5.3 E F F E C T O F Q UA L I T Y O N F U S I O N
In practice, not every sample of biometric modalities are of the same quality. This
may be caused by variation in environmental conditions or the relative position
of a remote biometric sensor with respect to the user. The quality of a biometric
signal, however, is non-discriminatory [137], which means that a difference in
quality is not useful to distinguish between A and A¯.
On the other hand, quality does affect the reliability of samples. In a parallel
fusion approach, a common approach is to give more relative weight to high
quality samples as compared to low quality samples. Since we process samples
sequentially, this approach is not suitable to our error-rate-based fusion strategy.
In the following, we discuss two approaches to include the effect of quality in
our fusion strategy.
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• The simplest approach to deal with poor quality samples is to discard such
samples. In this case, an expert generates a quality score qi, besides a sim-
ilarity score, and if the quality score is below a minimum threshold, deter-
mined experimentally from the training set, then the biometrics sample is
rejected.
• Because FAR and FRR vary with quality, we can use quality dependent,
composite EDTs: {(δ 1i ,q1i ), . . . , (δmi ,q1i )}, . . . , {(δ 1i ,qni ), . . . , (δmi ,qni )},
where q1i , . . . ,q
n
i are n different quality thresholds. As a result, the functions
FAR(yi,qi) and FRR(yi,qi) can be determined from the training set for
each pair (δ ji ,q
k
i ), for 1≤ j ≤ m and 1≤ k ≤ n.
However, under a set of reasonable assumptions, error-rate-based fusion is
robust to change in quality, without explicitly considering the quality measure.
In the rest of this section, we analyse why this is the case.
For error-rate-based fusion, we expect that the quality of a biometric sample
should determine the change in the confidence on the identity of A, i.e., the in-
crease in Pr(A|yi) due to a good quality sample of A should be more than the
increase due to a relatively poor quality sample of A. Further, if the quality is too
poor then no update in Pr(A|yi) should be made.
In this regard, an important observation is that degradation in quality adversely
affects similarity scores [47]. Thus the similarity score between a good qual-
ity biometric sample and the template is higher than the similarity score be-
tween a poor quality biometric sample and the template. Therefore, for the EDTs
{δ 1i , . . . ,δmi }, where δ 1i < · · · < δmi , a poor quality sample is likely to fall under
the range of a lower EDT.
We also note that the quality of biometric samples greatly affect TAR, but it
has a small effect on FAR, which is also evident in literature [46] [39]. As a result,
it is unlikely that a bad quality sample from an adversary matches the template
of A. Similarly, it is also unlikely that a bad quality sample from A improves the
similarity score between the sample and the template of A.
Let the similarity score resulting from a good quality sample of A be yi, and
let the similarity score resulting from a relatively poor quality sample of A be
y′i. Based on our previous discussion, we assume that y
′
i < yi. If the difference
in quality is significant then the two scores will correspond to different EDTs,
namely, δ ji ≤ y′i < δ ki ≤ yi. This translates to the following requirement:
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Given a significant difference in quality, i.e, δ ji ≤ y′i < δ ki ≤ yi, and
the same a-priori confidence Pr(A), it must be the case that Pr(A|yi)>
Pr(A|y′i).
If the above requirement is met for our fusion strategy, then we say that our
strategy is robust against changes in quality. Thus, considering Equation 19, we
see that satisfying Pr(A|yi) > Pr(A|y′i) requires the following condition to hold:
TAR(yi)
FAR(yi)
>
TAR(y′i)
FAR(y′i)
. (21)
Since we have δ ji ≤ y′i < δ ki ≤ yi, Equation 21 requires that the TAR to FAR
ratio at δ ki must be greater than the TAR to FAR ratio at δ
j
i . In fact, we can easily
enforce the above condition in our error-rate-based fusion strategy by explicitly
requiring that one should select the EDTs, {δ 1i , . . . ,δmi }, such that the following
condition holds:
TAR(δmi )
FAR(δmi )
> · · ·> TAR(δ
1
i )
FAR(δ 1i )
. (22)
Considering Figure 8 and Figure 10 together, we note that for typical expert
values the TAR to FAR ratio increases as yi increases and vice versa. A good
value for the EDT δ 1i will then commonly be the point of equal error rate.
Also note that if the quality of a sample is so poor that y′i < δ 1i then the sam-
ple is rejected. This is because FAR(y′i) and FRR(y
′
i) will evaluate to 1 and 0
respectively, as defined in Equation 14 and Equation 15.
5.4 S U M M A RY
Combining scores from multiple biometric experts is known as sensor fusion. A
common challenge in this field is that the results from evaluating different bio-
metric characteristic are usually incompatible, as they have different score ranges
as well as different probability distributions. Error-rate-based fusion is presented
as a novel fusion technique that transforms individual scores from different bio-
metric systems into objective evidences and combine them using Bayesian infer-
ence.
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Error-rate-based fusion uses the false acceptance and false rejection rates of
the biometrics systems to generate a confidence value that represents the proba-
bility that a principal has been correctly identified. For precise evaluation of the
error rates a non-parametric approach is taken, where the false acceptance and
false rejection rates are modelled as step functions.
The quality of the acquired biometric samples vary due to poor environmental
conditions or the relative position of the user with regard to a remote biometric
sensor. The presented error-rate-based fusion technique is shown to be robust to
this change in quality under a set of reasonable assumptions.
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I M P L E M E N TAT I O N

6
P ROT OT Y P E
In this chapter we present the algorithms and techniques used in the implementa-
tion of our camera-based persistent authentication prototype. We start by looking
at the representation of the target’s state and the integration with authentication
and authorisation zones. We then discuss the implementation of the tracker and
the use of filtering and flow techniques to aid in person tracking. We continue
with an overview of remote biometrics and the implementation of the chosen
biometric characteristics, namely, facial recognition and appearance analysis. Fi-
nally we end with the implementation of the persistent authentication model and
a discussion of the applications for location-based services and the challenges in
multi-camera setups.
In order for a surveillance system to be useful in an interactive environment,
the system needs to work in real time with data from multiple cameras. There-
fore, the implementation must be extremely efficient. This implies a strong focus
on parallelisation and distribution to integrated hardware. As a result, the most
important design goal in the persistent authentication prototype is to create a real
time, multi-camera surveillance system. We approach this goal by presenting a
fast and efficient tracking methodology that builds upon well structured and fully
developed computer vision algorithms for background modelling and foreground
detection. We use error-rate-based fusion to combine the output of biometric
experts to increase the confidence of the tracker. The persistent authentication
model provides input to a location-based service, represented by a context-aware
access control system, which enables location-based service provision, directly
at the principal’s position.
At each time instance, the persistent authentication prototype receives informa-
tion about the state of the target principal and passes it in parallel to the authenti-
cation, tracking, the detection components. The tracker estimates the motion of
the target based on its previous state and outputs a single hypothesis. The detec-
tion and recognition components maintain a model of the target and constantly
analyse the output of the tracker and the state of the principal to detect and recog-
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nise any appearances represented in the target model. This information is used
by the fusion component, which also output a hypothesis about the location of
the target. The hypotheses are passed to the persistent authentication component
which combine them into a single score that reflects the system’s confidence
in the identity of the principal. This confidence score determines the provision
of location-based services at designated authorisation zones in the environment.
Figure 11 shows an overview of the components in the persistent authentication
prototype.
Figure 11.: Overview of the components in the persistent authentication
prototype.
In the following we go into details with each of the components in the per-
sistent authentication prototype. The implementation touches upon many areas
in computer vision. Computer vision is a young field, but has seen tremendous
progress in recent years. One of the driving forces behind this progress is the
availability of high quality frameworks and libraries that enable fast and effi-
cient processing of state of the art algorithms. In the persistent authentication
prototype we make extensive use of the Open Source Computer Vision Library
(OpenCV). OpenCV is an open-source BSD-licensed library that includes a com-
prehensive set of both classic and state of the art computer vision and machine
learning algorithms. OpenCV is designed for computational efficiency, with a
strong focus on real-time applications. It is written in optimised C/C++ and can
take advantage of hardware acceleration and multi-core processing.
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The state is the representation of the target principal. The state is the result of
a feature extraction process on every frame of the video data as captured by the
cameras in the environment. At any time instance, the state is defined by a bound-
ing box detailing the position of the target. The bounding box is parameterised
by its location and scale. The spatial similarity between two bounding boxes are
measured using overlap. The state only concerns location and scale, other param-
eters such as in-plane rotation are not considered. Finally, the lack of a bounding
box for a target indicates that tracking is not currently possible for that target, for
instance because the tracked principal is not visible.
In the implementation we use background modelling to segment moving re-
gions in the video. We assigning one label to the principals and another label
to their surroundings and perform contour analysis to help draw the bounding
boxes. We use a Gaussian Mixture Model algorithm based on work by Zivkovic
et al. [138] [139], which automatically selects the appropriate number of com-
ponents per pixel and thus are able to fully adapt to the observed scene. The im-
plementation uses a non-parametric adaptive density estimation method, which
reduces processing time and improves the segmentation.
An important consideration in the Gaussian Mixture Model algorithm is the
approach for determining learning rates and initialisation parameters. The learn-
ing rate controls the adaptation and convergence speed of the model and intro-
duces a compromise between being fast enough to adapt to changes and slow
enough to store a useful temporal history. The optimal initialisation parameters
and value for the learning rate depends on the given scene. In the original publi-
cation [87] [88] the learning rate is set to some fixed small value, which allows
the mixture model to adapt to the gradual changes and prevents it from including
foreground objects into the background. In our implementation we follow this
approach by hand-tuning the learning rates and initialisation parameters in or-
der to produce the desired subtraction result. The need to tune these parameters
makes it difficult and time consuming to change setups, but gives a great deal of
control over the end result. Alternatively, the learning rate and other parameters
of the mixture model can be adjusted automatically, for instance using particle
swarm optimisation [140] or spatio-temporal voting schemes with random sam-
ples [141], which are useful additions for more dynamic scenes.
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In a comparative study Parks et al. [98], examine how a number of pre- and
post-processing techniques can improve identification of blobs in the foreground
mask. The authors conclude that noise removal, morphological closing, and area
testing significantly improves the performance. Noise removal is beneficial as
camera noise and limitations of the background model often introduce small
specks of noise in the foreground mask. These errors can be removed by ap-
plying a noise filtering algorithm to the foreground mask.
The authors specify ρ as the number of foreground pixels amongst 8-connected
neighbours, w as the width of a square kernel and a as the number of foreground
pixels. We apply a density-based noise removal method to the foreground masks
which discards a foreground pixel if it has less than 7 foreground pixels amongst
its 8-connected neighbours. We then apply morphological closing to fill internal
holes and small gaps in the blobs. We use a square 3–by–3 kernel, which slides
through the image in two iterations. Finally, area thresholding is used to remove
remaining blobs that are smaller than 30 pixels in size.
After applying the morphological operations we identify the contours in the
image using a topological structural analysis of the foreground mask by border
following [142]. Each contour is stored as a vector of points and enveloped by a
bounding box. This bounding box describes the state of the target and is provided
to the authentication, tracking and detection components.
6.2 AU T H E N T I C AT I O N A N D AU T H O R I S AT I O N
The authentication and authorisation components define the zones placed in the
environment as described in section 4.1. Tracking is initialised when a principal
successfully authenticates in the authentication zone and service is provided to
principals in authorisation zones, given they have sufficient clearance.
The zones are defined as a vector of points corresponding to the authentication
and authorisation areas in the environment. In the implementation we abstract
this definition by introducing the assumption that these areas can only physically
hold a single principal at a time. This eases the process of linking the authentica-
tions and authorisations to the correct principal. The assumption requires a very
strict security policy, but we found that this corresponded well with the security
policies in place in the premises we investigated. Later, in chapter 8 we present
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a review of the security policies in one of the investigated premises and how dif-
ferent layouts and rules for the accompanying authentication and authorisation
zones affect performance.
For premises with less restrictive security, the link between the principals and
the corresponding authentications and authorisations may be solved with addi-
tional sensors. Adding an additional sensor domain and fusing the data, gives the
system another dimension to base its decisions on. Infrared cameras can be used
for depth information and pressure sensitive floors provide very different operat-
ing characteristics to regular cameras. Integrating these sensor types allows the
system to more reliably link the principal and authentication/authorisation which
increases the robustness.
6.3 T R AC K E R
The tracker propagates the state of the target principal over time by estimating
frame-to-frame motion. The tracker recursively use state information to form a
trajectory for each of the tracked principals. The tracker initialise a track for
every incoming principal and terminates the trajectories associated with disap-
pearing targets. Initialisation always occurs at an authentication zone, whereas
the trajectories must be terminated when a target leaves the field of view of the
camera, or when tracking degrades under a predefined performance level. The
tracker is an exploratory and error-prone component, and therefore it is expected
that, without correction, tracking performance will degrade over time to the point
of tracking failure.
The persistent authentication prototype relies on an efficient tracking method-
ology that adapts to changing conditions and inaccuracy in the sensor data. The
tracking methodology is built on a combination of frame-to-frame tracking and
tracking-by-detection. In frame-to-frame tracking it is assumed that the principal
moves with a smooth trajectory. This approach can adapt to changes in the ap-
pearance of the principal, however, it will typically fail if the principal gets fully
occluded or disappears. In contrast, tracking-by-detection assumes that a model
of the principal is known in advance. This approach is resilient to occlusions and
disappearances, but may fail in cases with unexpected appearances or cluttered
backgrounds.
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In our system we divide tracking into two categories with different time scales.
First, we have motion tracking which is considered on a frame-to-frame basis
while the principal is visible and easily identified. If the principal is momentarily
occluded or there is temporary noise in the data, motion tracking relies on the
last know position of the principal and the associated trajectory and velocity of
the principal. If the tracking performances degrades noticeably or if the principal
is absent for a longer period of time we suspend tracking and consider restora-
tive tracking. Here, we require a re-authentication of the principal, either from
a discrete authentication mechanism or a biometric expert. We then restore the
tracking session and re-associate it with the target principal. Figure 12 gives an
overview of the tracking component.
Figure 12.: Overview of the tracking component.
6.3.1 Motion Tracking
In motion tracking the target is represented by a bounding box on which a sparse
motion field is calculated. We compute region correspondences based on the
shape, location and motion features of the target. This gives a strong correlation
when used on a frame-to-frame basis and since the process is not computationally
intensive it is suitable for real time applications.
The motion fields for each principal is estimated by calculating the optical
flow. Optical flow is the pattern of apparent motion of image objects between two
consecutive frames, caused by the movement of the object. We use a pyramidal
Lucas-Kanade approach [101] to calculate the motion points. These points form
a 2D vector field where each vector is a displacement that shows the movement
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of the point from the first frame to the second. In the implementation we integrate
a sparse iterative version of the Lucas-Kanade optical flow tracker [143] which
supports parallelisation for efficient calculation. In addition, this implementation
of the Lucas-Kanade tracker selects appropriate features within the bounding
box and applies a backwards-check of the feature points to reduce the number of
points that are wrongfully estimated or disappears between images.
The tracker receives the bounding box bt of the target principal and a pair of
images It , It+1. A set of points is initialised within the bounding box bt and the
points are tracked by the Lucas-Kanade tracker from It to It+1. The tracker then
outputs the resulting bounding box bt+1. The bounding box motion is parame-
terised by the horizontal and vertical displacement and the change in scale. All
three parameters are estimated independently using the median. Figure 13 shows
an example of three principals, each described by a bounding box, where the
arrow in the centre of each bounding box illustrates the median flow.
Figure 13.: Three principals described by bounding boxes. The arrow indicates
the median flow.
6.3.2 Tracking Failures
The frame-to-frame tracker can fail due to temporary occlusions or adverse sen-
sor noise. To detect these failures we let δi denote the displacement of a point
from It to It+1 and δm denote the median displacement of all points. We declare
a tracking failure if the median absolute deviation is larger than a threshold, as
given by median(|δi−δm|) > ∆, where a typical value of ∆ is 15 pixels.
Using this heuristic the tracker is able to identify most failures caused by fast
motion or sudden occlusions of the target. In these cases, the displacement of the
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individual points become scattered in the image, causing the median absolute
deviation to increase rapidly.
If a failure is detected, the tracker does not return a bounding box. Instead the
tracker relies on motion consistency to follow the target.
6.3.3 Trajectory Hypothesis
We create a trajectory hypothesis that predicts the location of the target over
time. We let a Kalman filter process the position of each principal in the previous
frames, to estimate their position in the current frame. The filter’s estimate gives
a prediction of the motion of the principals.
We use the Kalman filter algorithm presented by Welch et al. [106]. In our
case, we use a Kalman filter with 4 dynamic parameters and 2 measurement
parameters and no control. The algorithm assumes that the state vector xt , at
time t is evolved from the previous state (t–1) using the state transition matrix Ft
that relates the current time step to the previous one and the measurement model
Ht that relates the state to the measurement:
xt = Ftxt−1+wt
zt = Htxt + vt
(23)
With the state vector xt of the form:
x= [x,y,vx,vy]t (24)
Here x is a model vector, z is a measurement vector, w is the model noise
drawn from the distribution identified by the process noise covariance matrix Q
and v is the measurement noise drawn from the distribution identified by the mea-
surement covariance matrix R. Initialisation consists of constructing a model for
the transition matrix F, the measurement model matrix H and the noise matrices.
It is assumed that the parameters are independent and that there is no need
for transformation to convert measurements into model data. Therefore, the H
matrix is initialised as an identity matrix and the R and Q matrices are initialised
as one-valued diagonals with pre-defined values.
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The Fmatrix represents the expected transformation of a given state and shows
how the parameters change with each time step:
F=

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 (25)
The next time step can then be evolved from the previous one, using the dis-
crete approximation of the equations for an object moving with a constant veloc-
ity model:
xt+1 = xt + vxt
yt+1 = yt + vyt
vxt+1 = vxt
vyt+1 = vyt
(26)
An example showing the Kalman filter predicting the position of a principal
through an occlusion is shown in Figure 14. The small circle shows the prediction
of the filter, which correctly follows the target (large circle).
Figure 14.: The Kalman filter prediction (small circle) predicts the path of a
tracked principal (large circle) through an occlusion.
To re-associate the tracking sessions, we need to solve the matching problem,
i.e., associate the prediction of the filter with the target principal. The simplest
solution to the matching problem is to use a nearest neighbour approach. How-
ever, when tracking multiple principals in a crowded scene, there is no guarantee
that this approach finds the correct principal. Instead we take advantage of the
fact that the motion of principals rarely change drastically in small time windows.
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Thus, we compare the previous state with the current state and the previous mo-
tion field with the current velocity of the principal. Assuming motion consistency,
this gives a good indication of the target principal.
Figure 15 shows an exemplified position-time graph of the x-coordinate of the
tracked principal in Figure 14. The graph shows how the tracker begins to drift
from the ground truth due to the occluding principals. The track is terminated and
for a number of frames the principal is obscured, thus no bounding box is out-
putted. The predictions from the Kalman filter are used as search regions, within
which the tracker tries to relocate the target principal in each of the following
frames. In the example on Figure 14, the tracker is successful in re-associating
the tracking session with the target principal after the occlusion. This is illus-
trated in Figure 15 as the point where the motion estimate reaches the ground
truth.
Figure 15.: Position-time graph showing an example of tracking failure and re-
association based on motion estimation.
The result of the re-association is forwarded to the persistent authentication
component, which updates the confidence in the identity of the principal. If this
update reduces the confidence below a threshold, tracking is suspended. The
tracking mode is then changed to restorative tracking and a re-authentication of
the principal is required to restore the tracking session.
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6.4 D E T E C T I O N , R E C O G N I T I O N A N D F U S I O N
The current state of the principal and the output of the tracker is used by the de-
tection and recognition components. These components maintain a model of the
target and constantly analyse the output of the tracker and the state of the prin-
cipal to detect and recognise any appearances represented by the target model.
A match is used to increase the confidence of the tracker or to restore a sus-
pended session. The components are populated with prior information about the
principal and updated with online information. The output is fused using error-
rate-based fusion to increase the robustness of the evaluation.
6.4.1 Remote Biometrics
Biometrics are a multidimensional problem with the aim of understanding the
uniqueness of humans to facilitate recognition and verification of their identity.
Remote biometrics operate at a distance and require no interaction from the users,
thus ensuring a calm authentication process.
In the persistent authentication prototype we utilise remote biometrics to per-
form calm authentication of users. We consider two user-centric remote biomet-
rics, namely, facial recognition and appearance analysis. We let the biometric ex-
perts perform continuous authentication by processing samples of the biometric
modalities as they become available. We fuse the scores using error-rate-based
fusion and adjust the confidence in identify given the fused score yi.
To detect faces we use the object detection framework presented by Viola and
Jones [10] [11]. The detection is eased by leveraging the tracking information
as an initial search region for the algorithm. This significantly speeds up the
detection of faces in the persistent authentication prototype and allows faces to
be detected in real time with limited processing overhead.
In the following we discuss the implementation of facial recognition and ap-
pearance analysis.
6.4.1.1 Facial Recognition
For facial recognition we use a linear subspace technique to project high dimen-
sional data into a lower dimensional subspace by linearly combining features.
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Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [144] and Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) [145] are well established linear subspace techniques and are considered
some of the most robust methods for face recognition [146]. In the following we
present PCA and LDA and describe their differences.
Consider a set of N facial images x1,x2, ...,xN with values in an n-dimensional
image space. A linear transformation maps this n-dimensional image space into
a lower m-dimensional feature space y1,y2, ...,yN such that yk represents xk by
introducing a transformation vector W such that:
yk =W
Txk k = 1,2, ...,N (27)
For the transformation to accurately represent the original data, it is important
to retain the highest possible variation, thus the objective is to find a subspace in
which the variance is maximised. Let the total scatter matrix ST be defined as:
ST =
N
∑
k=1
(xk−µ)(xk−µ)T (28)
Where µ is the mean of all the images. After applying the linear transformation
W T , the scatter of the transformed feature vectors y1,y2, ...,yN is W T STW . In
PCA, the projection Wopt is chosen to maximise the determinant of the total
scatter matrix of the projected samples, such that:
Wopt = argmax
w
(W T STW ) (29)
The output is a set of n-dimensional eigenvectors w1,w2, ...,wm corresponding
to the m largest eigenvalues, which account for the most variance in the training
set. Since these eigenvectors have the same dimension as the original images,
they are referred to as Eigenfaces [144].
In PCA, classification can be performed in this reduced feature space, for in-
stance using a nearest neighbour classifier. However, a drawback of this approach
is, that much of the variation we seek to maximise is caused by illumination
changes [147], thus with images of faces under changing illumination the pro-
jected feature space will contain variation due to lighting and not necessarily due
to class separability. Consequently, the points in the projected space will not be
well clustered. A better approach is to use Linear Discriminant Analysis, where
classification is performed by selecting W in such a way that the ratio of the
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between-class scatter SB and the within-class scatter SW is maximised. With the
between-class scatter matrix defined as:
SB =
c
∑
i=1
Ni(µi−µ)(µi−µ)T (30)
and the within-class scatter matrix defined as:
SW =
c
∑
i=1
∑
xk∈Xi
(xk−µi)(xk−µi)T (31)
where µi is the mean image of class Xi, where Xi = 1,2, ...,c and Ni is the
number of samples in class Xi. A projection, Wopt is then found, that maximises
the class separability criterion:
Wopt = argmax
W
=
|W T SBW |
|W T SWW | (32)
The benefits of the class specific linear projection of LDA in comparison to
PCA is traditionally illustrated using the Iris flower dataset, a multivariate dataset
introduced as an example of discriminant analysis. The data quantify the morpho-
logic variation of Iris flowers of three related species “all from the same pasture,
and picked on the same day and measured at the same time by the same person
with the same apparatus” [148].
The dataset consists of 50 samples from each of three species of Iris setosa,
Iris virginica and Iris versicolor. Four features were measured from each sample:
the length and the width of the sepals and petals.
In the implementation we use the algorithms detailed by Duda et al. [149]
for Principal Component Analysis and the algorithm presented by Belhumeur et
al. [146] for Linear Discriminant Analysis.
Principal Component Analysis applied to the data identifies the combination
of attributes that account for the most variance in the data, whereas Linear Dis-
criminant Analysis try to identify attributes that account for the most variance
between classes. Figure 16 plots the two first principal components and the result
of the Linear Discriminant Analysis. As seen on the figure Linear Discriminant
Analysis allows for better class separation on the iris dataset.
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Figure 16.: Principal Component Analysis (top) and Linear Discriminant Analy-
sis (bottom) on the Iris dataset
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When used for facial recognition Linear Discriminant Analysis is known as
fisherfaces, after the original author of the algorithm. The performance of fisher-
faces is dependent on a well founded training set. In the persistent authentication
prototype we construct this training set from a series of enrolment images, which
we augment with high quality faces captured during operations. In the absence
of enrolment images our prototype can operate using only the captured faces,
though at a loss of accuracy.
6.4.1.2 Appearance Analysis
For appearance analysis we use colour profiles of the principals, calculated using
histogram comparison. Colour histograms are widely used for content-based im-
age retrieval [150] as they are fast to compute, and despite their simplicity, have
attractive properties. Since they contain no spatial information they are largely
invariant to rotation and translation of objects in the image. Additionally, colour
histograms are less affected by partial occlusions and changes in camera view-
point than facial recognition [151] [152].
The appearance of a person is considered only as auxiliary information in bio-
metrics, as it is not by itself sufficient to establish the identity of a person because
it generally is indistinct, unreliable, and can be easily spoofed. Appearance is
known as a soft biometric, which is defined as characteristics that provide some
information about the individual, but lack the distinctiveness and permanence to
sufficiently differentiate any two individuals [153].
Although soft biometrics are not as permanent or reliable as traditional bio-
metric characteristics, such as fingerprints and facial recognition, they do pro-
vide important information about the identity of the user, that can be leverage in
combination with other biometrics to provide higher accuracy in establishing the
principals identity.
Colour histograms used for appearance analysis are typically represented in
the RGB or the HSV colorspace, where the latter representation is more robust
with respect to illumination variability [154].
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The difference between two histograms h1,h2 can be expressed, for instance
by the chi-squared distance, as follows:
χ2(h1,h2) =
1
2∑k
(h1k−h2k)2
h1k + h2k
(33)
The histograms are calculated on the same regions as the facial recognition
expert. The search regions provided by the tracker are considered as bounding
boxes for the histograms. The histograms are calculated using the foreground
mask, to filter out any background information, which increases the robustness
of detection and reduces the processing time.
We combine the calculated distances with the results from the facial recogni-
tion using the error-rate-based fusion scheme described in chapter 5. The fusion
process yields a more robust result than provided by each of the individual sys-
tems. The fused biometric score yi is used to update the confidence in the identity
of the principal Pr(a|yi) in the persistent authentication component.
6.5 P E R S I S T E N T AU T H E N T I C AT I O N C O M P O N E N T
The persistent authentication component combine the responses from the tracker
and the fusion component into a single response and outputs the final hypothesis
about the target’s state. The updated score reflects the system’s confidence in the
identity of the principal and determines the provision of location-based services.
The confidence in the identity of the principal is calculated using Equation 7.
The confidence after receiving the authentication score si is expressed as the con-
ditional probability Pr(a|si). Likewise the confidence in identity after receiving
a biometric similarity score from the error-rate-based fusion component, yi, is
expressed as Pr(a|yi). The noise ei that will invariably occur in some of the mea-
surements results in an update of the confidence in a similar fashion Pr(a|ei).
This approach is illustrated in Equation 34:
Pr(a|si) =Pr(si|a)Pr(a)Pr(si) (34)
Ultimately, the updated score reflects the system’s confidence in the identity
of the principal and determines the provision of location-based services.
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When tracking is lost, due to an occlusion or noise in the sensor data, the sys-
tem’s confidence is lowered accordingly. We take an approach similar to Luber
et al. [155] and Mucientes et al. [156]. We let the probability of correctly re-
identifying a principal be described by an exponential function. This simulates
the decay in the probability of detecting a principal that has not been matched
for several consecutive frames. More formally, let t− t0 be the number of consec-
utive frames that principal a has not been observed, the probability of the event
ei given the principal a is then defined as:
Pr(ei|a) = exp(− t− t0λi ) (35)
where λ is the speed of the decay process. This exponential distribution en-
sures a gracefully degradation of the tracking confidence, as the confidence de-
creases concurrently with the likelihood that a principal will be correctly identi-
fied as time passes.
In many cases the tracker fails when the paths of multiple principals inter-
twine or when principals move too close together for the camera-based sensors
to differentiate them. In these cases the persistent authentication component will
revert to a failsafe state, setting Pr(a) to a fraction of the likely candidates, e.g.,
Pr(a) would be set to 0.5 if two principals are equally likely. This retains some
of the authentication confidence, and may increase the usability of the system,
as the principals can still access low-priority areas in the building, where only a
modest confidence score is required.
6.6 L O C AT I O N - B A S E D S E RV I C E
In real world applications, location-based services need to cover large areas that
may be composed of multiple cameras with overlapping and/or disjointed field of
views. In addition, these location-based services often include multiple authen-
tication and authorisation zones spread out in the environment. The principals
may appear in multiple cameras and their appearance in one camera might be
very different from their appearance in the next, for instance due to illumination
and pose differences or different camera properties. In addition, the occupants
may require any number of services in many locations. In conclusion, providing
location-based services is a challenging task that requires careful consideration.
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In the following we present some of the methods we use to make location-
based services possible in extensive environments and highlight an interesting
application for location-based services that is related to the behavioural analysis
of principals in the environment.
6.6.1 Multi-camera Systems
Multi-camera systems rely on the correspondences between a number of cameras
distributed in the environment. The cameras may be positioned such that they
monitor the same scene from different angles. For person tracking, this generally
gives more robust tracking results, especially in cases with persistent occlusion
between principals as the different viewing angles allows better segmentation
of the principals. However, it is not always possible to have overlapping cam-
era views due to limited resources or large areas of interest. Non-overlapping
multi-camera systems have to to deal with sparse object observations. Therefore
additional assumptions have to be made about the behaviour of the principals
in order to correlate observations from one camera to the next. Conversely, for
overlapping camera systems, calculating the correspondence between observa-
tions from the same scene requires careful consideration.
In either case, the first step in a multi-camera system is to identify the actual
area covered by the cameras in the world state and find a projection that maps
this into the model. In the analysis of digital images this problem is not always
trivial, as camera lenses introduce distortion in the images. Lens distortion occurs
in all cameras and one of the most prevalent forms of distortion is known as
barrel distortion. It results from the lens having a slightly higher magnification
in the centre of the image than in the periphery, which causes lines in the image
to appear warped around the centre. Barrel distortion is particular noticeable in
cameras with wide-angle lenses, which is clearly seen on the left in Figure 17.
Barrel distortion is primarily radial, and to correct barrel distortion one method
is to find the distortion parameter of the camera and use it to correct the distortion.
Li et al. [157] found that a relatively simple one parameter model can be used
to account for most of the distortion. Bailey et al. [158] propose a solution to
this model based on fitting parabolas to the distorted lines in the image and using
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Figure 17.: Distorted image (left) and corrected image (right)
Figure 18.: Illustration of the barrel distortion model
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the curvature to estimate the radial distortion component. The barrel distortion
model the authors use is:
ru = rd(1+κr2d) (36)
where ru and rd are the distance from the centre in the undistorted and distorted
images respectively and κ is the distortion parameter, which is specific to the
camera lens. Figure 18 shows an illustration of the barrel distortion model.
κ is determined for each of the fitted parabolas and a weighted average is cal-
culated. The barrel distortion can then be corrected by calculating the coordinates
in the undistorted image as a function of those of the distorted image. However,
in most cases we are interested in determining the inverse, i.e., we want to use
the coordinates in the undistorted image to select which pixel to display from the
distorted image. Therefore the barrel equation must be of the form:
rd = F(κ ,ru) (37)
Gribbo et al. [159] present a real-time implementation that solves this formu-
lation of the barrel distortion equation. Their approach also uses bilinear interpo-
lation to improve the quality of the corrected image. The result from correcting
barrel distortion is shown in Figure 17.
With the distortion corrected, the next step in a multi-camera system is to
identify the correspondences between the cameras. In computer vision, many au-
tomated methods exists to this problem and the survey by Szeliski et al. [160]
present an excellent overview of the most popular ones. On the other hand, man-
ual adjustment of the correspondences provides a simple and accurate alternative
to the automated methods, however it may be quite time consuming for a larger
number of cameras.
In the installations we have conducted with the persistent authentication proto-
type the number of cameras have been relatively low, in part due to the large area
covered by the wide-angle lenses, and in part to minimise the disruption caused
by the installation. As a result we have relied on manual adjustment of the cam-
era correspondences. Figure 19 shows how the corrected image from Figure 17
have been fitted to a model of the considered environment. The blue line repre-
sents the floor plan of the environment. The purple line indicates an input mask
applied to avoid certain regions, e.g., the windows to the street. The green line
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shows the camera view after taking into account the topology of the building and
the interposing objects.
Figure 19.: Corrected image fitted to the environment model
6.6.2 Behavioural Analysis
For a location-based service that spans multiple cameras, an interesting appli-
cation presents itself, namely the behavioural analysis of the principals in the
environment.
In the persistent authentication prototype we utilise the calculated optical flow
fields to form spatio-temporal patterns in the movement of the principals. Spatial
coherence describes the correlation between signals at different points in space,
whereas temporal coherence describes the correlation or predictable relationship
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between signals observed at different moments in time. By stacking multiple
consecutive frames from an image sequence on top of each other we obtain a
spatio-temporal volume that has two spatial dimensions and a temporal dimen-
sion.
An example of such aggregated motion vectors, calculated using optical flow,
is shown on Figure 20. By aggregating the flow, the dominant patterns of move-
ment in the building are identified. These patterns, in combination with the spa-
tial analysis of the building, can be used to detect and predict behaviour in the
building, as we later show in section 8.1.
6.7 S U M M A RY
An overview of the algorithms and techniques used in the implementation of
our camera-based persistent authentication prototype have been presented. The
prototype involves three main steps: detection of people in the scene, tracking of
these people, and evaluation of the tracking results with regards to the movement
patterns and the behaviour of the occupants.
We use motion-tracking for immediate frame-to-frame tracking of principals.
In cases with occlusions or noisy measurements motion tracking relies on tra-
jectory hypotheses and motion flow to re-identify principals. The probability of
correctly identifying a principal is modelled with an exponential function to rep-
resent the decreasing likelihood of identifying the correct principal over time.
Finally, if a principal is occluded for a longer period of time we consider restora-
tive tracking. Here, the authentication session is suspended and requires a re-
authentication before restoring the session.
Facial recognition and appearance analysis are integrated in the persistent au-
thentication prototype as remote biometric experts that operate at a distance and
require no interaction from the users. The experts perform continuous authentica-
tion by processing samples of the biometric modalities as they become available.
The results are fused with error-rate-based fusion to increase the robustness of
the evaluation.
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Figure 20.: Motion vectors calculated for each pixel in the image, aggregated in
a 20x20 grid, with magnitude (length) and the direction (colour).
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E VA L UAT I O N F R A M E W O R K
In this chapter we present the framework and methods used in the evaluation
of the camera-based persistent authentication prototype. The evaluation consists
of a combination of case studies, scenario-based validations and benchmarks on
public-domain datasets that are commonly used in the literature.
Firstly, We assess the performance of biometric verification with the two cho-
sen methods, Linear Discriminant Analysis and appearance analysis with colour
histograms. We assess the performance of each biometric expert individually, and
proceed with an evaluation of error-rate-based fusion of the biometric character-
istics. The results are compared with the state of the art in score level fusion. This
analysis is carried out on public-domain datasets to ensure the reproducibility of
our results.
Secondly, we analyse the performance of the tracker using the following eval-
uation framework: the tracker is initialised in the first frame of a sequence and
tracks the selected principal until a tracking failure occurs or the end of the se-
quence is reached. The generated trajectory is compared to the ground truth and
the performance is measured as the number of frames the principal was suc-
cessfully tracked. The analysis first evaluates motion tracking to establish the
baseline performance of the tracker. Restorative tracking is then evaluated using
continuous authentications provided by the biometric experts. The analysis is
carried out on two public-domain dataset, the first used to assess motion tracking
and the second to assess restorative tracking.
Finally, in order to ensure the convergence of the efforts deployed as part of
the RIBS project, a test facility has been provided for the partners to evaluate
their protection measures. Thus, we conclude the evaluation with our findings
from installing the persistent authentication prototype in a live building. This
part of the evaluation describes the data exploration techniques and tools devel-
oped to identify the contextual and behavioural patterns in the data and their
application to intrusion detection. In addition, a series of scripted scenarios have
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been defined which we use to perform scenario-based validation of the persistent
authentication prototype.
For comparative purposes with regard to previous work, we evaluate the accu-
racy of the contextual awareness provided by different smart environments and
the impact of using different sensing technologies. We employ the same met-
rics and test cases as presented by Kirschmeyer et al. [5] in their evaluation of
the original PAISE prototype. The implementation of the prototype is evaluated
on the basis of its persistence, robustness, and scalability in various conditions,
including both expected use, usurpation and malicious behaviour as follow:
Persistence: Addresses how well the system maintains the func-
tional requirements of tracking, i.e., the system’s ability to track
principals and preserve authentication sessions.
Robustness: Addresses the system’s ability to resist malicious at-
tempts of manipulation, such as usurping the identity of legitimate
users or accessing services without proper authorisation.
Scalability: Addresses the performance of the system to simulta-
neously authenticate and track a large number of principals in an
extensive environment.
The performance of the persistent authentication system deployed in either a
smart environment using closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV) or infrared
time-of-flight cameras (TOF) are compared and the impact on the persistence,
robustness and scalability noted. This part of the evaluation is presented in Ap-
pendix A.
7.1 DATA S E T S
To ensure the reproducibility of our results we evaluate the persistent authenti-
cation prototype on public-domain datasets. We consider four dataset, the IMM
Face Database [161], the Biometric Scores Set (release 1) from the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology [162], the CAVIAR dataset from INRIA
Labs at Grenoble in France, and the CAVIAR dataset from a shopping centre
in Lisbon, Portugal [163]. The IMM Face Database and the Biometric Scores
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Set is used to evaluate our error-rate-based fusion strategy with regard to the
biometric modalities. The CAVIAR INRIA Labs dataset is used to evaluate the
motion tracking capabilities of the persistent authentication system and finally,
the Lisbon CAVIAR dataset is used to evaluate the performance of the persistent
authentication prototype with continuous authentications provided by the remote
biometrics.
7.1.1 IMM Face Database
The IMM Face Database consists of 240 still images of 40 different human faces,
all without glasses. The images in the dataset are in high resolution format and
have been resized prior to the tests to 128 x 96 pixels. The gender distribution
is 7 females and 33 males. The pose, expression and illumination vary for each
subject as follows:
1. Full frontal face, neutral expression, diffuse light.
2. Full frontal face, happy expression, diffuse light.
3. Face rotated approx. 30 degrees to the person’s right, neutral
expression, diffuse light.
4. Face rotated approx. 30 degrees to the person’s left, neutral
expression, diffuse light.
5. Full frontal face, neutral expression, spotlight added at the per-
son’s left side.
6. Full frontal face, arbitrary expression, diffuse light.
An example of the varying poses and illumination of a subject is shown in
Figure 21.
7.1.2 NIST BSSR1 Dataset
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Biometric Score Set
(BSSR1) [162], is a public-domain dataset that is widely used in literature for
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Figure 21.: IMM Face Database: The varying poses and illumination of a subject
benchmarking score level fusion strategies [39] [164] [165]. We use the NIST-
face database which contains a set of similarity scores for each of two mid–
2002 face recognition algorithms, labeled system c and system g respectively.
Scores are provided on images from 3000 individuals. For each individual, the
set contains one score resulting from a genuine comparison and a number of
scores resulting from impostor comparisons as follows:
NIST-face Dataset
Number of subjects: 3000
Number of face systems: 2
Number of face images from which scores came: 2 per subject
Number of scores: 2 * 3000 * 6000
Number of similarity files: 12000
7.1.3 CAVIAR INRIA Labs dataset
The INRIA CAVIAR dataset contains a number of video sequences that include
staged and scripted behaviour intended to test various forms of interactions. The
videos are shot with a wide angle lens, and shows the entrance lobby of the IN-
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RIA Labs at Grenoble, France. The resolution of the video is half-resolution PAL
standard (384 x 288 pixels, 25 frames per second) compressed using MPEG2.
For each video sequence a hand-labelled frame-by-frame ground truth is pro-
vided, that details the location of each principal in the scene, and for some of the
clips, additional information about their head, gaze direction and hand, feet and
shoulder positions. The ground truth also contains bounding boxes for groups of
principals. Figure 22 shows a typical frame from the dataset, where the individ-
ual principals have been annotated with boxes (yellow) and the group annotated
with a bounding box (green).
The mapping between model and world state is computed using the ground
plane homography information. Figure 23 shows the coordinate system and a set
of reference points. Table 5 lists the corresponding positions.
Table 5.: INRIA Ground plane homography
Point Position (x,y) Position (cm)
1 (64,88) (0,671.5)
2 (211,40) (1116,670)
3 (349,184) (1545,190)
4 (39,187) (0,0)
7.1.4 CAVIAR Lisbon dataset
The second CAVIAR dataset is from a shopping centre in Lisbon, Portugal. This
set focuses on person interaction, including people walking, meeting with oth-
ers, conversing, and window shopping. The sequences show a corridor in the
shopping centre with entrances to a number of shops. Each sequence is made up
of two time-synchronised videos with two different view points. The first view
point (a) shows a view along the length of the corridor and the second (b) shows
a view across the corridor. The resolution of the videos are half-resolution PAL
standard (384 x 288 pixels, 25 frames per second) and they are compressed using
MPEG2.
Similar to the INRIA dataset, a hand-labelled frame-by-frame ground truth
is provided for each video and the mapping between model and world state is
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Figure 22.: Ground truth of individuals (yellow) and groups (green)
Figure 23.: INRIA Ground plane homography system and reference points.
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computed using the ground plane homography. The homography coordinate sys-
tem is shown for view (a) in Figure 24 and for view (b) in Figure 25, with the
corresponding reference points listed in Table 6.
Table 6.: Lisbon Ground plane homography
Point Position (x,y) Position (cm)
1 (91,163) (0,975 )
2 (241,163) (290,975 )
3 (98,266) (0,–110 )
4 (322,265) (290,–110 )
5 (60,153) (0,0 )
6 (359,153) (0,975 )
7 (50,201) (382,098)
8 (367,200) (382,878)
7.2 E VA L UAT I O N O F B I O M E T R I C F U S I O N
In the following we consider the performance of each of the two implemented
biometric experts. We then fuse the scores using error-rate-based fusion and com-
pared the results against the state of the art.
Score level fusion generally offers a good trade-off in terms of information
content and ease in fusion. However, score level fusion is still a challenging
task as the scores generated by the different experts can be either distance or
similarity based and may follow different probability distributions. Additionally,
the experts may provide quite different accuracies, which is accentuated when
fusing hard and soft biometrics.
7.2.1 Biometric Experts
In the implementation of the persistent authentication prototype we use Linear
Discriminant Analysis for face recognition and colour histograms for appearance
analysis. Both methods operate on data that can be measured from a distance,
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Figure 24.: Lisbon ground plane homography for view (a)
Figure 25.: Lisbon ground plane homography for view (b)
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thus they are non-invasive and allows authentication to be performed continu-
ously by sampling the modality recurrently.
We use the IMM Face Database to evaluate the performance of the biometric
experts. We compare each image against every other image in the dataset. This
generates a number of genuine scores, when the image pairs are from the same
individual and conversely, a number of impostor scores when the image pairs are
from two different individuals.
We calculate the error rates (ER) for each expert using different operating
parameters. The error rates and the corresponding true acceptance rate (TAR)
and false rejection rate (FAR) of the experts are shown in Table 7 for different
thresholds.
Table 7.: Error rates of the biometric experts at increasing thresholds
Biometric Expert TAR FAR ER
Face Recognition
89.1% 0.6% 5.75%
95.8% 1.41% 2.82%
99.6% 2.82% 1.61%
Apperance Analysis
70.77% 0.9% 15.07%
83.5% 1.81% 9.17%
100% 8.06% 4.03%
The results show that the LDA method described in subsection 6.4.1 is very ac-
curate and robust to the varying poses, with the best error rate being 1.61%. The
colour histograms have a comparatively higher error rate of 4.03%. The perfor-
mance difference is to be expected, and shows that the more robust LDA method
is capable of achieving high recognition rates, with a low false acceptance rate,
when the size of the dataset is small.
As expected, we found that the majority of errors were due to the high variance
between the images with either a rotated view or the added spotlight (images 3,
4 and 5 in Figure 21). As both pose and illumination affects the accuracy of the
experts such images should generally be avoided for use as enrolments images
in the system.
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7.2.2 Sum Rule Fusion
We fuse the scores generated by the experts using error-rate-based fusion and
compare the results to the sum rule combining scheme. In literature the sum
rule is often used as the golden standard for comparison, as it provides a com-
mon ground for different score level fusion techniques. The motivation for using
a common benchmark, instead of directly comparing the state of the art, arise
as most fusion techniques are closed-source and difficult to implement. In con-
trast, datasets are readily available, and with the sum rule, enables the ranking of
different fusion techniques across implementations based on their performance
against the benchmark. Thus, we use the sum rule combining scheme to generate
benchmark measurements that help asses the performance of our error-rate-based
fusion technique.
The sum rule is a simple fusion operator and as noted by Norman et al. [37]
is widely used for comparative purposes. The sum rule has been shown by Kit-
tler et al. [40] [41] to outperform other simple fusion operators such as min, max,
majority vote and product. Kittler and Alkoot [42] have later shown that for Gaus-
sian distributions of estimation errors, the sum rule outperforms all other simple
fusion operators. Fatukasi et al. [166] builds on the work of Kittler et al. and con-
cludes that the sum rule should be used if either a high level of noise is present
or when experts are highly correlated, which lends itself to the use of the sum
rule for our comparison.
The sum rule assigns weights to each of the experts and fuse the data as shown
in Equation 38. In the following evaluations we always consider an equal weight-
ing.
ywsum =
N
∑
i=1
wiyi (38)
In transformation-based score level fusion schemes, such as the sum rule, it is
often necessary to normalise the input scores before the fusion process. Common
approaches to score normalisation include: min-max normalisation, z-score nor-
malisation, and tanh-estimator normalisation. He et al. [167] present an overview
of these common normalisation techniques and compare the performance against
a proposed method, namely reduction of high-scores effect (RHE) normalisation.
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The authors found that multimodal biometric systems generally suffer more
from low genuine scores, as opposed to high impostor scores. We also noted this
effect in the discussion of the effect of quality on fusion in section 5.3. The situ-
ation occurs as the degrading quality of the biometric samples adversely affects
the similarity scores. Thus, it is unlikely that a bad quality sample from a genuine
user results in a high similarity score. Similarly, neither a good nor bad quality
sample from an adversary is likely to generate a high similarity score with the
template.
Using the NIST BSSR1 dataset, the authors conclude that min-max normali-
sation is the best performing common normalisation technique, albeit one that is
sensitive to outliers in the data. In min-max normalisation, let X denote the set
of raw matching scores from a given biometric expert and let the score x ∈ X .
The normalised score is denoted x′. The method maps the raw scores to the in-
terval [0, 1] and retains the original distribution of matching scores except for a
scaling factor. Given the maximum and minimum values of the raw scores, the
normalised score is calculated as:
x′ =
x−min(X)
max(X)−min(X) (39)
For each of our experiments, repeated sub-sampling cross-validation is used
to split the dataset into training and validation data. For each split, the model is
fit to the training data to estimate the normalisation parameters and error-rates
required by the fusion schemes. The predictive accuracy of the fusion algorithms
are assessed using the validation data. The partitioning of scores are repeated
10 times and the results averaged over the splits. Figure 26 shows the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve for each of the individual experts, the sum
rule and error-rate-based fusion. The results are summarised in Table 8.
Table 8 shows that the overall performance when using a combining scheme
is better than any of the individual experts. The sum rule has an error rate of
1.11%, which is significantly lower than the best performing biometric expert.
This increase in performance is expected and is in line with results published by
Kittler et al.
Error-rate-based fusion has an error rate of 1.06% and thus outperforms the
sum rule. This decrease in error rate stems from the fact that we weigh the scores
given by each expert based on their FAR and FRR values as outlined in Equa-
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Figure 26.: Performance of Linear Discriminant Analysis and colour histograms
on the IMM Face database
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tion 19; conversely the sum rule uses fixed values for each wi as given by Equa-
tion 38. As a result, our error-rate-based fusion strategy is more likely to resolve
the conflicts between experts in favour of the best performing expert for the given
biometric score.
Table 8.: Performance comparison of fusion schemes
Fusion Scheme TAR FAR ER
Sum Rule
90.5% 0.3% 4.89%
97.6% 0.6% 1.51%
100% 2.22% 1.11%
Error-rate-based
97.8% 0.4% 1.31%
98.1% 0.5% 1.20%
100% 2.11% 1.06%
7.2.3 State of the Art in Score Level Fusion
We evaluate error-rate-based fusion on the NIST BSSR1 dataset and compare the
results to the state of the art in score level fusion. From section 2.4 follows the di-
vision of score level fusion into three categories: (1) transformation-based score
fusion in which match scores are first normalised (transformed) to a common do-
main and then combined, (2) classifier-based score fusion in which scores from
multiple matchers are treated as a feature vector and a classifier is constructed
to discriminate genuine and impostor scores, and (3) density-based score fusion,
where scores are converted to likelihood ratios with an explicit estimation of the
genuine and impostor score densities.
We compare the performance of error-rate-based fusion to a score level fu-
sion scheme from each of the three categories, specifically: (a) a particle swarm
optimisation (PSO) algorithm using z-norm normalisation [165], (b) a classifier-
based score fusion scheme using support vector machines (SVM) [167], and
(c) a likelihood ratio-based fusion scheme with Gaussian mixture model-based
density estimation [39]. In short, PSO fusion finds the parameters for dynamic
weighting and fusion of scores using particle swarm optimisation. This is a func-
tion of the accuracy and the degree of correlation between the biometric classi-
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fiers. SVM fusion splits the training data into two classes with a hyperplane that
maximises the margin between them. Scores from multiple matchers are treated
as a feature vector and a classifier constructed to discriminate genuine and im-
postor scores. In likelihood ratio-based fusion the optimal combination of match
scores are based on the likelihood ratio test. The distributions of genuine and
impostor scores are modelled as finite Gaussian mixture models.
We assess the increase in true acceptance rate when using each of the fusion
schemes, compared to the best performing individual expert. Further, to support
the comparison and to provide a baseline for further use, we fuse the scores using
the sum rule. As mentioned, the motivation for this approach arise as the perfor-
mance of each fusion scheme is not only determined by their implementation
but more so by their operating parameters. Fusion schemes may require complex
pre-processing and normalisation techniques and detailed modeling of the score
distributions. Also, to obtain the high precision rates in the published results, one
must carefully select the operating parameters of each method. Therefore, there
exists a trade-off between implementation complexity and precision, which is
rarely reflected upon in literature.
The scores in the NIST face database are generated by two facial recognition
systems, c and g, which are listed to output scores in the range [0,1] and [0,100].
The score distributions are nonhomogenic, as seen in Figure 27. Note, that for
system c there exists a small number of outliers in the data, caused when the sys-
tem outputs a discrete score with the value –1. The other scores from the recog-
nition system is in the interval [0.35,0.95]. These outliers have been omitted in
the normalisation step.
The scores are processed and a threshold set for deciding whether to accept or
to reject a match. A genuine match is obtained when two feature vectors corre-
sponding to the same individual are compared, and an impostor match is obtained
when feature vectors from two different individuals are compared.
The methods for dividing the NIST-BSSR1 dataset into training and test-sets
vary greatly between implementations. Thus, in this evaluation we employ re-
peated sub-sampling cross-validation to split the dataset in an unbiased fashion.
For each split, the model is fit to the training data to estimate the normalisa-
tion parameters and error-rates required by the fusion schemes. The partitioning
is repeated 10 times and the results averaged over the splits. Figure 28 shows
the receiver operating characteristic curves of the two face recognition systems,
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Figure 27.: Genuine and impostor scores for each of the two face matchers
error-rate-based fusion and the sum rule combining scheme. Error-rate-based fu-
sion leads to significant improvement in the performance compared to the best
single system and to the sum rule.
For each fusion scheme, we compare the reported genuine acceptance rates
with the false acceptance rate set to 0.01%. The motivation for such a low FAR
is that the false acceptances measure the portion of unauthorised users who are
allowed in the system. In traditional applications of biometric authentication,
where the system is used as the verification scheme for access control, even a sin-
gle intruder is considered a serious threat to the overall security of the application.
Note, that in contrast to these traditional applications of biometric authentication,
persistent authentication tolerates a higher FAR, as the system continuously per-
forms authentication of the principals. As such, wrongfully admitted principals
may be detected and their authentication sessions revoked at a later stage.
Table 9 lists the performance comparison of the fusion schemes. The experi-
mental results show that error-rate-based fusion outperforms support vector ma-
chine classification, particle swarm optimisation and the sum rule. Only likeli-
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Figure 28.: Performance of error-rate-based fusion and sun fusion on the NIST
BSSR1 dataset
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Table 9.: Performance comparison of fusion schemes with FAR 0.01%
Fusion Scheme Best Matcher Fusion Gain
Likelihood 71.20% 77.20% 6.00%
SVM 73.35% 77.50% 4.15%
Sum Rule 84.07% 86.08% 2.01%
Error-rate-based 84.07% 89.24% 5.17%
PSO 87.30% 89.50% 2.20%
hood ratio-based fusion performs better. Yet, the performance of error-rate-based
fusion is close and in some applications error-rate-based fusion may be preferred
over the Gaussian mixture model-based density estimation. Gaussians are not al-
ways appropriate for modelling biometric scores, as the score distributions may
have more than one mode or require a great number of training samples to con-
verge.
To put these results into perspective, consider the comparison of fusion tech-
niques conducted by NIST [168]. With data from 187,000 subjects the authors
evaluated eight biometric fusion techniques and their findings paint a similar pic-
ture. The authors concluded that density-based score fusion schemes consistently
are the most accurate - but also the most complex to implement. This complexity
is in the modelling of distributions, rather than in the fusion per se and the effect
is especially true for density estimation at the tails.
For error-rate-based fusion this effect is evident as the performance of the fu-
sion scheme diverges towards the tails. As is illustrated on Figure 28, the overall
error rate of the fusion scheme at FAR 0.01% is 5.39%, whereas the best perfor-
mance is achieved with FAR 1.22% resulting in an error rate of 2.51%. For per-
sistent authentication, where the occurrence of false acceptances are mitigated by
the continuous sampling of the biometric modalities, setting a higher FAR will
lead to better performance in the fusion process, without causing undue security
concerns.
The accuracy of error-rate-based fusion is significant and warrants a use in
security sensitive biometric applications, where the performance of the biomet-
ric system is important. Error-rate-based fusion is especially suited for use with
persistent authentication, as it integrates directly with the prior probabilities in
the identity of the principals and benefits from the continuous authentications
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provided by the framework. On the other hand, for less security dependent ap-
plications, a classifier-based approach may offer adequate accuracy. Further, as
classifiers are simple fusion operators, they are significantly easier to implement
and maintain.
7.3 E VA L UAT I O N O F T H E T R AC K E R
The evaluation of the tracker first establishes the baseline performance of motion
tracking and then assess the performance of restorative tracking with continuous
authentications provided by the biometric experts.
The tracker is initialised on the first frame of the sequence that contains the
principal and tracks the selected principal until a tracking failure occurs or the
end of the sequence is reached. The generated trajectory is compared to the
ground truth and the performance is measured as the number of frames the prin-
cipal was successfully tracked. This measure is recorded as the number of frames
where the overlap with the ground truth bounding box is larger than 50%.
7.3.1 Evaluation of Motion Tracking
We use the INRIA dataset to assess the performance of the tracker. A subset
of the dataset is selected that contains people walking, browsing, meeting and
interacting as a group. In this subset 32 unique principals are identified. The
tracker is initialised on the first frame containing the principal and the measured
position of each principal is noted and compared to the ground truth. The results
are shown in Figure 29, which details the results for each of the 32 principals.
The figure shows the number of frames the principals are successfully tracked
by the persistent authentication system (white) compared to the ground truth
(red). The figure shows that the accuracy of the tracking algorithm, for most
sequences, is very high.
For the first 18 principals there are few to no occlusions and no drop-outs, i.e.,
principals that are obscured completely from the view of the camera, and thus the
system achieve near perfect tracking. In contrast, the remaining 14 principals are
selected to test the performance in cases with heavy occlusions and regular drop-
outs. In these sequences, the principals are often completely occluded or walk in
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groups that make individual tracking challenging. This causes the tracker to rely
on motion estimation to re-associate lost authentication sessions using the last
know position of the principal and the associated trajectory and velocity. This
is an error prone process that may cause tracking failures. Consequently, the
accuracy of the system drops considerably in these clips.
The overall accuracy of the system on the CAVIAR INRIA dataset is 86.53%.
While this might be sufficient for general positioning of the principals, it is too
low for security sensitive applications. Thus in the following we evaluate the
addition of remote biometrics for continuous authentication.
7.3.2 Evaluation of Restorative Tracking
We use the CAVIAR Lisbon dataset to evaluate the performance of persistent
authentication with continuous verification. The dataset is selected as it provides
a challenging setting that resembles the envisioned installation facilities. The
biometric characteristics used in the evaluation are facial recognition and appear-
ance analysis, both measured from a distance. Authentication is performed con-
tinuously by sampling the modalities recurrently, and the output of the biometric
experts are fused using error-rate-based fusion.
Like the INRIA dataset, 32 unique principals are identified and tracked to test
the performance of persistent authentication with fused biometrics. The tracker
and the remote biometrics are initialised on the first frame in the sequence that
contains the principal and has available biometric modalities. The performance
of the system is measured by recording the number of frames each principal has
been successfully tracked by the persistent authentication system compared to
the ground truth. To evaluate the effect of the remote biometrics we assess the
performance both with and without continuous authentications and compare the
results.
For continuous authentications, we sample the biometric features as they be-
come available. The setting in a corridor, where the principals are walking in
both directions, means the principals are not always facing the camera. As a re-
sult, the experts are only able to extract features from a subset of the total frames.
In addition the results may be less accurate due to occlusions and changes in
orientation.
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Figure 29.: Frames the principals are tracked by the persistent authentication sys-
tem (white) and the corresponding ground truth (red)
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Figure 30.: The varying poses and sizes of the captured faces from the CAVIAR
Dataset.
The 32 principals are tracked through varying poses, distances to the cam-
era and in changing illuminations. An example of this variance is shown in Fig-
ure 30 for three principals. The half-resolution PAL standard, which the CAVIAR
videos are recorded in, are considered quite low by todays standards and thus the
resolution of the captured facial images are very low. The examples shown in
Figure 30 are only 50 x 50 pixels, which we conjecture will have an impact on
the performance of the experts.
The dataset is constructed from the initialisation sample of each of the tracked
principals, as well as faces from 18 other occupants which provide additional
imposter scores. The normalisation parameters and error rates are calculated and
for each subsequently captured biometric sample this process is repeated using
leave-one-out cross-validation. New samples are then added to the training set
to increase the robustness of the system. In contrast, for a production system,
the training set would be constructed beforehand, using high quality samples
captured from each principal during the enrolment process.
Each step is monitored by a human expert who records the performance of
the system and of each of the biometric experts. Figure 31 shows the receiver
operating characteristic curves of the face recognition system, the colour his-
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tograms, error-rate-based fusion and the sum rule combining scheme. The FAR
value yielding the best performance for each system is summarised in Table 10.
Figure 31.: Performance of error-rate-based fusion and sun fusion on the
CAVIAR Lisbon dataset
Table 10.: Performance of Biometric Experts and Fusion Schemes
System TAR FAR ER
Facial Expert 94.58% 6.40 % 5.91%
Apperance Expert 85.96% 7.64% 10.84%
Sum Rule 95.81% 4.93% 4.56%
Error-rate-based 97.50% 5.98% 4.24%
Error-rate-based fusion performs significantly better than the best single sys-
tem and also outperforms the sum rule. Error-rate-based fusion has an error rate
of 4.24%, compared to 5.91% and 10.84% for the two biometric experts. Like-
wise, the sum rule performs really well on this dataset with an error rate of 4.56%.
We conjecture that the relative high error rate of the individual experts, espe-
cially the facial expert, on this dataset is caused by the very low resolution of
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the training images and the greatly varied poses of the principals. However, this
shows that even in adverse conditions the LDA method yields usable results. Ad-
ditionally, the simple approach of the appearance expert is still able to provide
meaningful information for the fusion algorithms.
With the performance of the biometrics determined, each of the 32 principals
are tracked following the framework outlined earlier. The number of frames each
principal is successfully tracked is measured and compared to the ground truth.
This process is repeated twice, once for motion tracking and once for restorative
tracking.
The results are shown in Figure 32, which charts the results for each of the
32 principals. The figure shows the number of frames the principals are success-
fully tracked by the motion tracker (white) with remote biometrics (grey) and
the ground truth (red). For some principals there are few or no occlusions and
no drop-outs, and in these situations both systems achieve near perfect tracking
of the principals. The accuracy of the tracking drops when occlusions and drop-
outs occur, for instance when principals enter a shop or when multiple principals
crowd the scene. The persistent authentication prototype may completely lose
track of a principal and in this case the remote biometrics are used to re-associate
the session with the correct principal. As a result, the system using remote bio-
metrics greatly outperforms motion tracking for a number of the tracks. This
effect is most pronounced for tracks 7, 13 and 21.
The overall performance of the system with only motion tracking is 73.60%,
whereas using continuous authentication with remote biometrics results in an
overall performance of 91.78%. Continuous authentication makes it possible
to re-identify principals who are otherwise lost, due to occlusions in crowded
scenes or drop-outs caused by camera positioning. The evaluation shows that the
persistent authentication system is able to achieve good tracking results, even
with low quality video data, in a challenging usage scenario.
7.4 S U M M A RY
The persistent authentication prototype is evaluated on four publicly available
datasets to ensure the reproducibility of the results. The datasets considered are,
the IMM Face Database, the NIST BSSR1 dataset, the CAVIAR dataset from
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Figure 32.: Frames the principals are tracked by the persistent authentication
system (white) with remote biometrics (grey) and the corresponding
ground truth (red)
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INRIA Labs at Grenoble in France, and the CAVIAR dataset from Lisbon in
Portugal.
Two biometric modalities are considered, namely, facial recognition and ap-
pearance analysis. Both characteristics are measured from a distance with con-
tinuous authentication performed by sampling the modalities recurrently. The
biometrics are used to evaluate the performance of error-rate-based fusion in
comparison to the sum rule to provide a baseline for further evaluations.
The experimental results show that error-rate-based fusion outperforms sup-
port vector machine classification, particle swarm optimisation and the sum rule.
Further, the performance of error-rate-based fusion approaches that of likelihood
ratio-based fusion. In addition, for some applications error-rate-based fusion may
be preferred over the Gaussian mixture model-based density estimation used in
likelihood fusion.
Error-rate-based fusion used in combination with persistent authentication in-
creases the tracking performance greatly. The persistent authentication prototype
with continuous authentication using fused remote biometrics achieves 91.78%
accuracy on the Lisbon CAVIAR dataset. Given the low quality video data and
the limited training set, this shows the robustness of the persistent authentication
method.
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8.1 T H E O B J E C T
In the scope of the RIBS project a test facility has been provided for the part-
ners to evaluate their protection measures, in order to ensure the convergence
of the efforts and integrations. The test facility represents a generic commercial
building located in Europe and is known as the object. Deploying persistent au-
thentication as a protection measure in the object were a truly multi-disciplinary
effort, contingent on the expertise provided by all the parters in the RIBS project,
to whom credit is due for their invaluable help during the planning, installation
and evaluation.
The object is a three story building with multiple service functions including
both public interfaces, private interfaces and back offices. This evaluation pri-
marily focus on the public interface, which is located on the ground floor. The
public interface concerns the main function of the object, namely, the operation
of a retail bank branch. The bank branch provides a number of services, includ-
ing a customer front desk, automated teller machines (ATMs), meeting rooms for
private conversations and waiting areas for the customers. There is considerable
interaction between the public and private interface of the bank and the areas
open to the public intersect the private areas and the back office. This creates an
interesting setting for persistent authentication, as the layout of the public and
private interfaces requires a disproportionate number of authentication points to
secure. This reduces the usability of the facility and require the bank’s employees
to continuously authenticate to access the private areas of the bank.
The formal security practices in the object are fairly straightforward–there
is a single entry point to the public section, beyond which smart-cards or keys
are required. Employees pass through the same security system as visitors to
the branch (double-doored turnstiles equipped with cameras, allowing only a
single principal to enter at a time). Entry to the private interface is regulated with
smart-cards. There is a single authentication zone at the entrance to each floor
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beyond the ground floor, which gives access to the entire private section on that
floor. Predominantly, the access control systems used in the object are in place
to prevent ‘casual’ faulty entry and not made to withstand more deliberate or
equipped malevolent entry. We would like to remind readers that the smart-card
based authentication system, used for the initial authentication of the principals,
is external to the persistent authentication system and as an interchangeable part
of the system, we do not consider it directly.
Surveillance routines in the object rely heavily on passive/collective surveil-
lance. Security guards are present at the entrance, beyond which most surveil-
lance is done by personnel with other tasks (cashiers, consultants, advisors). The
structure for this passive surveillance is eased by the generally sociofugal con-
figuration of the object, i.e., that the functions in the object are located in the
periphery, thereby concentrating visitors to central locations that are easier to
monitor. Video surveillance are only in select places in the object, and mainly
used to record events so as to establish proof and information for police investi-
gations post-event.
The persistent authentication system were installed in the object over a period
of two weeks. To substantiate the collected data, additional manual observations
were carried out that recorded the location and activity of people in the object.
These observations were followed up by interviews with the principals to dis-
cover additional contextual information, such as the frequency and reasons for
their visits to the bank. These interviews were used in conjunction with the persis-
tent authentication data to help detect behavioural patterns that encompass more
contextual information than sensors alone can provide.
The location-based service considered in this evaluation is a context-aware
access control system, similar to the one described in section 4.4. The initial au-
thentications were provided by the smart-card system already in place in the ob-
ject. The existing video surveillance were too sparsely distributed to provide con-
textual awareness to the persistent authentication system, thus additional CCTV
cameras were installed in the object. To reduce the intrusiveness of the installa-
tion the number of cameras were limited, conversely, the objective of the instal-
lation was to maximise the coverage of each camera.
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The CCTV cameras used in the installation are Level One network cameras1
with 360-degree fisheye lenses. The 360-degree field of vision allows a smaller
number of cameras to cover a larger area. On the other hand, the lens introduces
distortion, especially in the periphery of the image. The CCTV cameras were
mounted as recommended in the specification–in the ceiling, looking directly
down. This provides a viewing angle that helps reduce the occurrence of occlu-
sions, but makes it very difficult to capture faces of the principals. Consequently,
the persistent authentication system relies on the existing video surveillance cam-
eras and the smart-cards for continuous authentication.
The installation point of each camera and their respective fields of view are
shown for the ground floor of the object in Figure 33- The radial distortion of
the lenses were corrected using the methods outlined in subsection 6.6.1, and the
correlation between overlapping areas, covered by multiple cameras, adjusted
manually. Figure 34 shows the resulting area covered by the cameras. The purple
line indicates the field of view of the cameras after distortion correction. The
green line shows the field of view after taking into account the topology of the
building and interposing objects. The total area covered by the CCTV cameras
is 350 square meters.
To get a visual understanding of the distribution of people in the object, con-
sider Figure 35. The figure shows the location of people over a two hour period,
taken as five minute snapshots. This gives an indication of the areas with high
traffic and the areas where people queue up.
1 The CCTV cameras have a 1/3" Progressive CMOS 2-Megapixel Sensor, recording at VGA reso-
lution (640x480 pixel) using the H.264 compression format.
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Figure 33.: Field of view of the installed CCTV cameras
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Figure 34.: Area covered by CCTV cameras after radial distortion correction
(purple) and taking into account the topology of the building (green)
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Figure 35.: Distribution of people moving (red) and waiting (blue) taken over
two hours, as five minute snapshots.
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8.2 S C E N A R I O S
The method adopted in the RIBS project to assess the proposed protection mea-
sures belongs to a group of requirements engineering methods known as scenario-
based validation [169]. Scenario-based validation is an analysis that spans a
given period of time, with the objective of testing a range of conditions that
the protection measures may face. The relevant conditions are captured in a set
of scenario models that represent the successive states of the system over the
period.
In order to develop the scenarios our analysis starts with the central event [170].
In every attack there is a number of elements that are decided by the attacker
when planning and executing the attack. The central event is identified as the
defining element, that has the potential for causing severe consequences to the
stakeholders, and are considered as the basis of the perpetrator’s operational ob-
jectives.
The central events that are consider in the RIBS project are as follows:
• Activation of a biological weapon near or within the object
• Activation of a chemical weapon near or within the object
• Activation of an explosive weapon near or within the object
The constraints of the environment may introduce restrictions on which op-
tions are available to an attacker. As an example, the offender may choose to
hide the weapon in a car. The presence of the weapon in a car creates a number
of requirements on the scenario. For example, that the car must accommodate
the weapon and needs to be moved to reach its intended location.
When developing new security technologies, it is useful to know how offend-
ers might proceed to achieve their objectives. This information can be used to
identify relevant factors of potential attacks and devise strategies and control
principles to disrupt them. To this aim, attack models can be constructed in the
form of crime scripts [171].
Thus, in order to create the scenarios a diverse range of operational elements,
reflecting a variety of offender decisions, are selected and the scenarios interpo-
lated from these. For the majority of the scenarios, the most direct conditional
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path that meets the offender’s objectives are selected, as it is assumed that the
offender follows rational decision making theory and the least effort principle.
8.2.1 Crime Scripts
In the crime science literature, crime scripts are generally specified in natural lan-
guage [171] [172]. The purpose of the following scripts is to test the adaptability
of the persistent authentication system, i.e., to test if the system is able to detect
the offender in the chosen scenario.
Scripts can never be at the same time completely generic and consistently
applicable, which is why the RIBS project proposes a range of scripts that have
a wide range of uses. A total of 12 crime scripts are defined in the RIBS project,
most which deal with the central events and post-activation of a weapon in the
object. In the persistent authentication system we are instead interested in the
events leading up to the activation and the factors contributing to the delivery
and propagation of the weapon by insiders and intruders. Thus, in the following
we present a subset of the crime scripts, containing the two most applicable to
the persistent authentication system.
STORAGE
Weapon E: 5 kg IED (improved explosive device)
“A cleaner will attempt to introduce a weapon in the bank, bringing
in a small amount of agent at a time over several days. She intends
to place the device in a board room on the office floor and trigger
it remotely using a mobile phone, at a time where specific or many
employees are in the bank.” .
PACKAGE
Weapon E+B: IED + Bio agent
“An external supplier will attempt to introduce a small package, con-
taining a device with a small explosive charge and a threat agent
on the office floor. After leaving the bank, the individual intends to
trigger the weapon using a mobile phone, and contaminate the em-
ployees.”
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The first script evaluates that the persistent authentication system can detect
insiders, i.e., principals that are authorised to access parts of the object and can
exploit these access rights to introduce an explosive device into a sensitive area.
The second script evaluates that external personnel that are granted access to
the object are detected if they attempt to introduced a combined explosive and
biological weapon into a restricted area.
8.2.1.1 Storage
For the first script a set of logical security policies are created in the persistent
authentication system, which define the areas authorised personnel are allowed
access to. These policies include important appurtenant contextual information,
such as the time of day and the length of access. The policies are formulated as
detailed in section 4.4 and enables the persistent authentication system to detect
insiders if they violate these security policies.
The virtual walls used in the security policies are created as outlined in sub-
section 4.4.2, with three separate entities defined. The first virtual wall covers
general access to the office floor and monitors that only authorised personel en-
ters the back office. Entry to the back office is regulated with a smart-card based
access control system that were already in place in the object. The second wall
covers access to the board room, which likewise uses smart-cards for security.
Finally, the third virtual wall covers entrance into a manager’s private office. Ac-
cess to this office is not specifically restricted beyond the general access control
to the back office, but entry is only intended during office hours, when the man-
agers is present. We specify the walls as follows, with the response represented
by a boolean, accept/reject based on the evaluation of the principal:
w1 = 〈back office, employees, response〉
w2 = 〈board room, employees, response〉
w3 = 〈private office, manager / {employees}, response〉
(40)
To assess the robustness of the security policies we monitor and log access
to the back office, the board room and the private office. We note the entries
detected by the persistent authentication prototype and compare it to a manually
annotated ground truth. The performance is measured as the fraction of correctly
measured events detected by the prototype out of all events. Table 11 summarises
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the result of the evaluation over a 8 hour data collection period, for each of the
three virtual walls.
Table 11.: Evaluation of virtual walls in the object
Virtual Wall Entries Genuine Measured FRR Performance
Office floor 231 207 227 1.73% 98.27%
Board room 52 52 45 13.46% 86.54%
Private office 28 28 23 17.86% 82.14%
Out of the 231 entries to the office floor the majority, 207, are legitimate entries
in which the personel correctly presented their smart-cards before entering the
back office. In the remaining entries, employees were tailgating their colleagues
through the access control system in order to avoid the hassel of authenticating
themselves. The persistent authentication prototype successfully detected 227 of
these entries including all the illegitimate entries, giving an overall performance
of 98.27% with no false acceptances. The high detection rate is in part due to the
proximity of the smart-card authentication system to the virtual wall and in part
due to the sparse population of the access area. This provides optimal operating
conditions for the persistent authentication prototype, which is reflected in the
detection rates.
In the 52 entries to the board room the persistent authentication prototype cor-
rectly detected 45 entires, resulting in an overall performance of 86.54%. Only
genuine access occurred, thus the false rejection rate was 13.46%. The lower ac-
curacy of this result compared to entry to the office floor, is due to the way people
access meeting rooms. People will generally queue up and enter the board room
in groups, creating a very challenging situation for the prototype where identi-
fying each individual in the group is difficult. This causes the prototype to lose
track of the authentication sessions associated with each individual.
An extension to the persistent authentication prototype is proposed to deal
with groups of authenticated people by merging authentication sessions using
the least common denominator for each group. For instance, a group of authenti-
cated principals queuing up together are all authorised to access restricted areas
based on the individual in the group with the lowest privileges. Thus, even in
cases where individual tracking is impossible, this allows the system to authorise
principals where the service provision threshold, ∆ j, of the authorisation zone,
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S j, is lower than the least common denominator of the group. This approach
increases the usability of the system and is especially suited for areas, such as
meeting rooms, that do not require non-repudiation.
For entry into the private office the persistent authentication prototype cor-
rectly identified 23 out of the 28 entires. No illegitimate access was attempted
and the overall accuracy were 82.14%, which is considered quite low for the
prototype. One of the explanations are that access to the private office requires
the prototype to correctly evaluate the credentials of both the manager and the
accompanying employees. Further, the employees may authenticate at the entry
to the office floor and then wait before going to the managers office. Hence, the
persistent authentication prototype must track these principals for an extended
period of time, before their authentication sessions are needed. As the smart en-
vironment is not specifically setup to facilitate acquisition of remote biometrics
the number of positive biometric signatures are quite sparse. This has an ad-
verse affect on the confidence of the tracker, and ultimately results in poorer
performance. In environments where installation of more sensors are possbile,
the performance of the persistent authentication system will increase.
The demonstration shows that the persistent authentication prototype is able
to detect access and to determine the credentials of the involved principals. How-
ever, the static nature of the virtual walls and the security policies means that
attackers are only detected if the policies are violated directly. For instance, if
the cleaner is allowed access to the board room at a specific time and uses this
time to introduce the weapon, the persistent authentication system is unable to
detect the attack. It is therefore necessary to introduce dynamic constraints in the
formulation of the security policies.
Such dynamic constraints uses the movement patterns of the occupants to
create behavioural profiles based on data analysis of historical data. These be-
havioural profiles enables the persistent authentication system to detect if the
movement of an attacker deviates from the established patterns, either the pat-
terns created by all occupants or specifically the patterns created by the cleaning
personnel. Further, it is possible to detect deviations in the patterns generated
by the attacker over time, i.e., detecting if the attacker shows any unexpected
changes in behaviour. In the script, these dynamic constraints can facilitate the
detection of the attacker if the introduction of the IED to the board room causes
sufficient deviations from the normal patterns.
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We evaluate the detection using dynamic security policies by considering dif-
ferent normal patterns of the object. We learn these normal patterns by aggre-
gating the output of the persistent authentication tracker. Figure 36 shows an
example of the movement patterns generated by the occupants of the object. Pat-
terns that deviate from this established norm can be detected by the persistent
authentication system. The deviations can be measured using metrics such as
velocity, access time, density at location, and more.
Figure 36.: Example of the tracks generated in the object
The performance and viability of this approach are determined by the detec-
tion rate in contrast to the number of false positives. This primarily depends
on the rigidity of the detected movement patterns. Thus, for an organisation
with very specific working conditions and a methodical approach, dynamic con-
straints may offer a good detection rate with few false positives. Conversely, in an
organisation with diffuse working conditions the approach may not be suited to
detect insiders, and instead other measures, such as stricter surveillance or tighter
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access control, are needed. In either case, detecting insiders is one of the most
challenging tasks to solve for surveillance applications and ultimately detection
depends on the actions of the attacker and the specific scenario.
Figure 37 shows a few examples of the deviation from normal patters that
were detected in the object. These include (a) groups of people loitering in ac-
cess areas, (b) persons running or making quick dashes to catch an elevator, (c)
impromptu meetings between the personnel, and (d) cleaning personnel moving
furniture at night. These examples help illustrate that deviations can be detected,
but are primarily useful as a warning system, that requests human attention.
Figure 37.: Deviations from normal patters
8.2.1.2 Package
In the second script the attacker is an external supplier, thus no prior information
is known about the attacker’s movement patterns. Instead the persistent authen-
tication system relies on tracking the movement of the supplier to detect any
precursors to an attack. The supplier is authenticated at the front desk by stating
the intent and recipient of the package. The supplier is allowed entry to the pri-
vate interface of the bank on the condition that the delivery goes directly to the
intended recipient through a specific route. Within the persistent authentication
system this is considered a conditional authentication session, i.e., an authentica-
tion session that may be revoked based on the actions or contexts of the principal.
The persistent authentication system monitors the authentication session and if
the conditions are no longer met an alarm can be raised.
Conditional authentication sessions are useful for external personnel or guests
visiting restricted areas, which both pose critical security concerns. This is il-
lustrated by an incident that occurred in the national parliament of Denmark in
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2003. Two members of a grassroots movement entered the parliament under the
guise of visiting a minister. Instead they made their way unchallenged to a for-
eign policy meeting and assaulted the prime minister and the secretary of state
with red paint in frustration over the Danish participation in the Iraq war. With
conditional authentication sessions and the tracking capabilities offered by the
persistent authentication system this behaviour is detectable and actionable.
8.2.2 Behavioural Patterns
In persistent authentication we detect insiders, intruders, and hostile reconnais-
sance by learning the contextual and behavioural patterns generated by the move-
ment and interaction of principals in the environment. We use the state of each
principal and the flow techniques discussed in section 6.1 and section 6.3 to
create aggregated movement patterns of both authenticated and unauthenticated
principals. While we conjecture that attacks are distinguishable from normal pat-
terns in a suitable feature space, we observed no malicious behaviour during the
two week data collection period in the object. Thus, we will in this section in-
stead focus on some of the more benign behavioural patterns we detected and
how these integrate with the operation of the bank branch. In the following we
present our findings and experiences with the system and the tools we have de-
veloped to identify the dynamically changing behavioural patters.
Surveillance systems generate vast quantities of data. This data must first be
processed and then analysed before the prevalent patterns can be identified. Mo-
tivated by this we have developed a dedicated data exploration tool in collabora-
tion with AEDAS that is capable of processing and structuring very large quanti-
ties of data. We integrate the processed data with state of the art data visualisation
tools to present the information in a meaningful way.
The data processing tool is written in Java and presents the user with a top-
down overview of the facility as seen in Figure 38. The tools loads an .dsf for-
matted file that describes the structure and layout of the facility. The tool then
automatically creates partitions, such that each room in the facility is identified
in the model. The tool also takes the camera placements and viewing angles de-
scribed in section 8.1 as an input. Data is loaded in YAML-files, containing state
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information from the persistent authentication prototype in each frame of the
sequence.
The tool is used for data exploration and presents the user with a histogram
of the historic data (second image in Figure 38). At a glance this gives an indi-
cation of the level of occupancy in the facility. Each room in the model can be
selected and the histogram updates to reflect only the chosen partition. Dragging
the slider processes the data in chronological order and allows the user to quickly
examine the data. In addition, the tool provides the option to calculate the den-
sity of occupants in the facility. This is illustrated in the third image in Figure 38
where the heatmap colours indicate either a high or low density. This feature is
useful to detect choke points and areas of interest in the data. The tool is meant
to quickly allow the user to form hypothesises about certain patterns in the data.
Different hypothesises can then be investigated and the data foundation for each
recorded in the tool. The selected data can then be exported for later analysis and
visualisation.
In the following we present our findings from the case study in the object.
In the identified patterns there is a clear correlation between the movement of
principals and the spatial integration of services. Additionally, for the majority
of the patterns there is a strong component of time dependent factors and relation
to specific types of visits, which illustrates that the behavioural patterns contain
strong social structures and vice versa. Specifically we have found:
• Visits to the bank branch consist of a mix of explorative and purposeful
visits, i.e., some visits serve to gather information on contextual factors
such as waiting time, whereas other visits have a clear functional purpose
such as interaction with the branch functions.
• The movement flows are strongly connected with areas that allow for a
good overview of the functions and services provided in the object. These
areas are of further interest as they are prime spots to perform hostile re-
connaissance.
• The sociofugal configuration of the object creates a strong distinction be-
tween accessing or waiting for access to the branch functions and inter-
faces. Thus, dependent on the motive of an attacker, the detected patterns
provide different potential that are located very differently in the object.
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Figure 38.: Data processing tool
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• The patterns generated by the employees of the branch have little effect
on the overall movement flow. However, it has high impact on occupancy,
specifically the degrees of staff presence in different parts of the object.
• The automated interfaces have a stricter relation between occupancy and
movement patterns than the personal interfaces. This is likely due to, on
one hand the service provision time, and on the other the social character
of the personal interface.
We found that many of the visits to the bank serve to survey the current state of
the object. That is, visits with the purpose to see how long the line is to a certain
function, or to see if a personal contact is available. This is pointed out as a devi-
ation from normal behaviour, as it is a common perception that people only enter
organisations, especially banks, to make use of some of their services. Contrary
to this notion, nearly half of the visits to the object exit without interfacing with
personnel or service provision points. An example visualising this behaviour is
shown on Figure 39. The image series show how the movement flow evolves
with the availability of service provision points. The first frame shows the gen-
eral flow for a specific section of the object. In the second frame an additional
personal service point opens, which, in the third frame, creates an increase in the
flow to the area, as people begin to make use of the newly opened service. In the
fourth frame we see a circular pattern in the flow, created by principals who, after
surveying the waiting time to the service point, decide to postpone their visit and
leave the bank.
Another interesting behaviour we found is that tailgating through the access
control points are common amongst all employees. However, it should be noted
most employees know one another and would recognise if a stranger attempted
tailgating. A more serious problem is that certain deliveries leave the doors to
the private interface open when delivering goods. As there is only a single access
control point, this compromises the security of the entire floor. Persistent authen-
tication can be used in both cases to detect if unauthorised principals entered the
restricted area, either through tailgating, forced entry or by slipping in during a
delivery.
Finally, the interaction between the spatial configuration of the object and the
movement patterns of the occupants are analysed. The analysis is visualised by
processing the dataset and recording each unique position, which corresponds
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to the occupancy density for that particular point. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 40. The figure clearly illustrates that some areas have high densities and
that other areas are mostly used as access routes. The areas with high densities
are characterised by the presence of important service points, such as cashiers,
ATMs, and elevators.
The visualisation proves relevant not only for spatial analysis but equally for
understanding where the object’s generic interface reveals pressures at certain
times of the day and how the spatial arrangements become either overloaded
or underused. This can be of vital importance when it comes to evacuation or
emergency situations, or in the identification of choke points and high density
areas, that are prime targets for attacks and reconnaissance.
8.3 S U M M A RY
A test facility has been provided for the partners in the RIBS project in order
to ensure the convergence of the efforts deployed as part of the project. The test
facility represents a generic commercial building located in Europe and is known
as the object. The object is a three story building with multiple service functions
including both public interfaces, private interfaces and back offices. The public
interface concerns the main function of the object, namely, the operation of a
retail bank branch.
In the evaluation the movement patterns and behaviours of the occupants in the
object are explored. We found that depending on the motive of an attacker the
detected patterns provide different potential that are located very differently in
the facility. The scenario-based validation shows how persistent authentication
can help detect insiders by leveraging static security policies and the dynamic
behavioural patterns. These patterns provide important prior information that en-
ables the persistent authentication system to detect deviations in the behaviour
of occupants in the facility. In addition the scenario-based validation shows how
conditional authentication sessions, based on tracking data, can be used to detect
malicious external personnel.
A data processing tool is developed to quickly allow the user to form hypothe-
sises about certain patterns in the data. Different hypothesises can be investigated
and the data foundation extracted. The data integrates with our visualisations,
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Figure 39.: Behavioural patterns in the movement flow
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Figure 40.: Analysis of occupancy density visualised as a hybrid between a heat
map and a 3D bar graph.
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which proves relevant not only for spatial analysis but equally for understanding
where the object’s generic interface reveals pressures at certain times of the day
and how the spatial arrangements become either overloaded or underused.
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Part VI
D I S C U S S I O N

9
C O N C L U S I O N
This thesis presents a novel approach for person authentication in smart environ-
ments that improves the resilience and security of facilities. The main contribu-
tions of the thesis are the (1) development and evaluation of persistent authentica-
tion, (2) introduction of remote biometrics for continuous user authentication, (3)
formulation of error-rate-based fusion of biometric systems, and (4) implemen-
tation of data exploration techniques for identification of contextual elements.
1. Persistent authentication institutes a new approach to authentication that
combines traditional access control systems with the sensing technologies
and tracking capabilities offered by smart environments. Users are tracked
from the point of initial authentication to the point where authorisation
is requested by location-based services. The result is a calm approach
to authentication, where users are transparently authenticated towards the
system. Persistent authentication enables the secure provision of location-
based services and implies a shift in the current authentication paradigm
from a single discrete event to a continuous session.
2. Remote biometrics are introduced to facilitate the continuous authentica-
tion of users, by periodically verifying the identity of each tracked princi-
pal. Facial recognition and appearance analysis are used to form a multi-
factor biometric authentication approach that increases the reliability of au-
thentication and allows the persistent authentication system to re-associate
lost tracking sessions.
3. Error-rate-based fusion is presented as a novel technique to fuse the scores
of multiple biometric systems. In error-rate-based fusion the individual
biometric scores are transformed into objective evidences and fused using
Bayesian inference. This solves a common problem that occurs in sensor
fusion, namely, that the evaluation of multiple biometric characteristics
produce results that are incompatible, due to different score ranges and
different probability distributions.
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4. The contextual and behavioural patterns of the occupants are identified to
facilitate the detection of insiders, intruders, and hostile reconnaissance
by the persistent authentication system. A dedicated tool is developed to
process and structure the very large quantities of data generated by the
surveillance system. The learned patterns are considered in combination
with the spatial configuration of the facility and the correlation between
the service functions provided in the facility and the patterns in movement
are established. The findings are integrated with state of the art data visu-
alisation to present the information in a clear and useful manner.
The persistent authentication prototype is evaluated with regard to the persis-
tence, robustness and scalability to assess the performance in varying environ-
mental conditions, using different smart technologies. The evaluation consists
of a combination of case studies, scenario-based validations and evaluation on
public-domain datasets. The evaluation shows that the persistent authentication
prototype provides good results, even with low quality video data and no prior
information about the principals. More specifically, the persistent authentication
prototype achieves 91.78% accuracy on the Lisbon CAVIAR dataset.
In addition, the data provided by the persistent authentication system enables
the analysis of occupancy density. This analysis reveals a strong correlation be-
tween the movement of occupants and the spatial integration of services in a
facility. This relation shows how the spatial arrangements become either over-
loaded or underused during the day and is of vital importance when it comes
to evacuation or emergency situations. Further, the analysis is important in the
identification of choke points and high density areas, that are prime targets for
attacks and hostile reconnaissance.
Finally, we conclude that persistent authentication offers an effective inte-
grated protection measure that is distributed directly in the facility and is non-
intrusive to the public and affordable to the facility owners. Persistent authentica-
tion is suitable for security sensitive applications and can help protect the facility
against insiders and intruders who seek to cause disruption, terror and other types
of crime.
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9.1 F U T U R E W O R K
The implementation of persistent authentication as part of a protection measure
for counter-terrorism is a truly multi-disciplinary effort, that touches many re-
search areas. As the presence of technology progressively increases to pervade
our urban environments, it is clear that future work lies in pervasive computing,
supported by areas such as computer vision and anomaly detection.
These disciplines are all still young, but with much potential driven by a grow-
ing interest in surveillance applications and the availability of sensors and pro-
cessors at reasonable costs. Further, the increasing maturity of algorithms and
processing techniques makes previously unthinkable problems solvable in real-
time. However, as Szeliski et al. [173] so eloquently state: “It may be many years
before computers can name and outline all of the objects in a photograph with
the same skill as a two year old child.”.
The immediate directions for future work are in testing and evaluating the
persistent authentication prototype on larger datasets with more complex camera
and sensor setups. In addition, the following problems are worth exploring in
future work:
• Including additional biometric characteristics, such as gait analysis or long
range iris recognition. Further, improvements to the accuracy of the imple-
mented biometrics, to help overcome errors caused by inconsistent lighting
or varying poses of the principals.
• Experimenting with different segmentation and feature extraction methods
to improve the reliability of the labelling, especially for crowded scenes.
Also, investigating scene invariant feature extraction and auto calibration
methods for more accurate scene adjustments.
• Integrating recent advancements from the state of the art in person tracking
into the persistent authentication tracker. Further, investigating additional
options for initialising and terminating tracks between multiple cameras.
Finally, persistent authentication provides important functionality that, besides
advanced security applications, are attractive to many other areas. Future applica-
tions could include health care, multimedia and home automation, warehousing
and applications in business intelligence.
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Part VII
A P P E N D I X

A
C O M PA R AT I V E E VA L UAT I O N
For comparative purposes with regard to previous work, we evaluate the accu-
racy of the contextual awareness provided by different smart environments and
the impact of using different sensing technologies. We employ the same met-
rics and test cases as presented by Kirschmeyer et al. [5] in their evaluation of
the original PAISE prototype. The implementation of the prototype is evaluated
on the basis of its persistence, robustness, and scalability in various conditions,
including both expected use, usurpation and malicious behaviour.
A.1 P E R S I S T E N C E
The test of persistence addresses the system’s ability to maintain the functional
requirements of tracking. The tests are devised to evaluate the system’s capacity
to track principals and preserve authentication sessions in scenes with multiple
mobile principals that are interacting with each other and creating occlusions.
The objective of the tracking algorithm is to accurately track principals in all
the tests, meaning that neither interactions between the principals nor occlusions
should affect the system’s performance. The results of the persistence evaluation
is shown in Table 12.
The first three experiments validate that tracking works under normal condi-
tions with no interactions. Experiments 4, 5 and 6 show that the system is able
to handle partial occlusions and interaction between the principals. The last ex-
periment shows the differences between the sensing technologies, as the two
principals are successfully tracked with the time-of-flight camera and not with
the CCTV cameras. The depth information provided by the time-of-flight cam-
eras gives a better segmentation of the scene in cases with heavy occlusions and
allows the system to track both principals. For the CCTV cameras, the image seg-
mentation process is unable distinguish the two principals during the embrace,
and consequently the system needs to rely on the spatio-temporal analysis and
continuous authentication to re-associate the authentication sessions with the cor-
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Table 12.: The results of the persistence evaluation
Test Scenario CCTV TOF
1 Two principals walk in the same
direction.
3 3
2 Two principals walk in opposite
directions.
3 3
3 Two principals cross each other’s paths. 3 3
4 Two principals bump into each other
while walking.
3 3
5 Two principals talk. Minimal occlusion
of one principal.
3 3
6 Two principals shake hands. Moderate
occlusion of one principal.
3 3
7 Two principals embrace each other
warmly. Heavy occlusion of both
principal.
(3) 3
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rect principals. As a result, the success or failure in this case is determined by the
availability of the biometrics or the motion consistency of the scene.
We note that the loss of authentication sessions does not correspond to a secu-
rity vulnerability; it simply requires the principals to re-authenticate before they
can make use of further location-based services.
A.2 RO B U S T N E S S
The test of robustness addresses the system’s ability to function outside the nor-
mal operating conditions. The tests include changes in the illumination of the
scene and change in the velocity and appearance of the principals. The scene
is primarily illuminated with ceiling mounted fluorescent lights. However, large
windows allow direct sunlight to pour in, which can drastically change the illu-
mination of the scene.
Furthermore, the system’s ability to resist malicious attempts of manipulation,
such as usurping the identity of legitimate users or accessing restricted areas
without proper authorisation are evaluated. The results of the robustness tests are
shown in Table 13.
The two first experiments evaluate the system’s ability to preserve authenti-
cation sessions when the illumination of the scene changes, either periodically
during the day, or drastically, for instance caused by direct sunlight or fluores-
cent lights that are turned on/off. These changes affect the background model of
the scene and may cause labelling ambiguities, however the Gaussian Mixture
Model is a dynamic method and is sufficiently adaptive to handle even drastic
changes in the illumination.
Experiment 3, 4 and 5 evaluates the system’s ability to successfully track prin-
cipals despite change in their appearance or velocity. The velocity of principals
greatly impacts the time-of-flight setup, which is unable to track principals that
either move very fast or make quick changes in their direction. The hardware
is simply not fast enough to register the principals in these cases. Conversely,
the CCTV cameras are unaffected by the velocity of the principals, and track
principals in test 4 and 5 without problems.
Experiment 6, 7 and 8 verifies that the authentication and authorisation zones
are correctly defined, such that only a single principal at a time is allowed access
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Table 13.: The results of the robustness evaluation
Test Scenario CCTV TOF
1 The illumination of the scene changes
periodically during the day.
3 3
2 Direct sunlight causes a drastic change
in the illumination of the scene.
3 3
3 A principal changes clothes, causing a
drastic change in appearance.
3 3
4 A principal makes a quick dash forward. 3 7
5 A principal runs at high speed. 3 7
6 Illegitimate access is attempted by an
unauthenticated principal.
3 3
7 An usurper tries to tailgate a legitimate
principal through the authorisation zone.
3 3
8 Two principals try to authenticate at the
authentication zone with only a single
smart-card.
3 3
9 Denial of Service is attempted as a
principal points an infrared light at the
camera.
3 7
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and that the resolution of the sensors is sufficient to determine when multiple
principals are in the zones. Additionally, the experiment verifies that the security
policy protecting the restricted area is correctly enforced by the system.
In the last experiment it is possible for a principal to execute a denial of service
attack on the system by blinding the time-of-flight camera with an infrared light
source. The blinded camera is unable to track principals in the scene and all
current authentication sessions are lost. The CCTV cameras have an infrared cut-
off filter that blocks infrared wavelength, thus most of the effect of the attack is
mitigated. In either case the attacker has to be very close to the cameras, making
the applications of the attack restricted by the placement of the cameras.
The evaluation shows that the robustness of the persistent authentication sys-
tem is high, and that the system is suitable for security sensitive purposes. More-
over, we conjecture that the persistence and robustness can be improved signifi-
cantly by using a multi-modal sensor environment, e.g., by correlating the results
from multiple sensors covering the same scene. Ideally, a multi-model system in-
tegrates the time-of-flight and CCTV solutions, such that the strengths of both
sensor types are utilised.
A.3 S C A L A B I L I T Y
The scalability of the system depends on the prototype’s ability to track and au-
thenticate a large number of principals in an extensive environment. In addition,
the scalability depends on the effort required to install and maintain the system,
i.e., the expenses incurred by a large hardware installation including many sen-
sors, authentication points and similar smart technology. Our experience with
installing and maintaining the system during the case studies and evaluations
suggests that the scalability in this regard is sufficient for even very extensive
environments.
The following experiments test the system’s performance with a varying num-
ber of mobile and stationary principals, moving and queueing in the premise.
Figure 41 shows three examples of the varying number of principals occupying
the scene, in the figure each dot represents a principal and the colour of the dot
indicates if the principal is either moving (red) or static (blue). The results of the
evaluation are summarised in Table 14
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Table 14.: The results of the scalability evaluation
Test Scenario CCTV TOF
1 Low density, with large unoccupied
areas.
3 3
2 Average density, with queues in some
areas and interaction between principals.
3 (3)
3 High density, with many interactions
between mobile principals and compact
queues.
7 7
The tests show that for low population densities, the performance of the sys-
tem with both sensor technologies are good. When queues start to form and the
scene gets crowded, the CCTV solution is still performing satisfactory, whereas,
the time-of-flight solution have difficulties tracking all principals. This is caused
partly by the limitations of the hardware, and partly due to the mounting angle
of the camera, which creates more occlusions of the principals than the ceiling
mounted CCTV cameras.
In the third experiment, the scene is considered very crowded, with queues
in many areas. The time-of-flight solution is unable to distinguish individual
principals due to the many occlusions. The CCTV solution can track moving
principals, but are unable maintaining authentication sessions of principals in
the queues. The segmentation of these principals contain a lot of noise, thus the
labelling used for tracking are ambiguous.
The overall the scalability of the system is considered adequate. Based on
these tests and on our previous experiences with installing the persistent authen-
tication system, we recommend CCTV cameras for any larger installation. The
performance is higher and the cameras are considerably cheaper.
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Figure 41.: The varying number of principals (dots). Low density (top), average
density (middle) and high density (bottom).
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